DECEMBER
That is, such “being configured to” language merely represents a statement of intended use of the light projector. An intended use will not limit the scope of the claim because it merely defines a context in which the invention operates. Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
...
Although claim 73 claims a “3D imaging camera” in the preamble, “[w]hether to treat a preamble term as a claim limitation is ‘determined on the facts of each case in light of the claim as a whole and the invention described in the patent.’” Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 831 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, so as to meet the notice required of 35 USC § 132, requires (1) “set[ting] forth the statutory basis of the rejection”; (2) “the reference or references relied upon”; and (3) explaining the references “in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner.” In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Further, there must be (4) “a reason to combine prior art references[, which] is a question of fact.” Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
see also Laryngeal Mask Co. Ltd. v. Ambu A/S, 618 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (concluding the patentee did not act as his own lexicographer because “[t]o be his own lexicographer, a patentee must use a ‘special definition of the term [that] is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history’”).
Deering Precision Instruments, L.L.C. v. Vector Distribution Systems, Inc., 347 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The term ‘substantially’ can also mean ‘largely’ or ‘essentially.’”) (quoting Webster’s New 20th Century Dictionary 1817 (1983)); cf. Anchor Wall Systems, Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“the phrase ‘generally parallel’ envisions some amount of deviation from exactly parallel”).
Under the doctrine of inherency, if a claimed element is not expressly disclosed in a prior art reference, the reference nevertheless anticipates the claim if the missing element is necessarily present in the reference, and it would be so recognized by skilled artisans. Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). To anticipate the claim, the missing element must be necessarily present in the prior art—not merely probably or possibly present. Id.
Where a proposed modification would render the prior art invention being modified unsatisfactory for its intended purpose, the proposed modification would not have been obvious. See Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Michigan Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
In addition, we note that the word “substantially” is often used to mean largely but not wholly what is specified. See, e.g., York Products, Inc., v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Center, 99 F.3d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also, Amhil Enterprises Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d, 1554, 1562, (Fed. Cir. 1996).
See Bell & Howell Document Management v. AltekSys., 132 F.3d 701, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The testimony of an inventor and his attorney concerning claim construction is thus entitled to little or no consideration. The testimony of an inventor is often a self-serving, after-the-fact attempt to state what should have been part of his or her patent application ....”); Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“We have previously stated than an inventor's ‘after-the-fact testimony is of little weight compared to the clear import of the patent disclosure itself.’” (citation omitted)).
It is well settled that it is not necessary for a finding of obviousness under § 103 that all the elements or teachings of one reference be fully combined with those of another reference. In Re Griver 354 F.2d 377, 381 (CCPA 1966)
[I]n reexamination proceedings in which the PTO is considering the patentability of claims of an expired patent which are not subject to amendment, a policy of liberal claim construction may properly and should be applied. Such a policy favors a construction of a patent claim that will render it valid, i.e., a narrow construction, over a broad construction that would render it invalid. Papst-Motoren, 1 USPQ2d at 1656; Ex parte Bowles, 23 USPQ2d 1015, 1017 (BPAI 1991) (both nonprecedential 4). The Board also held in both Papst-Motoren and Bowles that it would be error to read “inferential limitations” into the claims. Papst-Motoren, 1 USPQ2d at 1657; Bowles, 23 USPQ2d at 1017.
See also, Ex parte Hoffman, 1989 WL 274371 *3, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1061, 1063-64 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1989) (“[I]t is an applicant‟s burden to establish that step practiced in a prior art method is excluded from [the] claims by „consisting essentially of‟ language.”).
“Construing claims broadly during prosecution is not unfair to the applicant (or, in this case, the patentee), because the applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims to obtain more precise claim coverage.” In re American Academy Of Science Tech Center, 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (appeal from reexamination proceeding).
“[I]n reexaminations proceedings in which the PTO is considering the patentability of claims of an expired patent which are not subject to amendment, a policy of liberal claim construction may properly and should be applied. Such a policy favors a construction of a patent claim that will render it valid, i.e., a narrow construction, over a broad construction that would render it invalid.” Ex parte Bowles, 23 USPQ2d 1015, 1017 (BPAI 1991) (quoting Ex parte Papst-Motoren, 1 USPQ2d 1655, 1656 (BPAI 1986)) (both nonprecedential).
