Nelson's Star of the Order of the Bath

and awards to the family of Admiral Sir Richard Keats

To be sold by auction at: Sotheby’s, in the Main Gallery 34-35 New Bond Street London W1A 2AA

Day of Sale: Friday 22 October 2010 at 2.00 pm

A biography of Sir Richard Keats in The Shipwrecked Mariner, January 1868

From Keats Family Papers

Apart from an oblique (and slightly inaccurate) reference in The Shipwrecked Mariner, the survival of the star seems to have passed unremarked until now. Both star and letter have been preserved in excellent condition by several generations of the descendants of Sir Richard Keats. The sale also includes Sir Richard’s watch (presented to him by Prince Edward) and his own G.C.B., as well as campaign medals awarded to his nephew and great-nephew.

The full insignia of a Knight Companion of the Order of the Bath comprised a gold and enamel Collar and Collar Badge for use on ceremonial occasions as well as the Star and Sash which could be worn at any time. Nelson’s collar was retained by the Hood family and was used by Lady Charlotte’s son General Alexander Nelson Hood, 1st Viscount Bridport when he was created G.C.B. in 1891. It still survives, having been presented to a private institution by ‘a group of friends’ in 1932. Nelson’s collar badge, clearly visible in contemporary photographs, was amongst the Nelson relics consigned by Viscount Bridport to Christie’s for auction on 12 July 1895. With eleven other orders and medals it was acquired on behalf of the nation in a private sale which was arranged shortly before the auction was due to take place. The group, lots 176 to 186, included an added lot 180a - a ‘Cross of [the Order of St Joachim] Always worn by Nelson on his ordinary Service coat’ - and the purchase price was Ј2,500. The use of public funds for such a purpose was unprecedented at the time and the pieces were placed on public display alongside other Nelson relics in the Painted Hall, Greenwich. Almost all, including Nelson’s Bath badge, disappeared in the 1900 burglary.

The circumstances under which this highly important Star, valuable even in 1814, was presented to Sir Richard Keats have revealed fresh information concerning the deep friendship between Keats and Horatio Nelson as well as Keats’s patronage aboard H.M.S. SUPERB of Charles Nelson, the young cousin of Horatio and William.

We are indebted to Stephen Wood MA FSA for his original research, insight and valuable contributions throughout this catalogue.

Morton and Eden

Nelson’s decorations (K.B. badge, upper centre) photographed for Viscount Bridport, circa 1889

‘A GLORIOUS AND BRILLIANT VICTORY’ NELSON AND THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST VINCENT

Nelson’s ‘Patent Bridge’ for boarding First Rates

Commodore Nelson’s knighthood in what Colin White called his ‘Year of Destiny’, and his consequent ownership of this magnificent Star of the Order of the Bath, followed his extraordinary contribution to Sir John Jervis’s great victory over a Spanish fleet on 14 February 1797.

By this time Britain had been at war with Revolutionary France for four years. In October 1796 Spain had changed sides and had become an ally of France, thereby shifting the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean considerably and necessitating the virtual evacuation of that sea by British naval and military units. Whilst Spain had been an ally British ships could, and did, blockade the great French naval base of Toulon with impunity; after she became an enemy British ships risked being caught between the numerically powerful fleets of two nations. While the French navy still commanded little respect, its officer corps having yet to recover fully from evisceration by Revolutionary ardour, the same could not be said for the Spanish navy which, as N.A.M. Rodger has said, ‘...reached its apogee in the mid-1790s.’ (Rodger, 2004, p 379). Although Spanish naval ship-building peaked in that decade, resulting in some very fine, large and robust ships, this advantage was countered by low levels of competence and poor discipline. These standards were regarded as lamentable by officers such as Jervis and Nelson who had witnessed them when Spain had been an ally (Knight, p 204). The few actions fought by British ships against those of Spain between October 1796 and February 1797 had done little to change the minds of British officers about the fighting capacities of their new enemy and so, in anticipation of a major fleet action with the Spanish navy, British morale was high and Jervis’s ships’ companies were spoiling for a fight.

