Working papers:
"Communication through biased intermediators", with Rubén Jara and Francisco Silva
Abstract: We study biased intermediated communication between a sender and a receiver. We prove that the information that can be transmitted from the sender to the receiver is exactly the same as with direct (non-mediated) communication, provided there are (at least) two intermediators who do not communicate with each other. In that sense, the sender is not harmed by not being able to communicate with the receiver directly. This is the case even if the sender does not know the agents' biases and regardless of the rules of communication (cheap talk, bayesian persuasion, etc.). We discuss the implications of our results to a related information design problem, where a decision maker designs the statistical experiment to be performed by a possibly biased agent. We show that, if the decision maker is able to manipulate the data without causing any statistical loss, she can implement her preferred statistical experiment despite the agent being biased. If, however, manipulating the data has a statistical cost, then strategies that reduce the overall informativeness of the experiment (like reducing the sample) might actually be (second-best) optimal for the decision maker, because they may require less costly manipulation in order to dissuade biased agents from misreporting. We discuss these ideas in the context of medical research.
"Do you like me enough? The impact of restricting preferences ranking in a university matching process", with Jeanne Lafortune and Alejando Saenz. Submitted.
Abstract: This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, the impact of imposing preferences-on-preferences (POP) within the context of a deferred-acceptance university matching process. We show, theoretically, that this type of rules renders invalid the property of strategy-proofness that normally exists in Gale-Shapley algorithm as students will misrepresent their preferences in order to secure a spot in the university that implements POP. We then explore how applicants to Chilean universities responded to a 2003 policy shock where one of the main university, UChile, imposed POP and then to a shock in 2004 when the entrance exam was transformed, increasing uncertainty. Our results indicate that the response of participants matched those predicted by our model. Finally, we show that POP-type of policies generated substantial welfare losses to students within the system, particularly when faced with higher uncertainty.