Professor of Economics, Mines ParisTech

Affiliate Professor, Paris School of Economics

pierre(.)fleckinger(at)mines-paristech(.)fr

+33 (0) 1 40 51 92 98



Office V.322

CERNA, MINES ParisTech

60, boulevard Saint-Michel

75006 Paris


Office R6.50

Paris School of Economics

48, Boulevard Jourdan

75014 Paris

Long CV

Research interests

Information Economics, Economics of Organizations, Regulation and Industrial Organization, Environmental Economics.

Publications

Journal articles

  • Contract Theory in the Spotlights: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners, with David Martimort. Revue d'Economie Politique , 2018. [penultimate WP]
  • Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments, with Matthieu Glachant and Gabrielle Moineville. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9(1): 242-274, 2017. [penultimate WP][doi:10.1257/mic.20150119]
  • Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise, with Thierry Lafay and Constance Monnier. Revue Economique 64(3), 457-467, 2013. [article]
  • Correlation and Relative Performance Evaluation. Journal of Economic Theory, 147 (1), 93-117, 2012. [penultimate WP][doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.016]
  • Negotiating a Voluntary Agreement when Firms Self-regulate, with Matthieu Glachant. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62 (1), 41-52, 2011. [penultimate WP][doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2011.03.002]
  • Product Flexibility and Price Competition in Hotelling’s duopoly, with Thierry Lafay. Mathematical Social Sciences, 60 (1), 61-68, 2010. [doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.03.006]
  • The Organization of Extended Producer Responsibility in Waste Policy with Product Differentiation, with Matthieu Glachant. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 59 (1), 57-66, 2010. [doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2009.06.002]
  • La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires? with Matthieu Glachant. Economie et Prévision, n°190-191, 95-105, 2009. [article]
  • Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication. Mathematical Social Sciences, 55 (1), 1-13, 2008. [doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.05.006]
  • Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives. Economics Letters, 94 (2), 240-244, 2007. [doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.039]
  • Concurrence en catalogue dans le duopole d'Hotelling, with Thierry Lafay. Revue Economique, 57 (3), 573-581, 2006. [article]

Book chapters

  • Voluntary Approaches in the Policy Cycle, with Matthieu Glachant and Gabrielle Moineville. in Corporate Social Responsibility: from Compliance to Opportunity?, ed. J-P Ponssard & P. Crifo, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris 2010.

Working papers and mimeos (drafts available upon request)

  • Game of Frauds, with Thierry Lafay and Constance Monnier.
  • Endogenous Correlation and Moral Hazard, with René Kirkegaard.
  • Communication Strategies of NGOs: Theory and Evidence, with Mathieu Couttenier, Matthieu Glachant and Sophie Hatte.
  • The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation, with Wanda Mimra and Angelo Zago.
  • Regulating Collective Reputation Markets [pdf] [pres]

(replaces "Collective Reputation and Market Structure: Regulating the Quality vs Quantity Trade-Off"). Revise & Resubmit, Journal of Industrial Economics.

  • The Incentive Value of Deadlines.
  • Collective versus Relative Incentives: the Agency Perspective, with Nicolas Roux [pdf]
  • Labelling Contests with Endogenous Precision, with Béatrice Roussillon and Paul Schweinzer.
  • Pesticide Regulation: The Case of French Wine, with Joël Aka and Christophe Deola.

Media and wide audience (in French)