Commodore Horatio Nelson was characteristically bellicose. Having been closely involved in the hasty departure of British ships from their shore bases in the Mediterranean, he raged about its implications in a much-quoted letter to his wife of 17 October 1796:

‘...I lament our present orders [to evacuate the Mediterranean] in sackcloth and ashes, so dishonourable to the dignity of England, whose Fleets are equal to meet the World in arms; and of all the Fleets I ever saw, I never beheld one in point of officers and men equal to Sir John Jervis’s, who is a Commander-in-Chief able to lead them to glory.’ (Nicolas, II, p 291).

Nelson’s pugnacity was heightened in December 1796 when he was forced to relinquish a Spanish prize and came close to experiencing the questionable delights of a Spanish prison. Following the capture of two Spanish frigates by two ships under his command, H.M.S.s BLANCHE (32) and LA MINERVE (44), the subsequent appearance of a large Spanish squadron obliged Nelson to abandon his prizes and their prize crews, and the two British frigates had to make a run for it. Nelson was again forced to run from a superior Spanish force on 11 February when he was chased westwards by two Spanish men-of-war through the Strait of Gibraltar in LA MINERVE, in which he flew his commodore’s broad pendant although the ship was commanded by Captain George Cockburn. The chase became part of the Nelson legend when John Drinkwater, later to record the Battle of Cape St Vincent in his Narrative in terms so favourable to Nelson, embellished the reality with more than a little romance. According to Drinkwater, LA MINERVE lost a seaman overboard while being pursued by the Spanish ships and Lieutenant T.M. Hardy, with a ‘party of sailors’, lowered the jolly boat to try to rescue the man who was being swept rapidly astern towards the oncoming Spaniards. Finding no trace of him, Hardy and the boat’s crew attempted to return to LA MINERVE but struggled against the strong current in the Strait. Despite the oncoming Spanish ships Nelson ordered Cockburn to slow LA MINERVE’s progress, reportedly saying ‘by God, I’ll not lose Hardy, back the mizzen topsail’. The ship drifted back towards the jolly boat, which was recovered safely, whereupon all sail was made and the frigate rapidly out-sailed its pursuers. As Roger Knight has observed ‘At this point in Nelson’s career myths began to take hold’ (Knight, p 218), and the reality of this particular chase, which is soberly told in Knight’s magisterial biography of Nelson, is naturally rather more prosaic.

What is beyond dispute, however, is that Nelson had twice been chased, and twice required to run, by superior Spanish forces within a two-month period. For someone like Nelson, so imbued with patriotism, contempt for his country’s enemies, frustration with the pusillanimity of some of his superiors and indubitable ambition, this only served to heighten his natural aggression. That aggression and ambition were to be given free rein on 14 February 1797.

Nelson arrived with Jervis’s fleet by noon on 13 February, having passed through the Spanish fleet in the darkness of the previous night. The two fleets were converging off Cape St Vincent. The Spanish were outward bound for South America, protecting some mercury-laden transports and anxious to avoid battle; the British were eager to engage them and to achieve a victory that would do much to improve morale at home. Jervis was aware of the proximity of the Spanish but their fleet was not sighted until early in the morning of 14 February. By this time Nelson had hoisted his broad pendant in H.M.S. CAPTAIN (74) which Jervis had stationed in the rear division of the British fleet. By mid-morning the two fleets were fully in sight of each other and the disparities between their number, size and sailing discipline became apparent. The Spanish fleet comprised twenty-two ships of the line, ‘some of them the biggest in the world, massively built of hardwoods from Spain’s empire’ (Knight, pp 221 and 222n). Against these colossi Jervis had fifteen line-of-battle warships, most of them third-rates of 74 guns; both fleets of course also included frigates and smaller craft whose function was not to trade broadsides in a fleet action.

At 10.57am Jervis signalled for line of battle to be formed and the British fleet headed like an arrow, at an obtuse angle, for the centre of the loosely grouped clusters of Spanish ships. The Spanish attempted, with conspicuous confusion, to form some sort of defence against this rapidly approaching British attack. At 11.30am, the head of the British line formed by H.M.S. CULLODEN (74), Captain Thomas Troubridge, sailed through a gap in the centre of the Spanish fleet, CULLODEN raking the stern of a Spanish three-decker as she passed. As the two fleets converged a general fire – at varying ranges – was exchanged, although the Spanish ships were so deployed that they were unable to bring the maximum potential weight of their guns to bear. By the time the British van was through the gap in the Spanish fleet, Jervis signalled to his fleet to tack in succession, a manoeuvre that would bring the two fleets on parallel or converging tacks. The British would have the weather gauge and so be better able to dictate the battle that Jervis wanted: to roll up the rear of the fleet, if possible by ‘doubling’ the Spanish ships (attacking them from both sides simultaneously).

