OTHERS

WHY DO RESEARCH ON UNRELATED TOPICS?

Curiosity, nice co-authors, chance, opportunities, ...

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“Pessimistic Information Gathering”, with David Martimort, Conditional Acceptance Games and Economic Behaviour, March 2015.

Abstract An agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal. Information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent’s effort. Contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering, and there are both moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-powered, productivity-dependent screening options following “good news ” with a fixed low-powered option otherwise.

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• ‘The Market for Lawyers and the Quality of Legal Services’, with Bruno Jullien, 2012, RAND Journal of Economics, 43 (4), 677-704.
• ‘Overoptimism and Lender Liability in the Consumer Credit Market’, with Giuliana Palumbo, Oxford Economic Papers, 2010, vol. 62(2), pp: 374-394.
• “Information Provision and Monitoring of the Decision-maker in the Presence of an Appeal Process; “with Giuliana Palumbo. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2007, vol. 163 (4), pp. 657-682.
• “Competition among universities and the emergence of the elite institution”, with Gianni De Fraja. Bulletin of Economic Research, 2002, vol. 54, pp. 275-293.