NIKOS NIKIFORAKIS

Abstract

Coordination problems are often modeled as weakest-link games, where the minimum contributing agent determines their group’s surplus to be shared in equal parts. Yet in many settings, the sharing of a jointly-produced surplus occurs through bargaining, which acts as a double-edged sword: It can promote effort by disciplining low contributors or deter it through the added uncertainty of returns. We present experimental evidence that bargaining improves coordination by promoting equitable divisions that reward higher contributions, even in one-shot interactions. High contributors are more likely than low contributors to propose allocations that reward effort, creating a virtuous cycle that increases efficiency. Allowing groups to endogenously select who can act as proposers can backfire: Efficiency increases when high contributors are endorsed but falls otherwise. These results highlight the scope and limits of participatory surplus division mechanisms in providing incentives for efficient coordination.

Abstract

Threshold models have been widely used to analyze interdependent behavior, yet empirical research identifying people’s thresholds is nonexistent. We introduce an incentivized method for eliciting thresholds and use it to study support for affirmative action in a large, stratified sample of the U.S. population. Most Asian, Black, Hispanic, and White men and women condition their support for affirmative action on the number of others supporting it. In line with preregistered hypotheses, thresholds are influenced by one’s perceived benefits and pressure to conform. We demonstrate how our method can offer unique insights for policy design and enhance understanding of social dynamics.

Abstract

There are pronounced racial, ethnic, and gender gaps in income in the U.S. We investigate whether these correspond with differences in competitiveness, risk tolerance, and confidence relative to performance in a large, stratified sample of the U.S. prime-age population. We find substantial differences in all three traits across Black, Hispanic, and White males and females. These traits predict individual income. Competitiveness and risk tolerance help explain the White gender income gap. Competitiveness also affects the Black-White income gap between men. Confidence about one’s performance helps explain a substantial and significant portion of all five race-gender income gaps with White men. 

Abstract

Cooperation often entails an unequal distribution of benefits. We study how inequality concerns affect the willingness to cooperate with others in an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. The experimental treatments vary the equality of payoffs resulting from mutual cooperation, the expected duration of an interaction, and whether the inequality remains constant throughout an interaction. At the aggregate level, we find that cooperation rates across treatments are accurately predicted by a model that assumes players solely care about their pecuniary payoffs. At the individual level, we find evidence that individuals care about treating others fairly, but not about inequality per se. 

Abstract

A substantial fraction of the gender gap in earnings is due to wage disparities between women with and without children. Inspired by evidence linking attitudes toward competition with labor-market outcomes, we explore the association between motherhood and the willingness to compete for pay. In two behavioral studies, one in the UAE and one in the USA, we find that mothers aged 18-30 are considerably less likely to choose a competitive payment scheme than similar women without children. The motherhood gap in competitiveness is not mediated by differences in ability, beliefs, risk attitudes, marital status, parental education, or the time since

the last pregnancy. In a third study, using survey data from a Dutch panel, we do not find support for the hypothesis that motherhood causes women’s competitiveness to drop. Instead, the findings suggest that the reduced competitiveness of mothers predates the birth of their children. Fathers, across studies, are at least as willing as non-fathers to compete for pay.

Abstract

Evidence from behavioral experiments with volunteer samples suggests that there exists a substantial gap in the willingness of men and women to compete. We ask whether a similar gap can be found in a population of economics majors – a population of interest as questions loom regarding the reasons for the underrepresentation of women in economics. We find a substantial gender gap in competitiveness – as well as in risk attitudes – among economics majors. We also find that self-selection into the lab causes us to overestimate this gap among volunteers by a factor of 2 to 3 depending on the econometric model.