Publications
Socially responsible lobbying (with Sara Yi Zheng) International Journal of Industrial Organization 103, December 2025, 103187. [full text]
Our paper analyzes lobbying contests in which firms can enhance their competitiveness in the eyes of a decision-maker and stakeholders through both traditional lobbying (e.g., political contributions and information campaigns) and responsible lobbying (e.g., sustainability programs and consumer advocacy). We establish that increasing demand for various Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) investments can incentivize firms to shift from traditional to responsible lobbying. Harnessing CSR for lobbying purposes obfuscates firm comparisons for the decision-maker and stakeholders, thereby reducing the intensity of lobbying competition and lowering equilibrium lobbying expenditures. This reallocation is generally welfare-improving and could occur even when traditional lobbying is somewhat more cost-efficient than responsible lobbying. Our results suggest that a transition to responsible lobbying—a "pro-consumer lobbying agenda"—can represent a move toward a more efficient lobbying standard.
Heterogeneous price technologies (single-authored) Journal of Industrial Economics 73, June 2025, 316-332). [full text]
We present a unified theory of dynamic oligopoly pricing with heterogeneous information technologies on each side of the market. Trackers (on the firm-side) and shoppers (on the consumer-side) can follow market prices costlessly, whereas non-trackers and non-shoppers cannot. We describe both non-collusive and collusive equilibria. While the effects of tracking may be non-monotone, the presence of trackers generally harms consumers. The price pattern that arises with trackers and non-trackers reconciles a multitude of cross-sectional price patterns, such as persistent price differences and adherence to or avoidance of certain prices. We find that non-trackers can counter tracker collusion by applying a limit-price strategy.
Prediction algorithms in matching platforms (with Vaiva Petrikaite) Economic Theory 78, April 2024, 979–1020. [full text]
We follow the future trajectory of more targeted wage formation in labor matching platforms, such as freelancing, crowd-sourcing, home-delivery, and ride-hailing, where local job search is coordinated by improving prediction algorithms. A labor matching platform is modelled as a directed search and matching market. We observe that targeted wage setting promotes efficient matching and longer employment spells. However, because a higher employment rate accentuates any disparities between available workers and vacancies, the effects of targeted wage setting on firm competition depend on prevailing market tightness. The impact of targeted wage formation on workers is positive when the vacancy-to-worker ratio is intermediate but turns negative at both extremes. Our results suggest that targeted wage setting may benefit occasional workers while potentially posing drawbacks for full-time platform workers.
Multiproduct search obfuscation (single-authored). International Journal of Industrial Organization 85, December 2022, 102863. [full text]
We introduce a new price competition model of search for a single product among multiproduct firms. Search order is optimal within and across firms. Consumers have limited time and require a random time to sample a product. Different search outcomes lead to price dispersion. We describe a symmetric mixed equilibrium where multiproduct firms provide discounted prices on some products and expensive prices on the other. Compared to single-product oligopolies, this strategy alleviates competition by (i) engaging consumers in searching more within (less across) firms and (ii) enabling more refined price discrimination.
Competitive search obfuscation (single-authored). Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 97, December 2018, 38-63. [full text]
“Obfuscation” is a literature term referring to various sales practices which increase the costs that consumers pay for searching. How does competition shape it? How does it shape competition? To address these questions, we develop a model where each firm can freely commit to any observable degree of search obfuscation, which pins down the time cost of searching its product. Consumers have limited time for browsing around websites. This endogenizes consumer information and competition intensity and gives clear predictions about market welfare and surplus division. We find that competition for prominence and the fear of frustrating consumers keeps the negative welfare effects of obfuscation low. However, because obfuscation reduces price awareness and differentiation relaxes price competition, the obfuscation choices in the unique equilibrium are positive and different.
Working papers
(In)efficient OTC screening (single-authored).
Consider an over-the-counter market with adverse selection, negligible trade frictions, and substantial asset information. When is market performance driven by informed trading-suggesting efficiency-and when by adverse selection and market frictions-propagating inefficiency? We show that the answer hinges on assets' equilibrium screening intensities-the time cost of trading a given type of asset at a high price--which determine the effective friction from adverse selection.
We establish new efficiency results for decentralized markets with quality uncertainty by characterizing equilibrium screening as trading frictions vanish: i. an efficient limit equilibrium exists under broad conditions, associated with lenient screening; but ii. inefficiency can persist despite arbitrarily informative signals, corresponding to excessive screening. As screening intensities are observable from transaction data, our analysis lends itself to future econometric investigation.
Work in progress
To be updated.
My take on academic bean counting [pdf]