Research

Publications:

Press Coverage: CNS, KPBS

*- SDSU MA Student

          Press coverage: Economist Magazine, October 2011, Krebs on Security, July 2011


Working Papers:


Agricultural productivity and deforestation with Teevrat Garg, Yao Pan, and Saurabh Singhal 

[Previously circulated as "Agriculture and deforestation"]

Improving agricultural productivity is vital to anti-poverty and food security goals but can have ecological ramifications. Increasing the relative value of agricultural land may spur deforestation, but factor market constraints paired with improvements in existing land productivity may reduce the demand for clearing forests for agriculture. Leveraging the discontinuity in eligibility for a large agricultural training program, we find that the program reduced deforestation by 14%. The program increased adoption of promoted practices such as manure-use and crop rotation driving higher productivity but no increase in cultivated area. Median estimates suggest that carbon savings alone cover 15% of program costs.


Electoral Accountability, Blacklisting, and Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon     

Local political authority (formal or informal) over natural resources may create rents for politicians. The political decision to use or allocate resources involves balancing private rents with reelection prospects. I examine the case of deforestation in Brazil and a presidential decree granting the federal government the authority to punish counties that failed to limit total deforestation within their borders. This collective punishment aimed to generate pressure on local politicians to slow deforestation. Using binding term limits as a source of variation in reelection eligibility, I find eligibility has no effect on deforestation prior to the decree. After the decree, reelection eligible mayors reduced annual deforestation 10% more than mayors ineligible for reelection. These findings are consistent with the equilibrium outcome of a lobbying model. Policies such as sanctions, which target the electorate in order to influence political behavior, may be less effective when politicians are not accountable to voters.



Trade, Emissions, and Environmental Spillovers: Issue linkages in Regional Trade Agreements with  Clark Lundberg and Dan Szmurlo

[World Bank Group - Policy Research Working Paper 10319]

Reducing trade barriers offers tremendous potential for economic growth and productivity gains.  However, higher incomes and increased industrial output can negatively impact the environment. We study the impacts of trade liberalization on the emissions of ozone-depleting substances controlled under the Montreal Protocol. While freer trade might challenge the gains achieved by the Montreal Protocol by increasing domestic use of CFC and other ozone-depleting substances, environmental provisions in regional trade agreements (RTAs) linked to Montreal Protocol participation might mitigate such negative environmental outcomes. We provide causal evidence that signature of new RTAs leads to increases in ODS consumption relative to Montreal Protocol targets. Environmental provisions aimed at controlling ozone-depleting substances offset the increase in ODS consumption observed in RTAs without such provisions. We find that the effect is rooted in preventing a ``reduction in overcompliance" to the Montreal Protocol observed in RTAs without provisions


Child Labor Standards in Regional Trade Agreements: Theory and Evidence with Clark Lundberg, Michele Ruta, and John McLaren

[NBER Working Paper #30908] [World Bank Group - Policy Research Working Paper 10331]

We study the impact of child labor standards in regional trade agreements (RTAs) on a variety of child labor market outcomes, including employment, education, and household inequality. We develop a stylized general equilibrium model of child labor in an economy open to international trade and consider the impact of RTAs with and without child labor bans. We empirically investigate the effects of these clauses in trade agreements in a broad international panel of 101 developing countries using harmonized survey microdata. Exploiting quasi-experimental methods to obtain plausibly causal estimates, we find that RTAs without child-labor bans lead to reductions in child employment and increases in school enrollment, particularly for older children aged 14-17. Child labor bans in RTAs perversely increase child employment among 14-17 year-olds and decrease school enrollment. These effects appear to decrease inter-household income inequality through increased child earnings. Our findings are consistent with theoretical predictions from our model and the literature on child labor bans.


The limits of cross-border environmental policies: Trade diversion as leakage with Hattie Jenkins** and Clark Lundberg

Global environmental externalities are one of the most pressing policy challenges of the modern era. Unilateral policy options to address global externalities are limited, however, by sovereignty and a general difficulty in achieving environmental objectives across national borders. We study an emerging trade policy tool used in cross-border environmental policies-environmental standards for imports-using a European Union program aimed at mitigating illegal timber harvest in tropical timber exporting countries. Through bilateral agreements with partner countries, the program established de facto import restrictions through supply chain transparency and certification requirements on forest-products. We find that the policy led to a diversion of partner country exports away from the EU towards other markets, particularly in Asia, and had no discernible reductions on forest loss. Our findings highlight the role that trade diversion can play as a leakage mechanism in such cross-border environmental policies.

 **- SDSU Undergraduate


The Dynamics of Weather, Yields, and Deforestation: Evidence from Soy in the Brazilian Amazon with Drew Behnke and Sam Heft-Neal 

This paper studies the relationship between agricultural productivity and deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Using annual variation in growing-season temperature, we demonstrate that increased soy yields lead to greater land in agriculture and ultimately more deforestation. We find a delayed effect between the increase in planted area and deforestation consistent with patterns of indirect land-use change documented in the literature. Our findings suggest there may be negative environmental spillovers from policies that increase productivity for highly developed agricultural industry in the tropics. 

Selected Works in Progress:

Local democratic transitions and deforestation in Indonesia with Clark Lundberg