Deparment of Economics
Fordham University
E-mail: pschenone@gmail.com
I am an Assistant Professor of Economics at Fordham University. My research is in microeconomic theory, in particular, decision theory, game theory, and networks. Previously, I was an Assistant Professor of Economics at the W.P. Carey School of Business at Arizona State University.
Final topologies for preference spaces (Accepted at The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics)
Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets, with Laura Doval (Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 132, December 2024)
Networks, frictions and price dispersion, with Javier Donna and Gregory Veramendi (Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 124, November 2020, pages 406-4)
Revealed Preference Implications of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection (American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Volume 12, May 2020, pages 230-56)
Frictions in Internet Auctions with Many Traders: a Counterexample, with Javier Donna and Gregory Veramendi (Economic Letters, Volume 138, January 2016, pages 81-84)
Identifying subjective beliefs in subjective state space models (Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 95, January 2016, Pages 59–72)
We propose a decision-theoretic model akin to Savage (1972) that is useful for defining causal effects. Within this framework, we define what it means for a decision maker (DM) to act as if the relation between the two variables is causal. Next, we provide axioms on preferences and show that these axioms are equivalent to the existence of a (unique) Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that represents the DM's preference. The notion of representation has two components: the graph factorizes the conditional independence properties of the DM's subjective beliefs, and arrows point from cause to effect. Finally, we explore the connection between our representation and models used in the statistical causality literature (for example, Pearl (1995)).
This paper studies repeated games of incomplete information where each player knows his own payoffs and where the unknown state of the world can be identified by the combined private information of all players. We obtain a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) folk theorem to hold. This contrasts with the existing literature where, due to the difficulty in keeping track of beliefs as play evolves, the analysis has focused on either Nash equilibrium for one-sided incomplete information or has dealt with various ex-post solution concepts. Finally, we also show the condition obtained is also necessary and sufficient to obtain Ex-Post folk theorems.
