Welcome to my private homepage (my official webpage).
I am Professor of Finance at Politecnico di Torino (Polytechnic University of Turin, Turin, Italy), in the Department of Management and Production Engineering (my full CV), and a member of the G53 Network on Financial Literacy and Personal Finance. https://g53network.org/.
Contacts:
riccardo *dot* calcagno *at* polito *dot* it
riccalca *at* gmail *dot* com
Research Interests:
Personal Finance
Financial Literacy and Financial Education
Financial Advice
Corporate Finance
Mergers and Acquisitions
Managerial compensation
Papers published in refereed journals:
Financial Literacy, Human Capital, and Long-Run Economic Growth with Alberto Bucci, Simone Marsiglio, and Tiago Neves Sequeira, (2025), The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 80, 102468. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2025.102468
It examines the long-term effects of investing in financial literacy, which can increase the allocational efficiency of the financial sector but may crowd out investments in human capital. Using a human-capital-based endogenous growth model (Lucas-Uzawa), we show that financial literacy has a positive impact on growth if its effect on the financial sector's efficiency is sufficiently strong.
Entrepreneurs on their Financial Literacy: Evidence from the Netherlands with Yan Alperovych and Martijn Lentz, (2023), Venture Capital, 26(4), 377–400.
It provides measures of self-assessed knowledge in various basic finance and accounting topics through a survey of Dutch entrepreneurs. This dataset allows us to determine whether entrepreneurs demand advice for problems they are less familiar with. We also test whether their financial knowledge is related to the economic performance of their firms.
Stock-Based Pay, Liquidity and the Role of Market Making, with Florian Heider , (2021), Journal of Economic Theory, 197, 1-27.
It shows that even an efficient stock price does not fully reflect the consequences of CEO shirking on the firm's value. To restore incentives, the optimal contract provides the CEO with high stock-based pay when, for example, the information of traders is less precise and the stock is more liquid.
Takeover duration and negotiation process, with Eric de Bodt and Irina De Bruyne-Demidova , (2021), European Financial Management, 27(4), 589-619.
It presents a first step towards a structural estimation model determining the main unobservables in M&A negotiations: the intensity of potential competition, the preferences of the acquirer and the speed of learning about future, uncertain synergies.
To trust is good, but to control is better: How investors discipline financial advice, with Maela Giofré and Maria Cesira Urzi Brancati, (2017) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 140, 287-316.
Do investors exert some form of control over the quality of the recommendations they receive, and, if so, which one? The paper shows that financial advice has the nature of a "credence service", for which investors with a low knowledge of finance issues control their advisors less. If they do so, they tend to ask for a second professional opinion.
Too busy to stay at work. How willing are Italian workers to "pay" to anticipate their retirement?, with Flavia Coda Moscarola and Elsa Fornero, (2017) Economics Bulletin, 3, 1694-1707.
It measures the reaction of Italian workers aged 55+ to the 2011 reform of the Italian pension system (the "Monti-Fornero" reform). Overall, individuals want to anticipate retirement, but they are not ready to give up part of their future pension benefits to do so.
Financial literacy and the demand for financial advice, with Chiara Monticone, (2015) Journal of Banking and Finance, 50, 363-380.
It shows that non-independent professional advisors have incentives to provide more information to more knowledgeable investors. Less financially literate investors, instead, are more likely to fully delegate their portfolio choice to advisors. The supply of professional advice is not a perfect substitute for individual financial literacy.
Competition and dynamics of takeover contests, with Sonia Falconieri, (2014), Journal of Corporate Finance, 26, 36-56.
Potential competition in a takeover contest is modelled as a bargaining game with alternating offers. Every bidder can call an auction as an outside option at every stage. The model shows why the takeover premium resulting from a negotiated deal is not significantly different from that resulting from an auction, and why tender offers are rarely observed in reality.
Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games, with Yuichiro Kamada, Stefano Lovo and Takuo Sugaya, (2014), Theoretical Economics, 9, 409-434.
It analyzes games with a pre-play phase during which players prepare the action that is implemented once the game officially opens. The technology during the pre-play phase is imperfect, since players cannot continuously revise their actions. It shows the equilibria in "common interest" games and in "opposing interest" games.
Do more financially literate households invest less in housing? Evidence from Italy, with Maria Cesira Urzi Brancati, (2014), Economics Bulletin, 34, 430-445.
It measures the impact of financial literacy on the quota of housing investment in the portfolio of Italian households, using the Bank of Italy's SHIW over a 5-year panel.
Portfolio Choice and Precautionary Savings, with Mariacristina Rossi, (2011), Economics Bulletin, 31, 1353-1361.
Holding the expected return of the risky asset constant, do investors save more or less when the capital risk of investment opportunities increases? This paper analyzes the case where the representative consumer has a power utility and optimally decides her portfolio.
The Effect of House Prices on Household Consumption in Italy, with Elsa Fornero and Mariacristina Rossi, (2009), Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 39, 284-300.
Do households consume more if they enjoy a capital gain in housing? The paper studies this effect on Italian households, using the Bank of Italy SHIW data. The results confirm a standard life-cycle model.
The incentive to give incentives: On the relative seniority of debt claims and managerial compensation, with Luc Renneboog, (2007), Journal of Banking and Finance, 31, 1795-1815.
When a firm is financed with risky debt, the incentive contract that shareholders-principals offer their managers depends on the capital structure. The model illustrates that the relative degree of seniority of managers’ claims and creditors’ claims in case a bankruptcy procedure starts is crucial to determine the optimal incentive contract.
Dispersed initial ownership and the efficiency of the stock market under moral hazard, with Wolf Wagner, (2006), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 42, 36-45.
It discusses the result obtained by Magill and Quinzii (1999, 2002) according to which the stock market provides a constrained-efficient allocation in a general equilibrium model with moral hazard.
Bid-Ask Price Competition with Asymmetric Information between Market-Makers, with Stefano Lovo, (2006), Review of Economic Studies, 73, 329-355.
Considers a transparent quote-driven stock market in which market makers with different information compete for the uninformed order book. One market maker is an information monopolist. He can influence and possibly mislead the beliefs of the uninformed competitors. This price leadership provides him with positive profits.
Current working papers and work in progress:
Financial Literacy of MSMEs owners and access to credit, with Paolo Finaldi Russo, Ludovica Galotto, and Anita Quas (under revision)
It investigates the impact of entrepreneurs' degree of financial literacy on their demand for bank loans and their likelihood of obtaining the loan demanded, by focusing on the mediating effect of professional financial advice.
Financial Literacy, Shocks Realizations, and Macroeconomic Outcomes, with Simone Marsiglio
It presents a stochastic, endogenous growth model in which an aggregate, undiversifiable shock can hit an intermediate sector. Financial education, by increasing the level of financial knowledge, improves the diversification of agents' portfolios and reduces the amount of credit granted to risky intermediate firms. We characterize the (stochastic) steady state and show that, without interventions that mandate financial education, in the long run, the economy can fall into a poverty trap with slow human capital growth.