Job Market Paper:

(2023) - The Impact of Monetary Penalties on Prosocial Motivation: Unveiling Crowding-Out and Crowding-in Effects(Teixeira)

Abstract: We investigate the impacts of distinct monetary penalties using a modified dictator game that allows participants to extract money from others. We introduce a penalty of equal monetary value in two distinct formats: a 'fine,' imposed after taking money, and a 'fee,' paid before taking money. Our findings reveal that the fee is more effective than the fine. In comparison to a situation with no penalty, the fee significantly reduces the aggregate amount taken, while the fine exhibits no significant overall impact. Additionally, we observe diverse effects of the penalties on individuals' prosocial behavior. Some individuals take more money when facing a penalty, indicating a crowding-out effect, while others abstain from taking money when confronted with the penalty, even when they take substantial amounts without penalties, providing evidence of a crowding-in effect. Overall, the fee proves to be more effective in promoting crowding-in than the fine, while crowding-out effects are similar across both conditions. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the implementation of monetary penalties induces changes in perceived social norms. As individuals conform to these norms, such changes partially elucidate the crowding-out and crowding-in effects. 


Working in Progress:

(2023) - Sex, Lies and Punishment: Gender Differences in Receiving Punishment After Suspected Dishonesty (Teixeira & Pico)

Abstract: The punishment gap refers to minorities and underprivileged groups facing more severe punishment for mistakes or transgressions compared to other groups. Untangling the reasons behind the punishment gap is challenging due to the complex interplay of various factors. In an effort to investigate such situations, we analyzed gender differences in receiving punishment for suspected dishonesty within a controlled experiment, using a sender-receiver game. Our results show that males engage in selfish lies more frequently than females and are more likely to be punished for such lies. We also explored individuals' beliefs about dishonesty, considering empirical expectations, normative expectations, and gender-based causal attribution as potential explanations for the observed behaviors. To capture this causal attribution, we developed a new methodology to incentivize the investigation of how people perceive the same behavior differently when it is done by males or females. The findings suggest that empirical expectations might explain the observed behavior, as males are expected to lie more often. The results also suggest that participants perceive lying behaviors to be less socially acceptable than honestly disclosing a selfish outcome. Additionally, lies are often attributed to motives involving 'rational calculations,' with females showing higher levels of such attributions compared to males.

Keywords: Gender Differences, Punishment, Lying, Social Norms, Social Attributes

(2023) - The Role of Roles: The Impact of Roles on Behavior and Norms in a Public Good Game (Teixeira, Onderstal & Stoelhorst)

Abstract: People take on various roles in their daily lives, such as fathers, mothers, teachers, and leaders, each involving a distinct set of expectations and responsibilities. This study delves into the influence of these social roles on behaviors and societal norms through a series of laboratory experiments. In our experimental design, we randomly assign one participant the role of 'group leader' in sequential public-good games, ensuring no other differences among the participants. In the first experiment, we investigate behavioral shifts and observe that leaders contribute more in the initial round than other group members. Additionally, we find that other participants are more inclined to follow the leader's example. In the second experiment, we scrutinize the impact of the 'leader' role on social norms and attributions. Concerning social norms, we discover that participants expect leaders to make greater contributions in the first round. As for social attributions, we introduce an innovative methodology to explore how people perceive the reasons and motivations behind the actions taken by leaders and other group members. Participants consistently perceive actions associated with leaders differently, describing different degrees of responsibility, conformity, and performance compared to those of other group members. In summary, our experiments demonstrate that social roles lead to changes in behavior and societal norms. Furthermore, these roles can be manipulated to foster both societal and individual transformations.

Keywords: Social Roles, Cooperation, Social Norms, Public Good Game, Leadership

Other Projects:


Abstract: We analyze the impact of suggesting three types of behavior (cooperative, competitive, and individualistic) as part of the instructions in a two-person team production game. The recommendations can also be interpreted as different frames as they do not affect the structure of the game. Subjects collaborated around 35% more in the cooperative frame than in the other two frames. We also observe that the subject’s beliefs about the behavior of their partner are affected by the frames. The beliefs seem to mediate the direct impact of the frames in the effort. Additionally, the results indicate that the individual’s social preferences, captured by a measure of altruism, is a powerful predictor of an individual’s sensitivity to framing effects.

Keywords: Framing Effect, Cooperation, Team Production Game, Social Value Orientation

Abstract: This research examines the assumption of fungibility of money commonly made in Economic Theory. Evidence from Behavioral Economics suggests that this assumption may not hold true in various behavioral contexts. One potential explanation for this is the concept of Mental Budgets, where individuals allocate their money into different expenditure categories. In this study, a theoretical model is developed to incorporate Mental Budgeting and explore its implications for Consumer Theory. Furthermore, we discuss behavioral observations related to such agents, providing new interpretations for anomalies like Preference Reversal.

Keywords:  Consumer Theory, Mental Accounting, Mental Budgeting, Preference Reversal

Abstract: This work analyzes the research methods employed by behavioral economists Kahneman and Tversky (K&T) and one of their main critics, Gigerenzer and the ABC Group. The objective was to elucidate the disparities between these two approaches in behavioral economics by examining their respective procedures for investigating the cognitive processes underlying decision-making. We identified similarities between K&T's methods and those of mainstream economics, which may account for some of the discrepancies with their critics' approach. In conclusion, we discuss how advancements in behavioral economics, such as Nudges and Choice Architecture, can capitalize on the complementary aspects of these perspectives.

Keywords: History of Economic Thought, Behavioral Economics, Methodology