RESEARCH

Summary: Despite a remarkable convergence in the economic roles of men and women, the labour market gender gaps (e.g., gender wage gap) have been a persistent phenomenon in most countries. Canada has one of the biggest gender wage gaps among 43 OECD developed countries. This gap narrowed down in the period between the 1970s and early 1990s, then plateaued around 20% since. The factors used to explain the gender gap have lost their significance e.g., women are now more educated than men. Moreover, about two­ thirds of this persistent plateaued gender gap remains unexplained i.e., women and men are paid differently even when they have similar education, work experience, and work in the same occupation and similar types of firms. One possible cause of gender inequality in payment is motherhood known as child penalty that can occur through labour supply and demand channels. The mechanisms of the negative effect of children on women’s earnings are not limited to after childbirth. On the supply side of the labour market, even before childbirth women may choose family ­friendly but lower paying jobs. On the demand side of the labour market, the prospect of childbirth could incline firms to consider female workers with weaker job attachment which results in lower wages offer. While parental benefit policies as a remedy to child penalty enabled women to combine careers and motherhood, they were not successful to close the gender gap in labour market outcomes. In this study, I focus on fertility and parental leave decisions as an explanation for the remaining gender pay gap in Canada. This research has two primary objectives: (1) to evaluate the mechanisms underlying households’ and firms’ decisions by taking into account their interactive effects (2) to design labour and family policies that can target the gender issue at its sources. I quantify both labour supply and demand channels and interactive effects to provide a better understanding of what causes the child penalty in Canada. Extending recent studies, this research project shed light on the sources of the gender gap on both sides of the labour market, and highlight the interactive effects. The mechanisms that are studied in this paper provide directions on policy design. I evaluate several counterfactual family and labour policies. 

We investigate how fathers influence their daughters' decisions to pursue a STEM major in college in Iran, where societal pressures and government regulations are strongly against women pursuing careers in male-dominated fields. Using data from the Iranian Labor Force Survey, we find that having a brother significantly reduces the probability of females selecting a STEM major by 5-7 percentage points when their fathers are employed in a STEM occupation. This effect remains robust after accounting for the mother's education, birth order, and the presence of an older brother, suggesting that the observed relationship is driven by shifts in female college major preferences rather than changes in ability. Results remained unchanged when a recent policy that imposed a gender quota was used to address the endogeneity problem. Findings underscore the critical role of family structure in shaping educational choices and contribute to understanding the persistent gender gap in STEM fields.

Summary: In addition to a reduction in overall birth rates in Canada, highly educated and high earning women are also having fewer children because of their higher opportunity costs. Starting July 2016 the Universal Child Care Benefit has been replaced by Canada Child Benefit policy in which the benefit depends on the number of children and adjusted family net income such as high earning women will receive less child benefit. I structurally estimate a model for fertility and combine the model with the exogenous variation caused by 2016 Canada Child Benefit policy to investigate the effects of alternative child benefit policies. The goal is to create a model which allows policy-makers to identify different type of women and design specific interventions to efficiently target them.

Summary: The risk of becoming unemployed and losing earnings is a major source of income uncertainty and welfare loss. Although the positive effects of unemployment insurance (UI) policies on individuals’ welfare are well-known, the optimal design of UI is a hotly debated issue as there is an insurance-incentive tradeoff. In this study, we evaluate the mechanisms underlying claimants’ labour supply decisions visàvis the incentives implicitly embedded into the claim rules of UI programs. In addition, we provide guidance on the design of more efficient UI programs by considering their welfare effects. We rely on variations in the rules of Canada’s Working While on Claim (WWC) to conduct the study. WWC allows a claimant to earn money by working up to a threshold of earnings, above which their UI benefits begin to be deducted dollar for dollar. Between 2005 and 2016, the government tested several rule changes regarding the earnings threshold to assess whether different rules on claims can encourage claimants to work more while on the program. We evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the WWC program. The result of this analysis provides directions on designing effective policies that can simultaneously reduce the welfare loss of unemployment and increase labour supply and earnings of claimants. We will give specific recommendations to set the level of the exemption threshold, and the rate at which benefits are reduced in order to achieve a particular policy goal.

 Summary: Despite growing attention to health equality on national and global policy agendas, few countries have successfully reduced health inequalities. This study examines the effectiveness of two key policies—cash transfer programs and health insurance—on health inequality. These policies influence household decisions through different mechanisms. Cash transfers provide households with greater flexibility to allocate funds according to their specific needs, but targeting these programs can be challenging. For example, younger recipients may choose to invest the money elsewhere. In contrast, health insurance does not offer direct cash benefits; instead, it provides access to health services either for free or at a reduced cost, encouraging individuals to utilize services they might otherwise forgo. However, this approach limits personal choice. The overall impact of these policies also depends on how they affect prices and the income elasticity of health spending.