The British van obeyed this signal and raced after the retreating Spaniards but the centre and rear divisions of the line were delayed by a short running fight with a group of Spanish warships to leeward and, after that had ended, by a shift in the wind. This meant that the British van, comprising only five ships, was gaining on seventeen Spanish ships and was in danger of being overwhelmed by them whilst unsupported by the rest of the British fleet. By noon the British van was in range of the Spanish. Being closer to the Spanish fleet than Jervis, whose vision of distant events was obscured by smoke from a recent engagement, Nelson could see that the British van was in danger and that the Spanish still represented a real threat, particularly if they were able to join forces with the other Spanish ships to leeward.

At 12.50pm Nelson gave the order for H.M.S. CAPTAIN to wear out of line and to head for the British van. In doing this he was not disobeying orders in the manner which has sometimes been suggested; he was rather using his initiative in interpreting Jervis’s latest signals. Jervis had just signalled, initially, to his ships astern of the flagship to tack in succession in order to reinforce the van and then, immediately afterwards, by flying signal 41:

‘The ships to take suitable station for their mutual support and to engage the enemy as arriving up with them in succession.’ (Knight, p 223).

Jervis was famously aware of the foolishness of too rigidly adhering to ‘tactics’ and rules of engagement in sea battles and welcomed initiative, especially if it got results; Nelson certainly knew this. By wearing ship, Nelson was able to bring H.M.S. CAPTAIN into action far faster than by tacking her but even so – and despite his somewhat exaggerated accounts of how quickly CAPTAIN joined the battle – the leading ships of the British van were engaged before CAPTAIN was able to join them, some thirty minutes after changing her course in order to do so (Palmer, p 42).

H.M.S. CAPTAIN opened fire at extreme range, her guns firing as they bore upon the vast Spanish flagship SANTISSIMA TRINIDAD, the largest ship in the world at the time and mounting 120 guns. In effect Nelson cut across the bows of the Spanish fleet, thereby halting its flight and, together with the other ships in the British van, bringing it to a battle that Knight calls ‘…a close-quarter mкlйe, with crews striving at a desperate pace to load and fire their guns as quickly as possible…’ (Knight, p 223). By 2pm, when Jervis made the signal for close action, the majority of the British fleet had caught up with the van; ten minutes later he signalled H.M.S. EXCELLENT (74), Captain Cuthbert Collingwood, to forge ahead and to assist Nelson by breaking the Spanish line. By 2.45pm the first Spanish ship had struck her colours and by 3pm a second had joined her in surrendering.

Nelson, with Berry, boarding the SAN JOSE

It was in this final stage of the battle that Nelson took the action which gained him lasting fame. Wearing out of the line of battle had been done before but Nelson’s next exploit had never previously been attempted. After being heavily engaged for about ninety minutes, H.M.S. CAPTAIN had sustained severe damage to her rigging, had lost her fore topmast and had her wheel shot away. She was alongside the 84-gun SAN NICOLAS and still heavily engaged with her when Collingwood, in H.M.S. EXCELLENT, passed very close to the Spanish ship and poured a rolling broadside into her before pressing on to attack the Spanish flagship. Collingwood’s broadside staggered SAN NICOLAS, causing her to luff and to collide with the 112-gun SAN JOSE, herself badly damaged. Nelson seized his opportunity, ordering 1st Lieutenant Edward Berry to secure CAPTAIN to SAN NICOLAS. As Berry did so Nelson gathered a boarding party of sailors and soldiers of 69th Regiment of Foot, serving on CAPTAIN as marines, and boarded SAN NICOLAS through her smashed stern cabin windows. This boarding party rushed the Spanish quarterdeck from her stern while Berry – who had been first aboard the Spaniard with another boarding party – fought his way aft from her bow; Spanish resistance was brief. Realising that a further prize was there for the taking, Nelson led his boarding party, by now reinforced by his loyal bodyguard of boat’s crew from H.M.S. AGAMEMNON, across to the quarterdeck of SAN JOSE, where resistance proved negligible. In the space of no more than twenty minutes Nelson and his men had captured two large Spanish warships, using one – as popular accounts of the event in Britain were to term it – as his ‘Patent Bridge’ for boarding the other. Although both ships were indeed boarded and captured by Nelson and his men, the Spaniards were ripe for the taking having sustained considerable damage from other British ships.

