In this project, we try to understand how firms can disclose information (about consumers' valuation for the firm's item) to direct consumer search in the context of price competition among firms. We consider a simple framework with two firms in which the match value of one of the firms' products is unknown. We study optimal information disclosure and optimal induced search in such a framework. We examine how pre-search information disclosure affects equilibrium prices and how does the search cost affect equilibrium prices and information disclosure.

In 2017, the Alberta Utilities Commission in Alberta, Canada, ordered the system operator to cease publishing the Historical Trading Report, which contained a complete list of firms' wholesale (past) market bids. It is well known that limiting the availability of information may reduce firms' ability to coordinate to push prices up. However, it may also reduce the ability of firms to learn about the fundamentals of the market, damaging their capacity to operate more efficiently. In this project, we study (both theoretically and empirically) the extent to which cutting information was beneficial for the competitiveness of Alberta's electric market.

The value that a consumer assigns to a product depends on the quality of their match. For search goods, the consumer can learn the quality through information about the product. For experience goods, the quality of the match can only be discovered after trying the item. In this project, we study a model in which the product has both an experience and search component. We assume that the consumer can acquire costly information about the first while the firm can provide information about the second. In this framework, we study the firm's optimal information disclosure and pricing strategy.