Spillover effects of entry and city development (Revise & Resubmit at the Journal of the European Economic Association)
Consumption amenities -such as restaurants and bars- are important drivers of urban development. This article focuses on the food and beverage service industry in the Netherlands, and investigates to what extent different amenity services generate spillovers on each other. Using a unique dataset on firms’ revenues and the number of market participants, I extend previous entry models and simultaneously estimate a static two-type entry model with revenue equations. The model controls for unobserved characteristics that can be erroneously interpreted as spillovers. It also allows for market expansion effects. I find that for the case of take-out places and bars, spillover effects upon entry are mainly unidirectional. Counterfactual analyses show that taking into account this asymmetry is relevant for both new entrant firms and urban planners.
Click & Collect Entry Regulation in the Grocery Retail Sector (joint with Céline Bonnet, Zohra Bouamra, and Claire Chambolle) - submitted
Click-and-collect (C&C) services have rapidly expanded in the grocery retail sector. In many countries, their adoption supersedes the use of delivery services. In France, the rise of C&C services prompted concerns among policymakers, leading to the implementation of a new entry regulation in 2014. This article examines the impact of this regulation on the openings of C&C warehouses in France. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that the legislation significantly hindered C&C warehouse openings, particularly for the two leading retail chains, and negatively affected their C&C revenue growth. Our analysis also highlights the varying effects of C&C warehouse entries on local market concentration, providing a better understanding of the potential unintended effects of the law on competition.
How Bundling Impacts Firms' Entry Decisions: Evidence from Broadband Internet (joint with Lukasz Grzybowski and Christine Zulehner)
This article analyzes whether fixed-mobile bundling by the incumbent operator limits competition in the broadband industry. Using a unique dataset on the share of consumers subscribed to the incumbent’s quadruple-play services, we estimate a structural entry model that allows us to measure heterogeneous effects on competition. In particular, we find that the incumbent’s bundling mainly affects the entry of small operators. Big competitors, also able to provide fixed-mobile bundles, do not seem to be affected by the incumbents’ bundling.
Firms’ strategic interaction and patent portfolio (previously circulated as Patent portfolio choices: an empirical analysis of the U.S. semiconductor industry)