Publications

With the help of more than 700 reviewers, we assess the reproducibility of nearly 500 articles published in the journal Management Science before and after the introduction of a new Data and Code Disclosure policy in 2019. When considering only articles for which data accessibility and hardware and software requirements were not an obstacle for reviewers, the results of more than 95% of articles under the new disclosure policy could be fully or largely computationally reproduced. However, for 29% of articles, at least part of the data set was not accessible to the reviewer. Considering all articles in our sample reduces the share of reproduced articles to 68%. These figures represent a significant increase compared with the period before the introduction of the disclosure policy, where only 12% of articles voluntarily provided replication materials, of which 55% could be (largely) reproduced. Substantial heterogeneity in reproducibility rates across different fields is mainly driven by differences in data set accessibility. Other reasons for unsuccessful reproduction attempts include missing code, unresolvable code errors, weak or missing documentation, and software and hardware requirements and code complexity. Our findings highlight the importance of journal code and data disclosure policies and suggest potential avenues for enhancing their effectiveness.

Beyond its technological impact, automation also transforms the social context of the workplace by weakening peer effects. We study the often-neglected effects of this transformation on work production. Using experiments in which people complete a sequential task, we show that humans who work with algorithms underperform those who work with other humans, especially when workers are rewarded under team incentives. Our findings stress that firms should account for the weakening of peer effects due to automation when assessing the cost-efficiency of replacing humans with algorithms.


A common rationale for the use of salary contracts is that they can produce substantial incentive effects when coupled with firing threats. However, enforcing firing threats may require close supervision of employees, thus possibly offsetting the very reasons salaries are commonly used, such as lowering monitoring costs and granting autonomy to employees. We design a series of experiments to study the effectiveness of firing threats when only limited information is available to supervisors. We show that light and unobtrusive supervision can produce large incentive effects. Compared to salary contracts, firing threats based on observing organizational performance alone increase employees’ output by 70% whereas only observing how long an employee works doubles output. These findings show that salaries can produce large incentive effects even in the absence of intensive supervision. Finally, we show that salary contracts with firing threats perform at least as well as other popular incentive schemes, such as bonuses, individual and team incentives, that rely on a similar amount of information about employees.

We study several solutions to shirking in teams, each of which triggers social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees are allowed to engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the appeal of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were comparably appealing to a baseline treatment. This suggests that solutions involving social interaction are more likely to be effective in the long‐run than solutions involving monitoring alone.

We study the effect of ambiguity on the formation of bubbles and crashes in experimental asset markets à la Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) by allowing for ambiguity in the fundamental value of the asset. Although bubbles form in both the ambiguous and the risky environments we find that asset prices tend to be lower when the fundamental value is ambiguous than when it is risky. Bubbles do not crash in the ambiguous case whereas they do so in the risky one. These findings, regarding depressed prices and the absence of crashes in the presence of ambiguity, are in line with recent theoretical work stressing the crucial role of ambiguity to account for surprisingly low equity prices (high returns) as well as herding in asset markets.

Even though economic models have typically put forth human capital, measured by standard intelligence tests, as the main driver of economic success, new developments in personality psychology and neuroscience have allowed economists to consider a wider variety of individual predictors. This chapter starts by briefly reviewing the literature on intelligence and work performance and discussing the added value of personality traits such as conscientiousness and grit to explain a person’s career achievements. Recent developments in cognitive psychology and neuroscience are then described as an inspiration for the study of new dimensions of human capital such as reflective skills and emotional intelligence. Even though each of these variables independently capture necessary ingredients for explaining economic success, complementarity effects exist. In particular, possessing high reflective skills along with acute emotional intelligence could grant a decisive comparative advantage. This is especially so because these skills are mostly uncorrelated thus making it rather unique to possess both. Nevertheless, there are examples in which possessing very high levels of these skills might actually be detrimental to the individual and the organization. This suggests our understanding of the individual determinants of economic success might still be incomplete.

