Edited Volume
M. Diss and V. Merlin (2021), «Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Essays by and in honor of William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley». Studies in Choice and Welfare - Springer, Berlin.
Peer-reviewed articles
M. Diss, C. Gubong Gassi Takoulo, and I. Moyouwou (2023), «Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule», Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 61, pp. 489-510.
M. Diss, K. Dougherty, and J.C. Heckelman (2023), «When Ties are Possible: Weak Condorcet Winners and Arrovian Rationality», Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 123, pp. 128-136.
A. Awde, M. Diss, E. Kamwa, J.-Y. Rolland, and A. Tlidi (2023), «Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures». In Kurz, S., Maaser, N., and Mayer, A. (editors), Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century. Springer, Berlin.
S. Béal, M. Deschamps, M. Diss, and I. Moyouwou (2022) «Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games», Public Choice, Vol. 191, pp. 75-103.
M. Diss and M. Gori (2022), «Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences», Theory and Decision, Vol. 92, pp. 319-347.
M. Diss and B. Tsvelikhovskiy (2021), «Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules», Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 111, pp. 11-18.
M. Diss, P. Pérez-Asurmendi, and A. Tlidi (2021), «The effect of closeness on the election of a pairwise majority rule winner». In Diss, M. and Merlin, V. (editors), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Essays by and in honor of William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley. Springer, Berlin.
M. Diss, E. Kamwa, I. Moyouwou, and H. Smaoui (2021), «Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention». In Diss, M. and Merlin, V. (editors), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Essays by and in honor of William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley. Springer, Berlin.
D. Bubboloni, M. Diss, and M. Gori (2020), «Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting», Public Choice, Vol. 183, pp. 151-185.
M. Diss, E. Kamwa, and A. Tlidi (2020), «On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle», Revue d’Economie Politique, Vol. 130 (5), pp. 699-725.
M. Diss and M. Mahajne (2020), «Social acceptability of Condorcet committees», Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 105, pp. 14-27.
M. Diss and E. Kamwa (2020), «Simulations in models of preference aggregation», OEconomia, Vol. 10(2), pp. 279-308.
M. Diss and A. Tlidi (2018), «Another perspective on Borda’s paradox», Theory and Decision, Vol. 84(1), pp. 99-121.
M. Diss, E. Kamwa, and A. Tlidi (2018), «A Note on the Likelihood of the Absolute Majority Paradoxes», Economics Bulletin, Vol. 38(4), pp. 1727-1734.
M. Diss and A. Doghmi (2016), «Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes», Public Choice, Vol. 169(1), pp. 97-116.
M. Diss and P. Pérez-Asurmendi (2016), «Probabilities of consistent election outcomes with majorities based on difference in support», Group Decision and Negotiation, Vol. 25(5), pp. 967-994.
M. Diss and P. Pérez-Asurmendi (2016), «Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes», Theory and Decision, Vol. 80(3), pp. 473-494.
M. Diss and W.V. Gehrlein (2015), «The true impact of voting rule selection on Condorcet Efficiency», Economics Bulletin, Vol. 35(4), pp. 2418-2426.
M. Diss and A. Zouache (2015), «A Study of the confessional distribution of power in Lebanon», Revue d’Economie Politique (in french), Vol. 125(4), pp. 527-546.
R. Baron, M. Diss, E. Rémila, and P. Solal (2015), «A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support», Social Choice and Welfare, Vol .45, pp. 123-153.
M. Diss (2015), «Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules», Annals of Operations Research, Vol. 229, pp. 347-376.
M. Diss and W.V. Gehrlein (2012), «Borda’s Paradox with Weighted Scoring Rules», Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 38, pp. 121-136.
M. Diss, A. Louichi, V. Merlin, and H. Smaoui (2012), «An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules», Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 64, pp. 57-66.
M. Diss, V. Merlin, and F. Valognes (2010), «On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives», In J.-F. Laslier and R. Sanver, editors. Handbook of Approval Voting. Heidelberg ; Springer-Verlag, pp. 255-283.
M. Diss and V. Merlin (2010), «On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules», Theory and Decision, Vol. 69(2), pp. 289-316.
Media
M. Diss (2020), «Failles dans le scrutin majoritaire». Journal en direct.
M. Deschamps and M. Diss (2019), «Brexit et agences européennes : pourquoi l’EMA va à Amsterdam et l’EBE à Paris». The Conversation.
Book review
M. Diss (2015), «Fuzzy Social Choice Theory, Michael B. Gibilisco et al, Springer: A review», European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 245, pp. 341-342.
Proceedings
M. Diss, A. Louichi, V. Merlin, and H. Smaoui (2010), «On the stability of a scoring rules set under the IAC», Dagstuhl Seminar Proceeding, Computational Foundations of Social Choice.