Terje Idland, Rolando Gonzalez, Øyvind Aas
Keywords: thinking classrooms, active learning, group dynamics, focused thinking, higher ICT education, didactics, group work
Abstract: This paper explores student learning experiences in the ICT course Digital Technology using one specific pedagogical approach, Pe- ter Liljedahl’s ”Thinking classrom”. We assigned 25 students to random groups to solve a network problem on whiteboards and conducted in- depth interviews with 10 participants. Thematic analysis revealed im- proved communication and academic focus, though knowledgeable stu- dents still took more active roles. While most students felt engaged, some noted drawbacks such as increased energy demands, awkwardness, and reduced autonomy, and expressed concerns about using this method for summative assessments.
Øyvind Aas and Wasana Leithe
keywords: Automated adaptive test, Undergraduate teaching, Randomized control trial
Abstract: We conduct a lab-based randomized controlled trial with 47 undergraduate students in mathematics, comparing an automated adaptive testing system, which adjusts difficulty based on performance, to traditional linear tests. Results shows that students using the adaptive test scored 26.2 percentage points higher on a subsequent exam than those in the linear test group (p < 0.05). Feedback indicate that participants found the system user-friendly, believed it could improve their performance, and valued the tailored feedback, particularly guidance on focus areas.
Øyvind Aas, Lester Lasrado, Helene Lie Røhr
Keyword: Higher Education, Field Experiment, Procrastination, Mathematics
Abstract: In this field experiment, we explore the connection between study habits and academic achievement among undergraduates in an introductory mathematics course at a Norwegian college. Using a procrastination scale based on self-reported behavior, we examine how students’ study habits influence their performance. Our findings reveal a negative correlation between self-identified procrastinators and the number of problem-sets submitted. Moreover, there is significant correlation between procrastination tendencies and the final course grade, but only for two of the four dimensions we use to measure procrastination. Notably, 43% of the variation in the final grade can be accounted for by prior competence, number of homework’s and the student’s age. Furthermore, to establish causality, we randomly divided the students into two groups: one received a text message on their mobile devices and the other did not. The text message emphasized the positive link between the number of completed problem sets and improved academic performance in the final exam. Through this controlled approach, we assess the impact of the text message on problem set submission and final exam performance. Our results indicate that the text message exerts no discernible influence on either the quantity of problem sets submitted or the performance in the final exam.
Øyvind Aas, Espen Moen, Fredrik Wulfsberg
Keywords: Price dispersion, retail prices, store heterogeneity
Abstract: This paper studies price dispersion in the Norwegian retail market for 766 products across 4 297 stores over 60 months. Price dispersion for homogeneous products is significant and persistent, with a coefficient of variation of 37% for the median product. Price dispersion differs between product categories and characteristics and over time. Store heterogeneity accounts for 30% of the observed variation in prices for the median product-month and for around 50% for the sample as a whole. Price dispersion is still prevalent after correcting for store heterogeneity.
Keywords: Career mobility, hierarchical organizations, learning and matching models.
Abstract: We analyze the careers of college football coaches who became head coaches at the FBS level from 2000 to 2016. Coaches move in two main ways: by college quality or coaching position. Our key finding shows that coaches don't always progress upwards linearly; 36.6\% of the moves are 'zigzag' moves, going up in hierarchy but down in college ranking, or vice versa. We present a model showing these moves as equilibrium outcomes. We document that these zigzag moves are related to both the speed at which a coach ascends to the top of the ladders and a team's performance following a new hire.
Øyvind Aas, Patrick Legros
Abstract: The success of organizations put in place by managers depends not only on the effort the manager exerts but also on how the manager's characteristics fit with those of other stakeholders. Both fit with the culture and the quality of the organization will determine whether a manager should stay or be replaced. Who has control at the time of this decision will affect the allocation of suplus, and also under which conditions renegotiation happens. What determines the duration of control of decision rights in contracts? We show that long-term control to the manager leads to first-best effort provision but with costly resolution of conflict for the owners; short-term control, on the other hand, always leads to inefficient effort provision but cheaper resolution of conflict for the owners.
Øyvind Aas
Abstract: This article studies the interaction between incomplete contracts and a decentralized input market on the make-or-buy decision in a vertical relationship, considering both contractual and matching frictions. The downstream manufacturer trades off the cost of inefficient investments against the option value of continued search. It is costly to search because the production has inefficient input levels. It is beneficial to search because the manufacturer can be matched with a better supplier. The model predicts that vertically integrated firms are more productive than non-integrated firms, and a sample of ex-ante identical manufacturers can choose different production structures.
Øyvind Aas
Abstract: This article introduces unobservable consumer characteristics in an equilibrium search model with random matching and posting to inspect the equilibrium price characteristics. When consumers hold different information about prices and preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous relative to the amount of informed consumers a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exist. Hence, the result from the standard models is only robust up to a certain point of added noise in preferences.