Research
Publications
"Analyzing the Aftermath of a Compensation Reduction," Management Science, 2021.
Ever wonder what happens when nominal wages drop? So did we! Coauthored with Jason Sandvik, Nathan Seegert, and Christopher Stanton.
Press (links):
How Higher Wages Can Increase Profits (WSJ, 01/21/21)
What is the Best Way to Survive a Downturn?(6/7/18)
“Allocating Non-Monetary Resources,” Management Science, 2021.
Unlike capital, having some consultants around is helpful, having too many is counter-productive. In this paper, we explore how best to allocate resources carrying positive disposal costs. Coauthored with Stanley Baiman (Wharton), and Mirko Heinle (Wharton).
“Workplace Knowledge Flows,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2020.
What would happen if instead of providing explicit incentives, a firm instead paired its employees and invited them to discuss work face-to-face and over lunch? (Spoiler alert: significant gains). Coauthored with Jason Sandvik (Tulane), Nathan Seegert (Utah), and Christopher Stanton (Harvard). Awarded the 2019 Sumantra Ghoshal Research and Practice Award by the Academy of Management.
Press (links):
How Virtual Teams Can Better Share Knowledge (Harvard Business Review 11/02/20),
BroadX Five-minute highlight reel (MSUToday 02/19/20)
"Implications of biased reporting: conservative and liberal accounting policies in oligopolies,” Review of Accounting Studies, March 2016.
We examine the effects of biased (conservative or liberal) reporting on product market competition. Cournot duopolists observe either firm-specific or industry-wide shocks and provide noisy reports subject to an exogenous mandated bias attributed to public policy. Coauthored with Jack Hughes (UCLA) and Henry Friedman (UCLA).
“A Theory of Participatory Budgeting,” The Accounting Review, May 2014 (1025-1050).
Complements the ongoing empirical discussion surrounding participative budgeting by analytically comparing its economic merits relative to a top‐down budgeting alternative. Coauthored with Mirko Heinle (Wharton) and Nick Ross (USF).
“Multi-stage Capital Budgeting with Delayed Consumption of Slack,” Management Science, April 2013 (869-891).
Identifies optimal resource allocation policy for staged investments; e.g. venture capital. Justifies empirical evidence of Fortune 500 firms simultaneously over- and under-investing across divisions. Coauthored with Stanley Baiman (Wharton) and Mirko Heinle (Wharton).
“Incentive Compensation and The Choice of Inventory Buffer,” The Accounting Review, 2010 (1839-1861).
Characterizes optimal inventory buffers from an incentive provision perspective. Explains prior reports of productivity drops following JIT implementations. Coauthored with: Stanley Baiman (Wharton) and Serguei Netissine (Wharton).
“The Incentive Value of Inventory and Cross-Training in Modern Manufacturing,” Journal of Accounting Research, 2009 (991-1025).
Details how manufacturers can profitably tie compensation to intermediary inventory levels in multi-agent production settings. Coauthored with: Madhav Rajan (Chicago GSB) and Venky Nagar (Ross).
“Optimal Second Stage Outsourcing,” Management Science, June 2008 (1147-1159).
Values the tradeoffs associated with outsourcing product development down the supply-chain; i.e. improved indemnification versus weakened contracting incentives.
“Resource Allocation Auctions within Firms,” Journal of Accounting Research, 2007 (915-946).
Establishes a framework for auctions to elicit (truthful) estimates of divisional productivity, and optimally allocate scarce resources (e.g., IT services, access to external consultants). Currently in use at HP, the U.S. Navy and IBM. Coauthored with: Stanley Baiman (Wharton), Paul Fischer (Wharton) and Madhav Rajan (Chicago GSB).
“Optimal Information Asymmetry,” The Accounting Review, 2006 (677-713).
Provides evidence linking profits with the delegation of decision making authority to lower level managers. Coauthored with Madhav Rajan (Chicago GSB).