Despite its central role in the theory of incentives, empirical evidence of a tradeoff between risk and incentives remains scarce. We reexamine this tradeoff in a workplace lab environment and find that, in line with theory, principals increase fixed pay while lowering performance pay when the relationship between effort and output is noisier. Unexpectedly, agents produce substantially more in the noisy environment than in the baseline despite weaker incentives. Even more surprisingly, principals’ earnings are significantly higher in the noisy environment. We show that these findings can be accounted for when agents maximize a non-CARA utility function or when they exhibit loss aversion.

We study a principal-agent framework in which principals can assign wage-irrelevant goals to agents. We find evidence that, when given the possibility to set wage-irrelevant goals, principals select incentive contracts for which pay is less responsive to agents’ performance. Agents’ performance is higher in the presence of goal setting despite weaker incentives. We develop a principal-agent model with reference-dependent utility that illustrates how labor contracts combining weak monetary incentives and wage-irrelevant goals can be optimal. The pervasive use of non-monetary incentives in the workplace may help account for previous empirical findings suggesting that firms rely on unexpectedly weak monetary incentives.

In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation. 

En este artículo se revisan los principales resultados obtenidos de experimentos que analizan la teoría de los incentivos. El artículo analiza el uso de incentivos tanto monetarios como no monetarios y como estos afectan al nivel de esfuerzo y producción de individuos trabajando de forma aislada y, también, en grupos de trabajo. Además, se discuten algunos de los resultados más recientes obtenidos utilizando un enfoque experimental y futuras líneas de investigación en este área.

Groups make decisions on both the production and the distribution of resources. These decisions typically involve a tension between increasing the total level of group resources (i.e. social efficiency) and distributing these resources among group members (i.e. individuals' relative shares). This is the case because the redistribution process may destroy part of the resources, thus resulting in socially inefficient allocations. Here we apply a dual-process approach to understand the cognitive underpinnings of this fundamental tension. We conducted a set of experiments to examine the extent to which different allocation decisions respond to intuition or deliberation. In a newly developed approach, we assess intuition and deliberation at both the trait level (using the Cognitive Reflection Test, henceforth CRT) and the state level (through the experimental manipulation of response times). To test for robustness, experiments were conducted in two countries: the USA and India. Despite absolute-level differences across countries, in both locations we show that: (i) time pressure and low CRT scores are associated with individuals' concerns for their relative shares and (ii) time delay and high CRT scores are associated with individuals' concerns for social efficiency. These findings demonstrate that deliberation favours social efficiency by overriding individuals' intuitive tendency to focus on relative shares.

Organizations crucially need the creative talent of millennials but are reluctant to hire them because of their supposed lack of diligence. Recent studies have shown that hiring diligent millennials requires selecting those who score high on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and thus rely on effortful thinking rather than intuition. A central question is to assess whether the push for recruiting diligent millennials using criteria such as cognitive reflection can ultimately hamper the recruitment of creative workers. To answer this question, we study the relationship between millennials’ creativity and their performance on fluid intelligence (Raven) and cognitive reflection (CRT) tests. The good news for recruiters is that we report, in line with previous research, evidence of a positive relationship of fluid intelligence, and to a lesser extent cognitive reflection, with convergent creative thinking. In addition, we observe a positive effect of fluid intelligence on originality and elaboration measures of divergent creative thinking. The bad news for recruiters is the inverted U-shape relationship between cognitive reflection and fluency and flexibility measures of divergent creative thinking. This suggests that thinking too much may hinder important dimensions of creative thinking. Diligent and creative workers may thus be a rare find.

This study conducts experiments to determine the modes of communication that are able to produce and sustain collusion and how the efficacy of communication depends on market structure. Two communication treatments are considered: non-binding price announcements and unrestricted written communication. We find that price announcements are conducive to coordinating on a high price but only under duopoly and when firms are symmetric. The standard experimental finding that collusion without communication is rare when there are more than two firms is shown to be robust to allowing firms to make price announcements. When firms are asymmetric, price announcements do result in higher prices but there is little evidence that firms are coordinating their behavior. When firms are allowed to engage in unrestricted written communication, coordination on high prices occurs for all market structures. We find that the incremental value to express communication (compared to price announcements) is greater when firms are asymmetric and there are more firms.

