“Mencius’ Junzi, Aristotle’s Megalopsuchos, & Moral Demands to Help the Global Poor.” Comparative Philosophy 4(1), January 2013.
ABSTRACT
It is commonly believed that impartial utilitarian moral theories have significant demands that we help the global poor, and that the partial virtue ethics of Mencius and Aristotle do not. This ethical partiality found in these virtue ethicists has been criticized, and some have suggested that the partialistic virtue ethics of Mencius and Aristotle are parochial (i.e., overly narrow in their scope of concern). I believe, however, that the ethics of Mencius and Aristotle are both more cosmopolitan than many presume and also are very demanding. In this paper, I argue that the ethical requirements to help the poor and starving are very demanding for the quintessentially virtuous person in Mencius and Aristotle. The ethical demands to help even the global poor are demanding for Mencius’ junzi (君子) and Aristotle’s megalopsuchos. I argue that both the junzi and megalopsuchos have a wide scope of concern for the suffering of poor people. I argue that the relevant virtues of the junzi and megalopsuchos are also achievable for many people. The moral views of Mencius and Aristotle come with strong demands for many of us to work harder to alleviate global poverty.
"The Varieties of Moral Luck in the Ethical and Political Philosophies of Confucius and Aristotle." 孔子与亚里士多德的伦理和政治哲学中的各种道德运气 in Virtue Ethics and Confucianism, Steven Angle and Michael Slote, eds. New York: Routledge, 2013.
ABSTRACT
Moral luck is, I believe, a central concept in the moral and political philosophies of Confucius and Aristotle that are golden means between the extremes of the deficiency of moral luck required by Kant and the excessive moral luck required by utilitarianism. I argue that, for Aristotle and Confucius, since the virtues are required for moral worth, there is moral luck gaining, developing, and exercising the virtues (contra Kant). However, the most important moral luck is not in the long-term consequences that are often outside of one’s control (contra utilitarianism), and there is a powerful, internal stability to morality through the virtues (similar to Kant but contra utilitarianism). Some contemporary philosophers argue that moral luck is not a part of Confucius’ moral view. Contrary to such contemporary philosophers, I argue that the following four forms of moral luck obtain for both Confucius and Aristotle:
1. Luck in acting well without virtue, which can lead to…
2. Luck in the development of virtue, which can lead to…
3. Luck in the expression of virtue in action, which can lead to…
4. Outcome luck in hitting the external targets of virtuous action.
I end by framing Aristotle on moral luck in terms of his discussion of torture on the rack, and I frame Confucius on moral luck in terms of his discussion of his favorite disciple Yan Hui. I argue that, for Aristotle, one may have all four forms of luck and thus be happy by exercising virtue on the rack. Contrary to others, I argue that Confucius’ Yan Hui requires significant moral luck that is similar to the luck needed by Aristotle’s torture victim.
我相信道德运气是孔子和亚里士多德的道德和政治哲学中的一个核心概念。而他们的概念亦是康德所要求的缺乏道德运气，和功利主义所要求的过度道德运气 ， 这 两者极端中的中庸之道。我会说，对于亚里士多德和孔子，的确有道德运气在增加，发展和行使德性（与康德相悖）。然而，最重要的道德运气并不是在长远的影响 中，而长远的影响往往不受人力控制（与功利主义相悖）。但同时有一个强大又内在的稳定性存在于道德当中并贯穿德性，（类似康德但与功利主义相悖）。与当代哲学家相反，我认为孔子与亚里士多德的学说中有以下四种形式的道德运气：
1。无德而行善的运气，这可能导致 ...
2。德性发展的运气，这可能导致 ...
3。付德于行的运气，这可能导致 ...
4。达到外在目标的行为中所具备的外来运气。
结论上，我认为对于亚里士多德来说，人可以同时具备这四种形式的运气，因此即使人在刑具上受刑时仍可以通过行使德性而得到快乐。与其它人相反，我认为颜回所需求的、重要的道德运气，正类似于亚里士多德所说的酷刑受刑者所需的运气。
"Modal Mereology & Modal Supervenience." Philosophical Studies 159(1), 2012: 1-20.
Also available at Springer Online.
ABSTRACT
David Lewis insists that restrictivist composition must be motivated by and occur due to some intuitive desiderata for a relation R among parts that compose wholes, and insists that a restrictivist’s relation R must be vague. Peter van Inwagen agrees. In this paper, I argue that restrictivists need not use such examples of relation R as a criterion for composition, and any restrictivist should reject a number of related mereological theses. This paper critiques Lewis and van Inwagen (and others) on their respective mereological metaphysics, and offers a Golden Mean between their two opposite extremes. I argue for a novel account of mereology I call Modal Mereology that is an alternative to Classical Mereology. A modal mereologist can be a universalist about the possible composition of wholes from parts and a restrictivist about the actual composition of wholes from parts. I argue that puzzles facing Modal Mereology (e.g., puzzles concerning Cambridge changes and the Problem of the Many, and how to demarcate the actual from the possible) are also faced in similar forms by classical universalists. On my account, restricted composition is rather motivated by and occurs due to a possible whole’s instantiating an actual type. Universalists commonly believe in such types and defend their existence from objections and puzzles. The Modal Mereological restrictivist can similarly defend the existence of such types (adding that such types are the only wholes) from similar objections and puzzles.
