University of Rome Tor Vergata IEFE-Bocconi, CEPR
Center of Research in Procurement and Supply Chain - Proxenter

"Go as far as the legs of reasons can tell you and then jump"

Selected Publications

Games and Economic Behavior (2015), Economic Journal (1998), Journal of the European Economic Association (2014),
International Journal of Industrial Organization (2002, 2015), Journal of Industrial Economics (1999),
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (2011), Journal of Public Economics (2006), 
Rand Journal of Economics (2004, 2012, 2012).

Pre-commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships in the EU: Rationale and Strategy

posted 25 Sep 2017, 13:44 by Elisabetta Allegra   [ updated 25 Sep 2017, 13:53 ]

Elisabetta Iossa, Federico Biagi and Paola Valbonesi

Abstract: We discuss public procurement instruments for acquiring innovation, focusing on the European Pre-commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships. We analyse in particular how the firms’ innovation incentives are affected by: (i) economies of scope and externalities between R&D and large-scale production; (ii) degree of specificity of the innovation; (iii) presence of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the market and level of market competition; (iv) risk of market foreclosure and supplier lock-in.  Our study contributes to the literature on incentives in demand-side innovation policy by tapping into the contractual design features and by offering relevant implications for academics and policy makers.

Accepted for Publication in Economics of Innovation and New Technology

Come La Qualità della Stazione Appaltante Incide sui Contratti Pubblici

posted 2 Apr 2017, 13:02 by Elisabetta Allegra

Workshop “Public Procurement: partecipazione qualità ed efficienza” Mercoledì 29 marzo 2017

Gli appalti pubblici rappresentano una quota consistente dell’economia nazionale. È essenziale che le regole che li governano siano disegnate in modo da massimizzare le ricadute positive sul prodotto e sulla crescita. Tali regole devono garantire un’ampia partecipazione delle imprese al mercato, ma anche assicurare qualità ed efficienza nell’affidamento e nell’esecuzione dei contratti. In che modo le riforme che stanno interessando il settore contribuiscono al raggiungimento di queste finalità? Cosa suggeriscono l’analisi economica e il confronto con gli altri paesi? Ne discuteremo con accademici, esperti di istituzioni, policymakers e rappresentanti del settore privato (cfr. programma).

Maintaining Competition in Recurrent Procurement Contracts: A Case Study on the London Bus Market

posted 1 Mar 2017, 14:02 by Elisabetta Allegra   [ updated 1 Mar 2017, 14:10 ]

By Elisabetta Iossa and Mike Waterson

Under recurrent procurement, the awarding of a contract to a firm may put it in an advantageous position in future tenders, which may reduce competition over time. The objective of this paper is to study the dynamics of competition for tendered contracts, focusing on factors that may generate incumbent advantage. Particular attention is given to learning economies, sunk costs of entry and switching costs for the procurer. The paper then applies these insights to analyse empirically the evolution of competition in the market for local bus services in London.

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