We introduce uncertainty and ambiguity in the standard investment game. In the uncertainty treatment, investors are informed that the return of the investment is drawn from a publicly known distribution function. In the ambiguity treatment, investors are not informed about the distribution function. We find that both trust and trustworthiness are robust to the introduction of these changes.

We present results from two studies that show a positive relation between cognitive reflection and trusting behavior, but no significant relation with trustworthy behavior. Our finding holds regardless of individual distributional social preferences and risk aversion. Our results add to a growing body of literature that illustrates the role of cognitive ability in helping explain outcomes in economic experiments.

The aim of this paper is to test the effectiveness of wage-irrelevant goal-setting policies in a laboratory environment. In our design, managers can assign a goal to their workers by setting a certain level of performance on the work task. We establish our theoretical conjectures by developing a model in which assigned goals act as reference points to workers’ intrinsic motivation. Consistent with our model, we find that managers set goals that are challenging but attainable for a worker of average ability. Workers respond to these goals by increasing effort and performance and by decreasing on-the-job leisure activities with respect to the no-goal-setting baseline. Finally, we study the interaction between goal setting and monetary rewards and find, in line with our theoretical model, that goal setting is most effective when monetary incentives are strong. These results suggest that goal setting may produce intrinsic motivation and increase workers’ performance beyond what is achieved by using solely monetary incentives.

Team incentives have been found to be particularly effective both in the lab and in the field despite the moral hazard in teams problem identified by Holmström (1982). In a newly developed virtual workplace, we show that, in line with Holmström, moral hazard in teams is indeed pervasive. Subsequently, we find strong evidence for the conjecture of Kandel and Lazear (1992) that peer pressure may resolve the moral hazard in teams problem. Organizations equipped with a very weak form of peer monitoring (anonymous and without physical proximity, verbal threats or face-to-face interactions) perform as well as those using individual incentives.

Recent studies have shown that despite crucially needing the creative talent of millennials (people born after 1980) organizations have been reluctant to hire young workers because of their supposed lack of diligence. We propose to help resolve this dilemma by studying the determinants of task performance and shirking behaviors of millennials in a laboratory work environment. We find that cognitive ability is a good predictor of task performance in line with previous literature. In contrast with previous research, personality traits do not consistently predict either task performance or shirking behaviors. Shirking behaviors, as measured by the time participants spent browsing the internet for non-work purposes (Cyberloafing), were only explained by the performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). This finding echoes recent research in cognitive psychology according to which conventional measures of cognitive ability only assess a narrow concept of rational thinking (the algorithmic mind) that fails to capture individuals’ capacity to reflect and control their impulses. Our findings suggest that hiring diligent millennials relies on the use of novel cognitive measures such as CRT in lieu of standard personality and intelligence tests.

Does house money exacerbate price bubbles? We compare house money asset market experiments with an earned money treatment where initial portfolios are constructed from a real effort task. Bubbles occur; however, trading volumes and earnings dispersion are significantly higher with house money. We investigate the role of cognitive ability in accounting for the differences in earnings distribution across treatments by using the cognitive reflection test (CRT). Low CRT subjects earned less than high CRT subjects. Low CRT subjects were net purchasers (sellers) of shares when the price was above (below) fundamental value. The opposite was true for high CRT subjects.

We study the effect of firing threats in a virtual workplace that reproduces features of existing organizations. We show that organizations in which bosses can fire up to one third of their workforce produce twice as much as organizations for which firing is not possible. Firing threats sharply decrease on-the-job leisure. Nevertheless, organizations endowed with firing threats underperformed those using individual incentives. In the presence of firing threats, employees engage in impression management activities to be seen as hard-working individuals in line with our model. Finally, production levels dropped substantially when the threat of being fired was removed, whereas on-the-job leisure surged.

