In case you are interested in reading a draft of any of these papers, by all means send me an email. And any feedback will be much appreciated.
For the same reasons, I would be very willing to present any of these papers at a conference or visiting speaker series.
Paper investigating possible rivalry between the formal cause and Aristotle's other three causes
This paper concerns the relation and interplay between the four causes, especially focused on the intended scope of the formal cause and its relation to Aristotle's other three causes. In much of contemporary discussions, a multiplicity of causes brings with it the impression of causal overdetermination and, hence, causal idleness of some of the things or events involved. For instance, if the formal cause supervenes on one or more of the other three causes, then this would be a reason to instead emphasize the cause which it supervenes upon. Or, if identifying the formal cause is merely a heuristic needed for identifying the efficient or final cause, then formal causes loose their causal and explanatory relevance once it is superseded by an efficient or final cause. I discuss several positions (especially Ferejohn's and Lennox's), and defend the view that formal causes does not supervene on any of the other causes. This is because each of Aristotle's four causes are causes of closely related yet distinct effects -- and each of the four causes are explanatory factors in explanations with closely related yet distinct explananda. What does this continuant come out of (material cause)? What is this continuant (formal cause)? What initiated the beginning of this occurrent (efficient cause)? What is the end state of this occurrent (final cause)?
Paper on scientific demonstrations involving processes
Many laws of nature involves occurrents, such as processes and events. Aristotle was no stranger to this fact, and I discuss the key cases such as the examples of eclipse and of thunder in Posterior Analytics II.8. I will make use of the recent literature on process ontologies. While I take Aristotle to hold the view that processes are dependent upon the active and passive participant in the process (i.e. the substances), and their respective powers, I also understand Aristotle to reject the view that the processes are reducible to their participants. This is especially made clear in the discussion of processes in the Posterior Analytics, and many places in Aristotle's biological and physical works.
Paper defending a mereological understanding of matter in Aristotle's hylomorphism
In this paper I argue that Aristotle had the resources needed for a non-hylomorphic account of change. Instead, I make use of Aristotle’s mereology. This alternative has fewer and less controversial presuppositions: it is less controversial to say that x has a form and has parts, than to say that x is a hylomorphic compound of form and matter. The difference lies in the account of substantial change. On the alternative account, which Aristotle could have defended (but probably did not), x can lose its form because one or more of its independent parts continues existing throughout the process of change. For Aristotle, many parts are dependent upon their whole (here Aristotle prefers “meros” ), but some are independent from their whole (“stoicheion”). For instance, the elements composing Socrates are independent from Socrates, while Socrates’ hand and Socrates’ whiteness are both dependent upon Socrates. By connecting Aristotle’s account of the possibility of change with mereology (and disconnecting it from hylomorphism), we get an account with more applicability to and relevance for contemporary discussions. And our contemporary theories of mereology can enrich Aristotle’s discussion of change.
Paper on the need for formal causes for mechanisms
The 'New mechanists' have duly emphasized the importance of mechanisms in causation. What they have so far failed to realize is the relevance of formal causation to mechanisms. I argue that formal causes are needed in order to capture the mechanism at its correct level of complexity. For instance, a diagram of a mechanism can sometimes be too complex, and involve too many entities and processes -- or conversely, a diagram can be too simplified, and not include enough entities and processes. This is an issue even when all entities and processes are required to be strongly relevant to the mechanism. I argue that by identifying the formal cause of the mechanism, the appropriate level of complexity can be captured, thereby yielding the most explanatory diagram of the mechanism.
Paper on formal causation as a type of metaphysical explanation
This paper relates my account of formal causation to the recent literature on metaphysical explanation. Building on A. Wilson, as well as my previous work on laws of nature, I will defend the ‘laws of nature criterion’: other types of causes are mediated by laws of nature, while formal causes are more fundamental than the laws of nature because some formal causes make it such that the laws hold.