"Kant’s Theory of Right as Aristotelian Phronesis." International Philosophical Quarterly 52(2), June 2012: 227-246.
Also available at the Philosophy Documentation Center.
ABSTRACT
Many philosophers believe a moral theory, given all the relevant facts, should itself determine what is morally right and wrong. It is commonly argued that Aristotle’s ethical theory suffers from a fatal flaw: it is the virtuous agent with phronesis, and not Aristotle’s ethical theory, that determines right and wrong. It is also commonly argued that Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory does give a theory of right that determines right and wrong. I argue, however, that Kant never gives a determinate theory of right. Rather, I argue that Kant’s moral theory is similar to Aristotle’s in that a moral agent with phronesis, rather than the theory, determines what is right. Kant’s practical philosophy was not meant to tell us right and wrong. Rather, it was meant to prevent bad moral theory from corrupting our moral common sense that simply determines right and wrong naturally.
"Maximality, Duplication, and Intrinsic Value." Ratio Vol. 24 No .3, September 2011, p. 311–325.
Also available at the Wiley Online Library.
ABSTRACT
In this paper, argue for the thesis that ‘maximality is extrinsic’ and that moral properties are extrinsic properties (contrary to classical ethical supervenience). Theodore Sider has a number of arguments that depend on his own simple argument that maximality is extrinsic. However, Peter van Inwagen has an argument that can be used to defend the thesis that maximality is intrinsic, and thus I argue that Sider’s simple argument fails. However, there is a more complex, sophisticated argument that maximality is extrinsic. I then argue that moral properties are extrinsic properties. Two physically identical things can have different moral properties in a physical world. This argument is a counterexample to a classical ethical supervenience idea (often attributed to G.E. Moore) that if there is identity of physical properties in a physical world, then there is also identity in moral properties as well. I argue moral value is ‘border sensitive’ and extrinsic for Kantians, Utilitarians, and Aristotelians.
"Teleology, Aristotelian Virtue, and Right" in Ethics: The Big Questions, James P Sterba, ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd ed, 2009, p. 409-419.
ABSTRACT
It has been claimed among contemporary philosophers that Aristotelian virtue ethics cannot possibly determine what is right - especially when imperfect agents are in a situation in which a completely virtuous agent could not be. This objection presupposes a conception of virtue which precludes the possibility of an imperfect agent's acting virtuously. I argue, however, that this conception of virtue is un-Aristotelian and un-teleological. In this paper, I develop a teleological, Aristotelian conception of virtue that can avoid this commonplace objection to virtue ethics.
"Review of Jens Timmermann's Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary" in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (4).
ABSTRACT
Jens Timmermann's book is an important commentary on what is probably Kant's most read and taught book. After reading my review of the book, purchase a copy of Timmermann's book ASAP!
Walsh, Sean and Shrader-Frechette, Kristin, “Environmental Justice and Procedural Safeguards: Ethics of Environmental Restoration.” Arizona Law Review (Summer 2000) 42(2): 525-540.
ABSTRACT
Several decades ago, Nathan Hare, editor of The Black Scholar and author of The Black Anglo-Saxons, wrote that the interests of environmentalists and blacks "stand in contradiction to each other." In this paper, we address Hare's concerns and focus on environmental justice. In focusing on environmental justice as an element of environmental restoration, this Article first reviews the emergence of environmental justice problems and the executive order designed to address them. Next, using the environmental impact study prepared for continued operations of the Los Alamos National Laboratory as a case study, this Article argues that the executive order has not succeeded in focusing the needed attention on environmental justice issues. As a consequence, although the United States has legal prohibitions against environmental injustice, these prohibitions have had little practical effect. Moreover, this Article argues that the Los Alamos case is typical. Because there is no one to watch the watchers, federal regulatory agencies have not acted to ensure environmental justice. Finally, this Article argues that, to solve the problem caused by a lack of meaningful oversight, the United States needs a system of adversary assessment and procedural safeguards.
"Aristotle on Friendship after Death" (Revise and Resubmit)
ABSTRACT
Aristotle infamously suggests that the fortunes that affect family and friends can affect a deceased person. Contrary to contemporary interpreters, I argue that Aristotle’s philosophy of friendship as shared activity demands that virtuous activity itself lasts even after death, because the shared activity is more stable (bebaiotes) and continuous (suneches) through the shared life (koinonia) of friendship (philia). I use my interpretation to solve some problems in the philosophy of death.