Even though human social behavior has received considerable scientific attention in the last decades, its cognitive underpinnings are still poorly understood. Applying a dual-process framework to the study of social preferences, we show in two studies that individuals with a more reflective/deliberative cognitive style, as measured by scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), are more likely to make choices consistent with “mild” altruism in simple non-strategic decisions. Such choices increase social welfare by increasing the other person's payoff at very low or no cost for the individual. The choices of less reflective individuals (i.e., those who rely more heavily on intuition), on the other hand, are more likely to be associated with either egalitarian or spiteful motives. We also identify a negative link between reflection and choices characterized by “strong” altruism, but this result holds only in Study 2. Moreover, we provide evidence that the relationship between social preferences and CRT scores is not driven by general intelligence. We discuss how our results can reconcile some previous conflicting findings on the cognitive basis of social behavior.

Situations such as an entrepreneur overstating a project's value, or a superior choosing to under or overstate the gains from a project to a subordinate are common and may result in acts of deception. In this paper we modify the standard investment game in the economics literature to study the nature of deception. In this game a trustor (investor) can send a given amount of money to a trustee (or investee). The amount received is multiplied by a certain amount, k, and the investee then decides on how to divide the total amount received. In our modified game the information on the multiplier, k, is known only to the investee and she can send a non-binding message to the investor regarding its value. We find that 66% of the investees send false messages with both under and over, statement being observed. Investors are naive and almost half of them believe the message received. We find greater lying when the distribution of the multiplier is unknown by the investors than when they know the distribution. Further, messages make beliefs about the multiplier more pessimistic when the investors know the distribution of the multiplier, while the opposite is true when they do not know the distribution.

On-the-job leisure is a pervasive feature of the modern workplace. We studied its impact on work performance in a laboratory experiment by either allowing or restricting Internet access. We used a 2 × 2 experimental design in which subjects completing real-effort work tasks could earn cash according to either individual- or team-production incentive schemes. Under team pay, production levels were significantly lower when Internet browsing was available than when it was not. Under individual pay, however, no differences in production levels were observed between the treatment in which Internet was available and the treatment in which it was not. In line with standard incentive theory, individual pay outperformed team pay across all periods of the experiment when Internet browsing was available. This was not the case, however, when Internet browsing was unavailable. These results demonstrate that the integration of on-the-job leisure activities into an experimental labor design is crucial for uncovering incentive effects.

A burgeoning problem facing organizations is the loss of workgroup productivity due to cyberloafing. The current paper examines how changes in the decision-making rights about what workgroup members can do on the job affect cyberloafing and subsequent work productivity. We compare two different types of decision-making regimes: autocratic decision-making and group voting. Using a laboratory experiment to simulate a data-entry organization, we find that, while autocratic decision-making and group voting regimes both curtail cyberloafing (by over 50%), it is only in group voting that there is a substantive improvement (of 38%) in a cyberloafer’s subsequent work performance. Unlike autocratic decision-making, group voting leads to workgroups outperforming the control condition where cyberloafing could not be stopped. Additionally, only in the group voting regime did production levels of cyberloafers and non-loafers converge over time.

Studying collusion in the real world is a daunting task. First, regulators do not have access to the data that is needed. Second, theoretical models are necessarily parsimonious for reasons of tractability and thus have a difficult time capturing the complex behavior of cartels. Policy thus has to be guided by simplistic models that do little justice to the (complex) problem at hand. Finally, theory is unable to explain how different forms of communication affect coordination among firms though can speak to the role of communication in ensuring compliance with respect to a collusive agreement. Using experiments one can study several issues important to collusive behavior that would be impossible to study in the real world.

Gender differences in economic decision making can arise from the supply side (e.g. differences in preferences towards competition, cooperation, or undertaking risks). Second, there are demand side factors such as statistical or preference based discrimination. Third, gender differences may arise due to the impact of the environment or due to inherited biology. The experimental research has shown that various factors contribute. Interestingly, both men and women discriminate against their own gender, males tend to be more competitive and overconfident, and context matters for both genders. Regarding responses to the environment and biology, the evidence indicates that environmental impact is dominant and inherited biological traits may not be determinant.

