Pierre Fleckinger

Professor of Economics, Mines ParisTech
Associate Member, Paris School of Economics


Long CV

Research interests

Information Economics, Economics of Organizations, Regulation and Industrial Organization, Environmental Economics.


Journal articles

  • Contract Theory in the Spotlights: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners, with David Martimort. 
    Revue d'Economie Politique , 2018 (forthcoming). 
    penultimate WP]
  • Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments, with Matthieu Glachant and Gabrielle Moineville. 
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9(1): 242-274, 2017. 
    penultimate WP][doi:10.1257/mic.20150119]
  • Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise, with Thierry Lafay and Constance Monnier.
    Revue Economique 64(3), 457-467, 2013

  • The Organization of Extended Producer Responsibility in Waste Policy with Product Differentiation, with Matthieu Glachant.
    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 59 (1), 57-66, 2010.
  • La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires? with Matthieu Glachant.
    Economie et Prévision, n°190-191, 95-105, 2009. 
  • Concurrence en catalogue dans le duopole d'Hotelling, with Thierry Lafay.
    Revue Economique, 57 (3), 573-581, 2006. 
Book chapters
  • Voluntary Approaches in the Policy Cycle, with Matthieu Glachant and Gabrielle Moineville. 
    in Corporate Social Responsibility: from Compliance to Opportunity?, ed. J-P Ponssard & P. Crifo
    , Ecole Polytechnique, Paris 2010.

Working papers and mimeos (drafts available upon request)
  • Game of Frauds, with Thierry Lafay and Constance Monnier.
  • Endogenous Correlation and Moral Hazard, with René Kirkegaard.
  • Communication Strategies of NGOs: Theory and Evidence, with Mathieu Couttenier, Matthieu Glachant and Sophie Hatte.
  • The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation, with Wanda Mimra and Angelo Zago.
  • Regulating Collective Reputation Markets [pdf] [pres]
    (replaces "Collective Reputation and Market Structure: Regulating the Quality vs Quantity Trade-Off").
    Revise & Resubmit, Journal of Industrial Economics.
  • The Incentive Value of Deadlines.
  • Collective versus Relative Incentives: the Agency Perspective, with Nicolas Roux [pdf]
  • Labelling Contests with Endogenous Precision, with Béatrice Roussillon and Paul Schweinzer.
  • Pesticide Regulation: The Case of French Wine, with Joël Aka and Christophe Deola.

Media and wide audience (in French)

updated August 2017