Dept of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata;  IEFE-Bocconi and CEPR London
Center of Research in Procurement and Supply Chain - Proxenter

"Go as far as the legs of reasons can tell you and then jump"

Selected Publications

Games and Economic Behavior (2015), Economic Journal (1998), Journal of the European Economic Association (2014),
International Journal of Industrial Organization (2002, 2015), Journal of Industrial Economics (1999),
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (2011), Journal of Public Economics (2006), 
Rand Journal of Economics (2004, 2012, 2012).

Barriers Towards Foreign Firms in International Public Procurement Markets: a Review

posted 11 Mar 2018, 04:09 by Elisabetta Allegra   [ updated 11 Mar 2018, 04:30 ]

BY Chiara Carboni, Elisabetta Iossa and Gianpiero Mattera

ABSTRACT: The international dimension of public procurement has gained in importance in the last decade and has attracted the attention of economist and policy makers. A number of trade agreements were signed with the intention to remove barriers to procurement markets and favour entry of foreign firms and products. However, empirical evidence shows that, despite the existence of trade agreements, discrimination towards foreign firms still applies in a number of countries around the world. In this paper, we present the methodologies used in the economic literature for the identification of overt and covert barriers to public tenders and discuss the importance of collecting high quality data for meliorating the ability of international traders to detect procurement barriers.


Public Private Partnerships In Europe For Building And Managing Public Infrastructures: An Economic Perspectiveo

posted 15 Feb 2018, 04:40 by Elisabetta Allegra

With Stephane Saussier

Abstract: Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are long-term contractual agreements between the public and private sector for the provision of public infrastructures and services. Due to tighter budget constraints and to a renewed interest in greater involvement of the private sector in the provision of public services, PPPs are likely to grow in the near future. In this paper, we review the theory and practice of PPPs, highlighting their potential role as well as discussing the main factors influencing the likelihood of performance failure.

With Stephane Saussier

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Link to Paper

Quando l’incompetenza fa più danni della corruzione

posted 23 Jan 2018, 03:34 by Elisabetta Allegra

Il nuovo codice degli appalti istituisce un sistema di qualificazione delle stazioni appaltanti sulla base di criteri di qualità, efficienza e professionalizzazione. Manca però il decreto attuativo. Eppure, potrebbe essere un aiuto alla spending review.   La VOCE Info del 23/01/2018

Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

posted 16 Jan 2018, 00:21 by Elisabetta Allegra   [ updated 15 Feb 2018, 04:49 ]

To what extent does a more competent public workforce contribute to better economic outcomes? We analyze this question in the context of the US federal procurement by combining data on office-level competencies, federal workforce characteristics, and procurement performance. Using an instrumental variable strategy, we find that the effects of competence heterogeneity across bureaus are quantitatively important: if all federal bureaus were to obtain NASA's high level of competence (corresponding to the top 10 percent of competence), delays in contract execution would decline by 7.2 million days and price renegotiations would drop by $13.5 billion over the 2010-2015 period analyzed. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings.

Pre-commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships in the EU: Rationale and Strategy

posted 25 Sep 2017, 13:44 by Elisabetta Allegra   [ updated 31 Oct 2017, 02:45 ]

Pre-Commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships in the EU: Rationale and StrategyElisabetta Iossa, Federico Biagi and Paola Valbonesi

Abstract: We discuss public procurement instruments for acquiring innovation, focusing on the European Pre-commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships. We analyse in particular how the firms’ innovation incentives are affected by: (i) economies of scope and externalities between R&D and large-scale production; (ii) degree of specificity of the innovation; (iii) presence of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the market and level of market competition; (iv) risk of market foreclosure and supplier lock-in.  Our study contributes to the literature on incentives in demand-side innovation policy by tapping into the contractual design features and by offering relevant implications for academics and policy makers.

Accepted for Publication in Economics of Innovation and New Technology


Come La Qualità della Stazione Appaltante Incide sui Contratti Pubblici

posted 2 Apr 2017, 13:02 by Elisabetta Allegra

Workshop “Public Procurement: partecipazione qualità ed efficienza” Mercoledì 29 marzo 2017

Gli appalti pubblici rappresentano una quota consistente dell’economia nazionale. È essenziale che le regole che li governano siano disegnate in modo da massimizzare le ricadute positive sul prodotto e sulla crescita. Tali regole devono garantire un’ampia partecipazione delle imprese al mercato, ma anche assicurare qualità ed efficienza nell’affidamento e nell’esecuzione dei contratti. In che modo le riforme che stanno interessando il settore contribuiscono al raggiungimento di queste finalità? Cosa suggeriscono l’analisi economica e il confronto con gli altri paesi? Ne discuteremo con accademici, esperti di istituzioni, policymakers e rappresentanti del settore privato (cfr. programma).

Maintaining Competition in Recurrent Procurement Contracts: A Case Study on the London Bus Market

posted 1 Mar 2017, 14:02 by Elisabetta Allegra   [ updated 1 Mar 2017, 14:10 ]

By Elisabetta Iossa and Mike Waterson

Under recurrent procurement, the awarding of a contract to a firm may put it in an advantageous position in future tenders, which may reduce competition over time. The objective of this paper is to study the dynamics of competition for tendered contracts, focusing on factors that may generate incumbent advantage. Particular attention is given to learning economies, sunk costs of entry and switching costs for the procurer. The paper then applies these insights to analyse empirically the evolution of competition in the market for local bus services in London.

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