We study the effect of consultative participation in an experimental principal–agent game, where the principal can consult the agent's preferred option regarding the cost function of the transfer to be implemented in the final stage of the game. We show that consulting the agent was beneficial to principals as long as they followed the agent's choice. Ignoring the agent's choice was detrimental to the principal because it engendered negative emotions and low levels of transfers. Nevertheless, the majority of principals were reluctant to change their mind and adopt the agent's proposal. Our results suggest that the ability to change one's own mind is an important dimension of managerial success.

Each year, organizations sustain a multi-billion-dollar productivity loss because of internet abuse: the use of workplace internet for non-work purposes. Accordingly, they have implemented various forms of top-down monitoring, in which an authority controls employees’ online behavior. The efficacy of this “vertical” control system, however, is less clear than its unintended consequence: demotivated employees. Drawing from research on self-determination and control systems, the current research examined whether two “horizontal” control systems—peer monitoring and peer communication—would mitigate internet abuse with fewer motivational consequences. Using a new virtual environment and a survey, three studies compared the systems’ objective and subjective effects, documenting an underlying psychological mechanism: autonomy. Consistent with predictions, the results suggested that both horizontal systems can reduce abuse as readily as the vertical system, but they exact fewer motivational costs by supporting autonomy. Beyond their practical import, these findings help to integrate theories of motivation and control.

We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of differing qualities to households and farmers. Most of our results are in line with the theoretical predictions. Overexploitation of the resources is observed independently of the market structure. Stock depletion for the public utility is the fastest, followed by the private duopoly and private monopoly. On the positive aspects of centralized public management, we find that the average quality to price ratio offered by the public monopoly is substantially higher than that offered by the private monopoly or duopoly.

This paper analyzes cognitive effort in 6 different one shot p-beauty games. We use both Raven and Cognitive Reflection tests to identify subjects’ abilities. We find that the Raven test does not provide any insight on Beauty Contest Game playing but CRT does: subjects with higher scores on this test are more prone to play dominant strategies. The results are confirmed when levels of reasoning instead of entries in the BCG are used.

We study incentives to vertically integrate in an industry with vertically differentiated downstream firms. Vertical integration by one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. Increased production costs negatively affects quality investment both by the integrated firm and the unintegrated rival. Quality investment by both firms decreases under any (vertical integration) scenario. The decrease in quality invesment by both firms softens competition among downstream firms. By integrating first, a firm always produces the high quality good and earns higher profits. A fully integrated industry, with increased product differentiation, is observed in equilibrium. Due to increase in firm profits, social welfare under this structure is greater than under no integration.

We report results from experimental water markets in which owners of two different sources of water supply water to households and farmers. The final water quality consumed by each type of consumer is determined through mixing of qualities from two different resources. We compare the standard duopolistic market structure with an alternative market clearing mechanism inspired by games with confirmed strategies (which have been shown to yield collusive outcomes). As in the static case, complex dynamic markets operating under a confirmed proposals protocol yield less efficient outcomes because coordination among independent suppliers has the usual effects of restricting output and increasing prices to the users. Our results suggest that, when market mechanisms are used to allocate water to its users, the rule of thumb used by competition authorities can also serve as a guide towards water market regulation.

List, or retail, pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage. Competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice. We modify the standard Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage. Both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount, or not, in a subsequent stage. We show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome. This is true for a general class of rationing rules. Further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader, the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader.

This paper empirically analyses the determinants of firm participation in Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). A review of the theoretical literature highlights the difficulty of identifying testable hypotheses. Using a large database of European RJVs, we estimate a participation equation at the firm level using the logit procedure. We find that sectorial R&D intensity, industry concentration, firm size, technological spillovers, and past RJV participation positively influence the probability of forming RJVs. By contrast, patents’ effectiveness reduce the likelihood of RJV formation. Last, country fixed effects suggest that firms from larger countries are less likely to participate in cross–border RJVs.

BOOKS & OTHERS