Research
1. "Intergenerational Discounting and Inequality"
(with Frikk Nesje). First draft available!
We axiomatically characterize the theories of intergenerational justice that disentangle normative views on discounting from normative views on intergenerational inequality.
A large family of criteria emerges, capturing many more ethical views than standard, including non-exponential discounting (hyperbolic, etc.) or positional attitudes to inequality (Gini, etc.).
2. "Household welfare when needs differ"
(with Kristoffer Berg and Morten Håvarstein). Email for a draft.
We reexamine the measurement of welfare and inequality when households have different needs.
First, we identify a dilemma between compensation and responsibility for needs. Next, we show how to address it by allowing for partial compensation/responsibility. Finally, we extend the results to multicommodity settings, heterogeneous preferences, and non-homothetic needs.
3. "The normative content of other-regarding preferences"
(with Maya Eden). First draft soon.
We address the aggregation of other-regarding preferences. We characterize an impartial observer theorem.
4. "Intergenerational population ethics". Email me for a draft.
I study the problem of ranking infinite streams of consumption with endogenous fertility.
The axiomatic characterization singles out a recursive family of criteria that identify the quantity-quality tradeoff from individuals' willingness to have children.
5. "Measuring Economic Inequality"
(with Rolf Aaberge and Magne Mogstad). First draft soon.
The variety of inequality indices used in empirical research begs a question: which inequality index should be used? Answering this question has proven difficult as there exists no unified framework that allows researchers to directly compare the properties of the many alternative inequality indices. Our paper helps to close this gap by providing such a framework.
Main Results:
- most existing measures (Atkinson, entropy, etc.) face a dilemma: they are either hypersensitive at the bottom or at the top;
- the Gini coefficient is neither sensitive at the bottom nor at the top;
- we characterize tractable inequality measures allowing for any sensitivity;
- we reexamine the relationship with social welfare.
Fairness demands treating individuals equally, unless there are good reasons to treat them differently. These reasons may include: needs, desert, effort, circumstances, status quo, special ties, etc. and lead to some inequalities being justified.
Yet, these fairness reasons are generally disregarded by standard welfare criteria. In this paper, we show how Paretian social welfare functions can account for such fairness considerations.
We also include an application to Mirrleesian non-linear income taxation and allow individuals to partially deserve their income opportunities. Generalized utilitarianism is the extreme case when individuals do not deserve their income opportunities.
7. "Lack of opportunities, non-paternalism, and priority to the worse off." Link!
How to assess welfare reforms that affect the worse off? Poverty measures? Social welfare functions? I suggest a way to bridge the gap between the two!
Unlike SWFs, the characterized criteria compare individuals by their lack of opportunities.
Unlike poverty measures, the characterized criteria respect individuals' preferences.
Moreover, these criteria flexibly prioritize the worse off.
8. “The Ethics of Intergenerational Risk". Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 186: 104999.
9. “A Lipsetian Theory of Voluntary Power Handover" (with R. Boucekkine and F. Prieur). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2019 168: 269-291.
10. “A Fairness Justification of Utilitarianism." Econometrica, 2017, 85: 1261-1276.
11. “Equity and Efficiency in an Overlapping Generation Model.” (with T. Isaac) Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, 44, 549-565.
12. “Intergenerational Egalitarianism.” Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, 153: 117-127.
13. “Announcements as an Equilibrium Selection Device” (with N. Acocella, G. Di Bartolomeo and A. Hughes-Hallett). Oxford Economic Papers, 2014, 66: 325-347.
14. “Conflicts and coordination among groups” (with N. Acocella, G. di Bartolomeo, and A. Hughes-Hallett) in The theory of economic policy in a strategic context, N. Acocella, G. di Bartolomeo, and A. Hughes-Hallett; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 2012.
15. “Announcements as a coordination mechanism” (with N. Acocella, G. di Bartolomeo, and A. Hughes-Hallett) in The theory of economic policy in a strategic context, N. Acocella, G. di Bartolomeo, and A. Hughes-Hallett; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 2012.
16. "Conflict of interests, (Implicit) Coalitions and Nash Policy Games” (with N. Acocella and G. Di Bartolomeo), Economics Letters, 2009, 105: 303-305.
Paolo Piacquadio
Institute of Economics, University of St. Gallen, Varnbüelstrasse 19, 9000 St. Gallen