Research

Working Papers:

"Profit-Driven Media Bias" (under review) Manuscript; Online Appendix; Codes.

(Formerly circulated under the title: "Media Bias, Political Polarization, and the Merits of Fairness")

Abstract. We present a model of the market for news with rational consumers and profit-maximizing media outlets in which media bias arises endogenously in equilibrium. Our model relaxes assumptions commonly made in the literature that restrict the number of signals a media outlet can communicate to its consumers and the number of news sources accessible by the latter. This leads to novel behavioral implications on the part of the consumers and new insights into how media bias depends on the industrial organization of the market for news and the effects of government imposed fairness standards that restrict the degree of bias of individual news sources. Our model is consistent with findings by recent empirical studies that establish relationships between media bias, consumer ideology, and news consumption patterns. It also provides an explanation for documented historical variation in media bias in the U.S. market that is based on changes in the news consumption costs and the intensity of competition. Our policy analysis demonstrates the perverse effects government imposed fairness standards may have when media outlets are profit-maximizing. Specifically, such policies can lead to Pareto inferior outcomes for consumers and can cause some consumers to consume overall more biased bundles of news reports.

"Corruption and Public Goods Provision under Authoritarian Regimes" Manuscript.

Abstract. We consider a model in which the elite governing a country can either spend tax revenues on public goods or simply misappropriate it. Public goods provision complements the citizens' private consumption and is used as an instrument for redistribution. The elite make the policy choice with the knowledge that they will face a rebellion, in which event the citizens each choose whether or not to rebel against the elite. We are able to select a unique equilibrium, in which the citizens are less likely to join the rebellion if they enjoy higher consumption under the current regime. We show that, after weighing the immediate gain from corruption against the increased risks of being overthrown, the elite's misappropriation of public funds is strictly increasing in its strength. However, public goods provision is non-monotonic in the elite's strength, in particular, an elite with a medium level of strength spends the most on public goods.

"Games with or without Unawareness" Manuscript.

Abstract. This paper argues that the behavioral predictions of the unawareness model developed by Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2007) can be replicated by standard models with properly defined state spaces and belief structures. This is achieved essentially by allowing individuals to hold false beliefs and no other assumptions made in the standard rational model need to be relaxed. Moreover, the model proposed is truly standard and admits a standard, unawareness-free interpretation.

Work in Procrastination:

"Inductive Learning Organized by Theories"

"Persuasion by Theories"

"Charitable Giving as a Mechanism Design Problem"

"A Model of Learning by ’simple minded’ Decision Makers"

"Status, Envy, and Redistributive Politics"

"Spreading Rumors"

"Confidence, Hesitation, and the Ellsberg Paradox"

Publications:

"Private and Public Incentives for Mergers in the Face of Foreign Entry" (with Martin Richardson) Review of Development Economics, August 2010, 14(3): 520-532