"Contemplation in the Moral Life for Confucius and Aristotle" (Forthcoming)
Also available at the Springerlink Journal Website.
ABSTRACT
Aristotle’s best human life is attained through theoretical contemplation, and Confucius’s is attained through practical cultivation of the social self. However, I argue that in the best human life for both Confucius and Aristotle, a form of theoretical contemplation must occur and can only occur with an ethical commitment to community life. Confucius, like Aristotle, sees that the best contemplation comes after later-life, greater-learning and is central to ethical and community life. Aristotle, like Confucius, sees the best contemplation as presupposing full ethical commitment to community life. So, I argue for the theses that:
(a) On Aristotle’s view, the best human contemplation requires one be fully morally good, and
(b) On Confucius’s view, to be fully morally good requires the best human contemplation.
(c) Being fully morally good for both requires commitment to the good of others and the community.
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"The Vagueness of Ethics and Epistemicism about Vagueness" (Under Review)
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, I argue that a variety of ethical theories and principles are vague, including those of Kantian, Utilitarian, and Aristotelian ethics. If vague terms are indispensable to an ethical theory (and they often are), then ethics is vague according to the ethical theory. On epistemicist accounts of vagueness, all cases of vagueness are merely epistemic, and so moral valence is merely unknown and yet always precisely determined. Second, I argue via dilemma that epistemicist accounts of vagueness exhibit either (a) conceptual relativism, and thus has unpalatable ethical implications like cultural relativism, or (b) implausible metaphysically extravagance. I argue for the first horn of the dilemma via another dilemma: either (i) ethical terms are vague like ‘bald’ is vague for Timothy Williamson or (ii) ethical terms are vague like natural kinds such as ‘human species’ are vague for Richard Boyd (and either way, conceptual relativism holds for epistemicists). In the end, I suggest that epistemicism is false, and that we should accept that the border between ethical right and wrong is sometimes imprecise and inexact (as Aristotle famously suggests).
"Vagueness in Abilities Options & Utilities"(Under Review)
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I argue that options, but not abilities, satisfy the ‘Simple Conditional Analysis’ of counterfactuals. One has the option to do X if one both (a) has the ability to do X and (b) meets certain other ‘move forward conditions’ that overcome any finks, masks, etc., and allows one to exercise one’s relevant abilities. Having the option to do X implies one has the ability to do X, but not vice versa. I also argue for the following six theses:
1. It is often metaphysically vague what a given agent is able to do, and thus...
2. It is often metaphysically vague what options an agent has, and thus…
3. It is often metaphysically vague for a given option whether there are better options, and thus…
4. It is often metaphysically vague what, on utilitarianism, the rightness status for many options is, since it is vague what is indeed the maximal option, and…
5. The epistemicist alternative to metaphysical vagueness (e.g., Timothy Williamson’s) lacks motivation in this domain, and leads to right and wrong becoming unstable and subject to Cambridge Change.
6. Semantic vagueness solutions does not help in this domain.
"Metaphysical Indeterminacy of Compatibilist Counterfactuals in Consequentialist Theories of Right" (2011 Pacific APA Symposium Presentation, with Holly M. Smith, Jussi Suikkanen, & Jean-Paul Vessel)
ABSTRACT
This paper is about a purely metaphysical issue. Many consequentialists claim that it is a virtue of their view that there is always a determinate metaphysical fact about which of our options would maximize utility, even if we do not always know which of those options it is. In this paper I challenge this metaphysical claim. I argue that on standard variants of David Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals, there could be no such metaphysical facts about what maximizes utility in deterministic worlds. On Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals, I argue, the ‘similarity of worlds’ relation is too coarse-grained (imprecise and vague) to allow for such metaphysical facts. While many coarse-grained counterfactuals are determinately true, the counterfactuals needed by many consequentialist theories of right are too fine-grained to be determinately true. Lewis’s own way of precisifying coarse-grained counterfactuals using ‘interest’ is relativistic in a way that is unacceptable for most consequentialists, who wish to avoid ethical relativism. Thus, I argue that many consequentialists face a dilemma: they must either (i) reject the standard Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, or (ii) reject the standard consequentialist idea that options (such as actions, rules, dispositions, etc.) can have maximal (or relatively high) utility as a metaphysically objective matter of fact.
