Journal Articles
Vall-Prat, P. & Rodon, T. (forthcoming) Working for Democracy: Poll Officers and the Turnout Gender Gap. British Journal of Political Science. [Ungated paper & Supplementary Information] [Reproduction materials]
Vall-Prat, P. & Rodon, T. (2024) The Spanish 2023 general elections: unexpected snap elections to survive in power. West European Politics. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2024.2317679 [Ungated paper]
Vall-Prat, P. (2023) Economic Shocks, Mobilization, and Regional Elite Splits. Comparative Political Studies, 56(2), 193–227. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221089641 [Ungated paper] [Replication materials]
Vall-Prat, P. (2021) Dataset of Historical Electoral Results in Catalonia (DHEC): Micro-Level Historical Results (1890–1923). Data in Brief. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2021.107017 [Original dataset]
Rodon, T. & Vall-Prat, P. (2018) Designing a regional cabinet: How the economic context, political fragmentation and polarization shape cabinet size. Revista d'Estudis Autonòmics i Federals, 27(June): 80-116. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2436/20.8080.01.26
Vall-Prat, P. & Rodon, T. (2017) Decentralization and Regional Cabinet Size: the Spanish Case (1979-2015). West European Politics, 40(4): 717-740. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2016.1275422 [Original dataset]
Work in Progress
Democratization is Calling: The Political Consequences of Telephone Networks (with Francesc Amat). Draft
New communication technologies have important economic and political consequences. The availability of a new communication technology can become a weapon in hands of elites to obtain larger shares of political power ―either through coercion or mobilization but also a powerful resource for new challenger parties. In this paper we explore the political consequences of telephone network expansion in a semi-autocratic regime; we focus in Catalonia in the 1901-1923 period. We analyze the political consequences of a new public telephone network through a diff-in-diff identification strategy based on the timing and characteristics of telephones at the municipality-level. We also exploit distances to the existing private networks to exogeneize telephone extension and to test the robustness of our findings. Our main results show that new challenger parties directly benefited from the extension of telephone networks and reduced support rates for status quo elite parties. The heterogeneous effects of telephone extensions point out to a double dynamic of (i) elite replacement of status quo elites by new economic elites and (ii) voters' mobilization associated with telephone expansions among left-wing parties. Our findings contribute to better understanding the political consequences of new communication technologies in semi-autocratic contexts, where new political parties are as interested in advancing their position as to erode the influence capacity of entrenched status quo elites.
Bank Failures and Elite Democratic Consent: An Exploration with Individual Panel Data (with Francesc Amat & Enrique Jorge-Sotelo).
Do economic shocks influence elite democratic attitudes and commitment? Elites play a crucial role in shaping democratization processes and their consent is oftentimes thought of as a necessary condition to consolidate democratic political institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003). Yet, this theory has never been tested at the micro-level with individual data. In this paper we exploit the failure of a large bank in Catalonia in 1931 to assess the impact in democratic support held by individuals exposed and unexposed to this financial shock. We use a novel individual-level database that assembles the amounts lost by each individual depositor of the bank, and then we match individuals to their electoral turnout behavior in different elections from individual voting roll calls. We specially focus on the last elections before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War to capture support for democracy because in this election elites were divided and part of the political parties boycotted the elections, hence making turnout a \textit{de facto} signal of support for democracy. This unique setting allows us to test whether economic interests are indeed influential on elites’ democratic consent at the individual-level. The individual panel structure of the data allows the inclusion of individual FEs and a difference-in-difference identification strategy that exploits individuals’ differential turnout rates across several elections. Preliminary results indicate that, as expected, individuals exposed to financial losses were less likely to turnout in the last elections before the Spanish Civil War. We interpret this differential abstention rates among individuals exposed to the bank collapse as evidence of a loss in democratic consent of these individuals. To explore further the mechanism, we plan to match the individual depositors lists and the individual voting roll calls with individual registers of political associations and clubs. We show that the differential abstention rates among depositors exposed to the bank collapse are driven by individual members of associations and clubs that explicitly supported the boycott of the last democratic elections. Overall, we provide the first ever individual-level evidence from the interwar period that shows that individual elites’ exposure to financial shocks during the 1930s caused the abandonment of individual democratic consent.
Paper available upon request
Intra-Elite Competition and Electoral Fraud.
Work in Progress
Work in Progress
Dissertations
Vall-Prat, P. 2022. The Political Economy of Regional Elite Splits. Origins, Competition, and Consequences [PhD Dissertation, UB] [Link]
Vall-Prat, P., 2016. The Politics of Decentralisation in Fiscal Rules Compliance: (Dis)Obeying Fiscal Rules in Spanish Regions [MSc Political Science and Political Economy, LSE] [Link]
Vall-Prat, P., 2015. Who Are the Most Active MPs? Determinants of MPs parliamentary activity. [Research Master in Political Science, UPF] [Link]
Vall-Prat, P., 2014. Regional Cabinet Size: autonomic cabinet size variation in Spain. http://hdl.handle.net/10230/22820 [BA Political Science and Public Administration, UPF] [Link]
Hodgepodge
Reports & Published Working Papers
New Productive Models Against COVID-19: Beyond the choice between saving the economy and saving lives. 2020 [Link]
Case study: The Closing of the Model Prison. 2018 [Link] [CATALAN]
Curto, F. & Pau Vall-Prat, 2016. 'Mesurar la governança: Anàlisi dels World Governance Indicators', EsadeGeo Working Paper 27. [link] [CATALAN]
Consultancy Projects
Anàlisi de l’organització i de les entitats membres en clau de governança. 2019 [Link] [CATALAN]
La provisió d'atenció integrada: una aproximació internacional comparada. 2016
Una proposta de criteris de governança per a una organització tributària moderna. 2014. [Link] [CATALAN]