Game Theory - Information Economics
Pedro Vaissman Guinsburg
I am mostly interested in bringing Information Design to canonical "market" models. The idea is that, unless there exists the presence of a physical designer, information structures are endogenous, or "market " outcomes.
In general I study the intersection between Information Design and Game Theory. One of my questions of interest is how should a "designer" provide information to agents, with examples being when websites assign ads to users via algorithms, when audit companies choose methods of investigations that are more or less prone to certain risks, or when CDO issuers bundle different debt obligations together.
In other economic situations, not only is there information provision, but also exchange. For example, mergers and acquisition cases involve an intense exchange of verifiable reports, retail companies segment markets in order to compete in an aggregate market, pharmaceutical companies run drug trials that reveal information about the drugs to their competitors, and publicly traded firms make reports available before issuing new debt or equity. In all these situations, firms reveal information not only about their strategies or the quality of their products, but they also reveal something to the competitors.
These are my ongoing projects:
(More Advanced Projects)
- Information Design and Sensitivity to Market Fundamentals
- Information Design and The Problem of Bargaining over a Joint Venture
- Making Money Out of Thin Air: An Arbitrage Condition for SHA 256 Algorithms (joint with Lones Smith)
- Estimating the Demand for Services Using Google Ads and a Personal Computer
- The Problem of C.D.O. from the Perspective of The Issuer