A reference qualifies as prior art for an obviousness determination under 35 U.S.C. § 103 only when it is analogous to the claimed invention. Innovention Toys, LLC, v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
When a claim is drawn to a computer implemented function invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, a general purpose computer is usually sufficient for the corresponding structure for performing a general computing function, but the corresponding structure for performing a specific function is required to be more than simply a general purpose computer. In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The structure needed to transform a general purpose computer into a specific purpose computer is an algorithm. Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008). An algorithm is defined, for example, as “a finite sequence of steps for solving a logical or mathematical problem or performing a task.” MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 23 (5th ed. 2002).
“Ordinarily drawings which accompany an application for a patent are merely illustrative of the principles embodied in the alleged invention claimed therein and do not define the precise proportions of elements relied upon to endow the claims with patentability.” In re Olson, 212 F.2d 590, 592 (CCPA 1954).
Accord Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1085-86, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (defining Rambus’s claim term, “integrated circuit device,” as a “circuit constructed on a single monolithic substrate, commonly called a ‘chip’”) (relying on trade dictionaries, citations omitted).
Determination that a claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) involves two analytical steps: (1) the Board must interpret the claim language; and (2) the Board must then compare the construed claim to a prior art reference and make factual findings that "each and every limitation is found either expressly or inherently in [that] single prior art reference."
Yorkey v. Diab, 605 F.3d 1297 (2010) (quoting In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (quoting Celeritas Techs. Ltd. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed.Cir.1998) (alteration in original))).
The elimination of a feature disclosed by the prior art, along with its attendant function, is a matter of obviousness for one of ordinary skill in the art. Application of Thompson, 545 F. 2d 1290, 1294 (CCPA 1976) Application of Kuhle, 526 F. 2d 553, 555 (CCPA 1975)
In sustaining a multiple reference rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Board may rely on one reference alone without designating it as a new ground of rejection. In re Bush, 296 F.2d 491, 496 (CCPA 1961); In re Boyer, 363 F.2d 455, 458 n.2, (CCPA 1966).
An obviousness rejection predicated on selection of one or more components from numerous possible choices may be appropriate if the prior art provides direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful. See PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1364 (Fed Cir. 2007).
The initial question is whether the Examiner has advanced acceptable reasoning inconsistent with enablement such that the Examiner’s burden of proof is met. In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1982). Once this burden is met, the burden shifts to Appellant to show that one of ordinary skill in the art could have practiced the claimed invention without undue experimentation. Id.
NOVEMBER
See In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“If an applicant demonstrates that an embodiment has an unexpected result and provides an adequate basis to support the conclusion that other embodiments falling within the claim will behave in the same manner, this will generally establish that the evidence is commensurate with [the] scope of the claims.”).
" 'A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.'" Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
See Asyst Tech., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 544 F.3d 1310, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven though commercial embodiments of the '421 invention may have enjoyed commercial success, Asyst’s failure to link that commercial success to the features of its invention that were not disclosed in Hesser undermines the probative force of the evidence pertaining to the success of Asyst’s and Jenoptik’s products.”).
Moreover, the recitation of a material intended to be worked upon by a claimed apparatus does not differentiate the claimed apparatus structure from the structure of a prior art apparatus. In re Rishoi, 197 F.2d 342, 345 (CCPA 1952).
Only claims “not amenable to construction or insolubly ambiguous are indefinite.” Star Sci., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
A claim is unpatentable if it encompasses an unpatentable embodiment. See In re Landgraf, 436 F.2d 1046, 1050 (CCPA1971); In re Muchmore, 433 F.2d 824, 826 (CCPA 1970) (Claims that read on patentable as well as unpatentable subject matter are unpatentable.)
See Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(“The inventors’ definition and explanation of the meaning of the word … as evidenced by the specification, controls the interpretation of that claim term).
see also, e.g., In re Spitzglass, 96 F.2d 1002, 1005 (CCPA 1938) (construing functional limitations in such a manner prior to the enactment of what became 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph).
“It is impermissible within the framework of section 103 to pick and choose from any one reference only so much of it as will support a given position, to the exclusion of other parts necessary to the full appreciation of what such reference fairly suggests to one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Wesslau, 353 F.2d 238, 241 (CCPA 1965).
See In re Skoner, 517 F.2d 947, 950 (CCPA 1975) (“Expected beneficial results are evidence of obviousness of a claimed invention. Just as unexpected beneficial results are evidence of unobviousness.”)
Conception is the touchstone of inventorship, the completion of the mental part of invention. Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415, 30 USPQ2d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1994). It is “the formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.” Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376, 231 USPQ 81, 87 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Conception is complete only when the idea is so clearly defined in the inventor's mind that only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or experimentation. Sewall, 21 F.3d at 415, 30 USPQ2d at 1359;
The “clear linkage or association” in the Specification of the structure to the function recited in the claim is determined based on the understanding of an artisan of ordinary skill. See AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
In addition, we do not agree with Appellants that the group of compounds of which compound (III) is a member is so large as to make this the “needle-in-the-haystack” situation discussed in In re Luvisi, 342 F.2d 102, 106 (CCPA 1965).
