Publications

Cooperation is unaffected by the threat of severe adverse events in public goods games, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2024, 108, 102145  (with E. Bilancini, L. Boncinelli and V. Pizziol) 

Abstract: In the context of a one-shot public goods game with a large group size and a low marginal per capita return, we study if and how cooperation is affected by the presence of environmental risk—defined as an exogenous stochastic process that generates a severe adverse event with a very small probability—and by the correlation of such risk among the group members. More specifically, we run an online experiment to investigate the effect of a risk that is independent across group members, a risk that is positively correlated among group members, and a risk that is negatively correlated among group members on cooperation. We find that neither the presence nor the correlation of risk significantly affects individual contributions.

Letting Third Parties who Suffer from Petty Corruption Talk: Evidence from a Collusive Bribery Experiment, European Journal of Political Economy, 2023, 76, 102233  (with M. V. Levati) 

Abstract: Following a recommendation by Transparency International, we conduct a laboratory experiment to gauge the impact of a specific type of grassroots participation on petty corruption. Participants play a one-shot, three person sequential bribery game that, depending on the treatment, either gives or does not give passive third parties suffering from corruption the opportunity to send a publicly visible message to potential bribers and bribees.We find that messaging opportunities deter bribe offers (i.e., the extensive margin of bribe), but affect neither the size of the offered bribe (i.e., the intensive margin) nor bribe acceptances. We conjecture that the different impact of the treatment on bribe-givers and bribe-takers may be due to the order of play.

Risk Preferences and the Role of Emotions, Economica, 2018, 85(338), 305-328 (with A. Conte and M. V. Levati). 

Abstract: There is a large volume of research showing that emotions have relevant effects on decision-making. We contribute to this literature by experimentally investigating the impact of four specific emotional states—joviality, sadness, fear and anger—on risk attitudes. In order to do so, we fit two models of behaviour under risk: the expected utility model and the rank dependent expected utility model, assuming several functional forms of the weighting function. Our results indicate that all emotional states mitigate risk aversion. Furthermore, we show that there are some differences across gender and participants’ experience in laboratory experiments.

Play versus Strategy Method: Behavior and the Role of Emotions in the Ultimatum Game, Italian Economic Journal, 2018, 4(1), 91-106.

Abstract: In the context of a three-person ultimatum game featuring a proposer and two responders, this paper aims to investigate whether there are differences in bargainers' behavior engendered by the use of the play and the strategy methods and to shed light on the role of emotions in explaining these differences. Although proposers correctly expect responders facing the play and the strategy methods to feel different emotions, our results reveal that they offer the same amount to both responders, on average. The two response methods also yield quantitatively similar acceptance rates. We thus provide further evidence that the play and the strategy methods do not significantly bias the behavior of bargainers.

An ultimatum game with multidimensional response strategies, Review of Behavioral Economics, 2016, 3(3-4), 281-310 (with W. Güth, M. V. Levati and I. Soraperra).

Abstract: We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative approach to type classification, we find that the majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome-based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer’s demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer. According to our data, this result can be explained by a concern for moral integrity rather than by a strong preference for equality.