Edited Volume
M. Diss and V. Merlin (2021), «Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Essays by and in honor of William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley». Studies in Choice and Welfare - Springer, Berlin.
Peer-reviewed articles
M. Diss, E. Kamwa, and C. Gubong Gassi Takoulo (2025), «On the price of diversity in multi-winner elections under (weakly) separable committee scoring rule», European Journal of Operational Research, forthcoming.
M. Diss, C. Gubong Gassi Takoulo, and I. Moyouwou (2025), «Combining diversity and excellence in multiwinner elections», Group Decision and Negotiation, forthcoming.
S. Béal, M. Diss, and R. Tido Takeng (2025), «New axiomatizations of the Diversity Owen and Shapley values», International Journal of Game Theory, 54, 12.
S. Béal, M. Deschamps, M. Diss, and R. Tido Takeng (2025), «Cooperative games with diversity constraints», Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 116, 103077.
M. Diss, E. Kamwa, and A. Tlidi (2025), «The effect of close elections on the likelihood of voting paradoxes: Further results in three-candidate elections», Revue d’Economie Politique, Vol. 135(1), pp. 113-148.
S. Béal, M. Deschamps, M. Diss, and R. Tido Takeng (2025), «Multiwinner elections with diversity constraints on individual preferences», Revue d’Economie Politique, Vol. 135(1), pp. 169-204.
R. Biard, M. Deschamps, M. Diss, and A. Roussel (2024), «Assessing available care time and nursing shortage in a hospital», International Game Theory Review, Vol. 26, 2440004.
M. Diss, C. Gubong Gassi Takoulo, and I. Moyouwou (2023), «Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule», Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 61, pp. 489-510.
M. Diss, K. Dougherty, and J.C. Heckelman (2023), «When Ties are Possible: Weak Condorcet Winners and Arrovian Rationality», Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 123, pp. 128-136.
A. Awde, M. Diss, E. Kamwa, J.-Y. Rolland, and A. Tlidi (2023), «Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures». In Kurz, S., Maaser, N., and Mayer, A. (editors), Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century. Springer, Berlin.
S. Béal, M. Deschamps, M. Diss, and I. Moyouwou (2022) «Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games», Public Choice, Vol. 191, pp. 75-103.
M. Diss and M. Gori (2022), «Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences», Theory and Decision, Vol. 92, pp. 319-347.
M. Diss and B. Tsvelikhovskiy (2021), «Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules», Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 111, pp. 11-18.
M. Diss, P. Pérez-Asurmendi, and A. Tlidi (2021), «The effect of closeness on the election of a pairwise majority rule winner». In Diss, M. and Merlin, V. (editors), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Essays by and in honor of William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley. Springer, Berlin.
M. Diss, E. Kamwa, I. Moyouwou, and H. Smaoui (2021), «Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention». In Diss, M. and Merlin, V. (editors), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Essays by and in honor of William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley. Springer, Berlin.
D. Bubboloni, M. Diss, and M. Gori (2020), «Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting», Public Choice, Vol. 183, pp. 151-185.
M. Diss, E. Kamwa, and A. Tlidi (2020), «On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle», Revue d’Economie Politique, Vol. 130 (5), pp. 699-725.
M. Diss and M. Mahajne (2020), «Social acceptability of Condorcet committees», Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 105, pp. 14-27.
M. Diss and E. Kamwa (2020), «Simulations in models of preference aggregation», OEconomia, Vol. 10(2), pp. 279-308.
M. Diss and A. Tlidi (2018), «Another perspective on Borda’s paradox», Theory and Decision, Vol. 84(1), pp. 99-121.
M. Diss, E. Kamwa, and A. Tlidi (2018), «A Note on the Likelihood of the Absolute Majority Paradoxes», Economics Bulletin, Vol. 38(4), pp. 1727-1734.
M. Diss and A. Doghmi (2016), «Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes», Public Choice, Vol. 169(1), pp. 97-116.
M. Diss and P. Pérez-Asurmendi (2016), «Probabilities of consistent election outcomes with majorities based on difference in support», Group Decision and Negotiation, Vol. 25(5), pp. 967-994.
M. Diss and P. Pérez-Asurmendi (2016), «Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes», Theory and Decision, Vol. 80(3), pp. 473-494.
M. Diss and W.V. Gehrlein (2015), «The true impact of voting rule selection on Condorcet Efficiency», Economics Bulletin, Vol. 35(4), pp. 2418-2426.
M. Diss and A. Zouache (2015), «A Study of the confessional distribution of power in Lebanon», Revue d’Economie Politique (in french), Vol. 125(4), pp. 527-546.
R. Baron, M. Diss, E. Rémila, and P. Solal (2015), «A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support», Social Choice and Welfare, Vol .45, pp. 123-153.
M. Diss (2015), «Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules», Annals of Operations Research, Vol. 229, pp. 347-376.
M. Diss and W.V. Gehrlein (2012), «Borda’s Paradox with Weighted Scoring Rules», Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 38, pp. 121-136.
M. Diss, A. Louichi, V. Merlin, and H. Smaoui (2012), «An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules», Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 64, pp. 57-66.
M. Diss, V. Merlin, and F. Valognes (2010), «On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives», In J.-F. Laslier and R. Sanver, editors. Handbook of Approval Voting. Heidelberg ; Springer-Verlag, pp. 255-283.
M. Diss and V. Merlin (2010), «On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules», Theory and Decision, Vol. 69(2), pp. 289-316.