Rather, “[a] reference may be read for all that it teaches, including uses beyond its primary purpose.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); see also id. at 1334 (The Federal Circuit has explained “that just because better alternatives exist in the prior art does not mean that an inferior combination is inapt for obviousness purposes.”).
C]laims should always be read in light of the specification and teachings in the underlying patent. See Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 217, 61 S.Ct. 235 (1940) (“The claims of a patent are always to be read or interpreted in light of its specifications.”).
To avoid running afoul of the exclusive statutory right of copyright owners to control the distribution of their copyrighted works (17 U.S.C. §106(3)), I would more narrowly interpret the scope of Appellants’ claimed “media” as being limited to media that is in the public domain and/or media that is properly owned or licensed in accordance with existing copyright law.
The informational content of non-functional descriptive material is not entitled to weight in the patentability analysis. See In re Lowry, 32 F. 3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir, 1994) ("Lowry does not claim merely the information content of a memory... Nor does he seek to patent the content of information resident in a database.")
Lowry, In re, 32 F.3d 1579, 32 USPQ2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting a reference qualifies as prior art for an obviousness analysis only when it is analogous to the claimed invention (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992))).
Also, where relatively low level functions are claimed, the disclosure of a general purpose computer may be sufficient.
Katz has not claimed a specific function performed by a special purpose computer, but has simply recited the claimed functions of "processing," "receiving," and "storing." Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms "processing," "receiving," and "storing," [] those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming. As such, it was not necessary to disclose more structure than the general purpose processor that performs those functions. Those seven claims do not run afoul of the rule against purely functional claiming, because the functions of "processing," "receiving," and "storing" are coextensive with the structure disclosed, i.e., a general purpose processor.
Katz v Am. Airlines, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed,Cir. 2011)
SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Com’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of the claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing calculations.”).
See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F. 3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) "A reference does not teach away [...] if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not 'criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage' investigation into the invention claimed."
We have considered Applicant’s remaining arguments and find none that warrant reversal of the Examiner’s decisions. Cf. Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
OCTOBER
The Examiner’s reliance on Howard vs. Detroit Stove Works, 150 U.S. 164 (1893) is inappropriate because Katagiri’s structure requires multiple components of different materials which cannot be integrally formed as one piece (App. Br. 17-18, Reply Br. 9).
Weak secondary considerations generally do not overcome a strong prima facie case of obviousness. See Media Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 596 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2010 WL 2897876 (Oct. 04, 2010) (“Even if [the patentee] could establish the required nexus, a highly successful product alone would not overcome the strong showing of obviousness.”).
The consistent use of different terms implies an intent to give the terms different meanings. See CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
In re Burckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 1179-80 (CCPA 1979) (the claimed subject matter must be compared with the closest prior art in a manner which addresses the thrust of the rejection).
See In re Voss, 557 F.2d 812, 816 n.11 (CCPA 1977) (“reversal is not a mandate to the PTO to issue a patent and does not preclude the PTO from reopening prosecution”) (citing In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 718 (CCPA 1974) (the Board may not force the granting of patents on inventions that do not comply with the statutes)); see also In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 589 (CCPA 1972) (rejecting the notion that the reversal of a rejection indicates that a patent should be granted); In re Fisher, 448 F.2d 1406, 1407 (CCPA 1971) (“we pass only on rejections actually made and do not decree the issuance of patents … the Patent Office can always reopen prosecution”).
“[W]here the general conditions of a claims are disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation.” In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (CCPA 1955) (citing In re Dreyfus, 73 F.2d 931 (CCPA 1934); In re Waite, 168 F.2d 104 (CCPA 1948)).
An examiner’s reasoning “may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of ordinary skill,” which does “not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion.” See Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385, 1390 (CCPA 1969) (examiner may rely on “common knowledge and common sense of the person of ordinary skill in the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference”). However, “the mere recitation of the words ‘common sense’ without any support adds nothing to the obviousness equation.” Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
See also In re Korpi, 160 F.2d 564,566 (CCPA 1947) (case in which it was held to be obvious to convert batch process into continuous process) and In re Lincoln, 126 F.2d 477, 479 (CCPA 1942).