"Relativism and Metaphysical Vagueness in Alternate Outcomes for the Utilitarian Theory of Right" (Under Review)
ABSTRACT
Many utilitarians argue that their normative ethical theory is superior to others because it, as a matter of (metaphysical) fact, precisely determines right and wrong. While we might not ever know what option has maximal utility, there always is such an option. In this paper I argue that this is not the case, because it is metaphysically vague what the outcomes of alternative options are. On David Lewis’ standard possible world semantics, there is no such a thing as ‘the outcome’ for an alternative option, because the ‘similarity of worlds’ relation is vague. There is also no metaphysically precise expected utility for alternative options. Timothy Williamson argues that vagueness is always merely epistemic, and vague terms are always metaphysically precise (and thus while utility might not be known, there is a precise fact of the matter what the utility is). Moreover, Lewis (successfully) argues that human interest is needed to precisify the relevant possible world semantics for the ‘similarity of worlds’ relation. Thus, utilitarianism is not only necessarily vague for deterministic worlds like our own, but is also necessarily relativistic (like cultural relativism).
IP Neuringer, S Walsh, R Mannon, S Gabriel, and RM Aris, “Enhanced T-Cell Cytokine Gene Expression in Obliterative Bronchiolitis.” Transplantation (2000) 69: 399-405.
ABSTRACT
Background. Obliterative bronchiolitis (OB), chronic allograft rejection of the lung, is a major cause of morbidity and mortality after lung transplantation. Previous studies of the trachea in chronic airway rejection have shown a T cell infiltrate composed of CD4+ and CD8+ T cells. The goal of these experiments was to characterize the pattern of T lymphocyte cytokines during chronic airway rejection.
Methods. Isografts (BALB/c into BALB/c) and allografts (BALB/c into C57BL/6) were implanted into cyclosporin-treated animals and harvested 2, 4, 6, and 10 weeks posttransplant. Cytokine mRNA expression in these grafts was determined using reverse transcription polymerase chain reactions. Expression of Th1 cytokines, interleukin- (IL) 2 and γ-interferon, and Th2 cytokines, IL-4, and IL-10 were analyzed, as well as the cytotoxic lymphocyte product granzyme B and expressed relative to β-actin gene expression.
Results. In allografts, expression of IL-2 (P =0.002), γ-interferon (P =2×10-6), granzyme B (P =0.003), IL-4 (P =0.06), and IL-10 (P =8×10-6) were 2- to 10-fold higher compared to isografts throughout the time-course of graft injury. Th1 and cytotoxic lymphocyte gene expression were increased to a greater extent than Th2 cytokines in allografts compared with isografts, and both Th1 and Th2 cytokine gene expression persisted at 6-10 weeks.
Conclusions. These data suggest that Th1, Th2, and cytotoxic lymphocyte subtypes all contribute to the development of obliterative bronchiolitis in the heterotopic mouse trachea model. Efforts to reduce the development of obliterative bronchiolitis may require the antagonism of multiple T cell pathways.
RM Aris, S Walsh, W Chalermskulrat, VS Hathwar, and IP Neuringer, “Growth Factor Upregulation during Obliterative Bronchiolitis.” (see my pretty picture on the cover) American Journal of Respiratory Critical Care (2000) 166(3): 417-422.
ABSTRACT
Obliterative bronchiolitis (OB), or chronic allograft rejection, is a major cause of morbidity and mortality after lung transplantation. The goal of these experiments was to determine whether several important growth factors were upregulated during OB in the mouse heterotopic trachea model. Isografts (BALB/c into BALB/c) and allografts (BALB/c into C57BL/6) were implanted in three sets of cyclosporine-treated animals and were harvested from 2 to 10 weeks. Ribonucleic acid was isolated using the cesium chloride-guanidine method and was reverse transcribed and semiquantitated with the polymerase chain reaction using specific primers for platelet-derived growth factor (PDGF)-A and PDGF-B chains, fibroblast growth factor (FGF) isoforms 1 and 2, transforming growth factor-beta, tumor necrosis factor-alpha (TNF-alpha), edothelin-1, (prepro) epidermal growth factor, insulin-like growth factor-1, and beta-actin as a control. Transforming growth factor-beta, TNF-alpha, endothelin-1, and insulin-like growth factor-1 expression were increased 1.5-fold to 5.0-fold (p < or = 0.04 for each) in the allografts compared with the isografts at Weeks 2 through 6. Significantly increased expression of FGF-1, FGF-2, and PDGF-B was noted in the allografts at 4 weeks (p < 0.05 for each), which reversed at 6 and 10 weeks. No differences were found with the PDGF-A chain. The isografts expressed more epidermal growth factor than allografts (p < 0.001). Treatment with a TNF-alpha-soluble receptor (human TNFR:Fc) significantly reduced epithelial injury (p = 0.01) and lumenal obstruction (p = 0.037) in this model. We conclude that increased expression of a large number of growth factors occurs during OB in this model. Growth factor blockade (in particular with regard to TNF-alpha) may be useful in ameliorating OB in this model.