In capturing two Spanish ships, Nelson and his boarding parties were responsible for a half of the prizes taken at Cape St Vincent. The victory was one that Britain sorely needed and the nation’s rewards were generous. Jervis was created Earl St Vincent, two of his subordinate admirals received baronetcies, and Nelson was made a Knight Companion of the Order of the Bath.

On the day after the battle Nelson was discussing the question of honours with Colonel Drinkwater who, together with Sir Gilbert Elliot, had rather unexpectedly been present to witness his daring triumph. Rebuffing with feeling Drinkwater’s initial speculation regarding a baronetcy (which would have been expensive and socially burdensome), Nelson much preferred Drinkwater’s next suggestion of the Bath:

‘Yes, if my services have been of any value, let them be noticed in a way that the public may know me, or them’. (Nicolas, II, p 348).

Nelson wrote to Elliot without delay, aware that he and Drinkwater were imminently leaving for England aboard the LIVELY to report on the outcome of the battle. Already an accomplished self-publicist, he asked Elliot to make it known that (at this time, at least) he had no desire for an hereditary title but, in a clear reference to the Bath:

‘… other Honours, which die with the Possessor … I should be proud to accept, if my efforts are thought worthy by my King’. (Nicolas II, p 351).

Nelson’s hopes were fulfilled. His award of the Bath was confirmed in a letter from the Admiralty dated 17 March 1797, by which time Nelson had become a Rear-Admiral as the result of a regular promotion.

‘I have His Majesty’s commands to acquaint you, that in order to mark his Royal approbation of your successful and gallant exertions on several occasions during the course of the present War in the Mediterranean, and more particularly of your very distinguished conduct in the glorious and brilliant Victory obtained over the Fleet of Spain by His Majesty’s Fleet, under the command of Admiral Sir John Jervis on the 14th of February last’.

In June the Duke of Portland wrote to the newly-created Earl of St Vincent with the King’s further instructions:

‘to nominate him [Nelson] to be one of the Knights Companions of the most Honourable Order of the Bath, and it being necessary that he should be invested with the ensigns of the said order which are transmitted to him by this opportunity I am to signify to your Lordship the Kings pleasure that you should perform that ceremony’.

In the event Nelson’s voyage to Tenerife and the loss of his arm at Santa Cruz meant that the intended on-board ceremony, which would have created a precedent, never took place. Instead, he was invested by King George III on 27 September 1797 at St James’s Palace, when the King observed that Nelson had lost his right arm. Nelson is said to have replied: ‘but not my right hand, as I have the honour of presenting Captain Berry to you; and besides, may it please Your Majesty, I can never think that a loss which the performance of my duty has occasioned; and so long as I have a foot to stand on, I will combat for my King and Country’ (Nicolas II, p 448). The King’s retort was: ‘But your country has a claim for a bit more of you’. (Knight, p 257).

For Nelson it was crucial that the Crown should bear the cost of his K.B. which, in his case, amounted to the substantial sum of Ј428 7s 5d; this included Ј7 13s for a ‘Warrant for Dispensation for wearing the Star’. The star was, of course, a highly visible mark of distinction of exactly the type which Nelson craved and which, whether in its metal or cloth form, he was to wear at every opportunity. As Drinkwater later wrote:

‘To him medals and ribbons were no trivial baubles, but badges of bravery, earned distinctions unavailable to mere men of birth’. (Drinkwater 1840).

As with so many events in Nelson’s life and career, his actions at Cape St Vincent on 14 February 1797, as well as his means of ensuring that his was the first account of the battle to be read by the King, and even his knighthood have attracted different interpretations and reactions ever since that bloody St Valentine’s Day more than two centuries ago. What is undisputed, however, is the tangible recognition by his King of Nelson’s actions at Cape St Vincent, epitomised by the superb star now offered for sale.

Stephen Wood MA FSA

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