We have considered applicant’s remaining arguments and find none that warrant reversal of the Examiner’s rejections. Cf In re Antor Media Corp. 12 F.3d ___, ___, 2012 WL 3055928, 103 USPQ2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
In this context, the term “contain” is construed as an open ended term. See TAP Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Owl Pharms., L.L.C., 419 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
SEPTEMBER
Instead, the Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious “to increase the area of ridges and valleys, since it has been held that a mere duplication of the essential working parts of a device involves only routine skill in the art.” (Ans. 4, citing St. Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co., 549 F.2d 833 (7thCir. 1977)).
The holding of St. Regis Paper is not persuasive of unpatentability in this appeal. In St. Regis Paper, the court agreed with the infringement defendant that a prior art reference described a bag including three of four elements recited in the claim there at issue. The court held that the fourth element, “the use of multiple layers to achieve the effect of many bags within one,” had been well known in the industry. Id. at 838. The court then held that the plaintiff was not entitled to patent protection for “the fusion of the old elements that comprised” the bag described in the prior art reference “and the old element of multiple layering.” Id.
The Examiner has not shown that the embossment of a majority of the bottom surface of such a roofing membrane was known in the pertinent art prior to the Appellants’ disclosure. Therefore, the facts of St. Regis Paper are distinguishable.
We are not persuaded. The instant situation is similar to that in Wrigley, where the Court finds that:
This is not a case in which the prior art reference merely discloses a genus and the claim at issue recites a species of that genus. . . . Shahidi specifically discloses WS–23 as a coolant and menthol as a flavoring agent. The question for purposes of anticipation is therefore whether the number of categories and components in Shahidi was so large that the combination of WS–23 and menthol would not be immediately apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art.
Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
We must be careful not to use hindsight to define the particular problem facing the inventor in terms of its solution. Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
see also Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Tradeoffs often concern what is feasible, not what is, on balance, desirable. Motivation to combine requires the latter.”).
“[M]ental processes–or processes of human thinking–standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical application.” In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
"[A]bsent a clear disclaimer in the specification, the embodiments in the specification do not limit broader claim language." Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F. 3d 1325, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
See In re Applied Materials, Inc., No. 2011-1461, 2012 WL 3711586, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 2012) ("A recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is sufficient to find the variable result-effective.").
In other words, a skilled artisan would have understood that a telephone must inherently have a speaker to play audio information and that a video telephone must inherently have a video display to show video information. See Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that limiting "a" to "one" requires a clear indication in the record).
The test of whether a reference is from a nonanalogous art is first, whether it is within the field of the inventor's endeavor, and second, if it is not, whether it is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was involved. See In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA 1979).
See In re Brink, 419 F.2d 914, 917 (CCPA 1970) (“if a reference is ambiguous and can be interpreted so that it may or may no [sic] constitute an anticipation of an appellant's claims, an anticipation rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 based upon the ambiguous reference is improper.”).
When "about" is used as part of a numeric range, "the use of the word `about,' avoids a strict numerical boundary to the specified parameter. Its range must be interpreted in its technologic and stylistic context." Id. In determining how far beyond the claimed range the term "about" extends the claim, "[w]e must focus ... on the criticality of the [numerical limitation] to the invention." Cohesive Techs, Inc. v. Waters Corp. 543 F.3d 1351, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Citations omitted)
We agree with the Examiner that when given its broadest reasonable interpretation, the phrase in question “an adjustment assembly configured to position the actuator assembly relative to the body in the second position” encompasses any adjustment assembly capable of so positioning the actuator assembly. See e.g., Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F. 3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Appellants have not apprised us of any reason “configured to” should be construed more narrowly. Appellants chose to define how the adjustment assembly is configured by what it does.
Further, the combination of elements from the asserted prior art is reasonably expected to maintain their respective properties or functions after they are combined. See Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The Requester cites to a footnote in Intellectual Pro. Dev., Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cablevision of Westchester, Inc. in support of its assertions, but the footnote merely states that the court "see[s] no reason why, as a matter of law, one claim limitation may not be responsive to another merely because they are located in the same physical structure" in reversing a district courts granting of summary judgment of invalidity. Intellectual Pro. Dev., 336 F.3d 1308, 1320, fn. 9 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The footnote in Intellectual Pro. Dev. does not stand for the proposition that a single structure can be read upon multiple claim limitations would be reasonable and correct irrespective of the facts of the case.
Cf. ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers, Inc., 668 F.3d 1340, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (distinguishing Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (“[T]he disclosure that this chemical process works for systems with 150 ppm or less is what anticipates. . . . [H]ere, there is no allegation of criticality or any evidence demonstrating any difference across the range.”).
AUGUST