"Establishment Productivity Convergence and the Effect of Foreign Ownership at the Frontier" - World Development, 122: 245-260, 2019 (PDF)

"Foreign Direct Investment and Collective Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries" - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 149: 389-412, 2018. (PDF)

Working Papers:

"Complementarity in Public and Private Intellectual Property Enforcement; Implications for International Standards" Revision requested by Oxford Economic Papers


Abstract: I examine the relationship between publicly provided enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights and an authentic producer's strategies to influence entry of non-deceptive counterfeit products. I consider investment in supplemental private IP enforcement through the legal system, as well as endogenous product quality. I show that when public IP enforcement is low, the authentic firm accommodates counterfeit entry by choosing low private enforcement and relatively high product quality. However, under high public enforcement, the firm deters entry through high private enforcement and a reduction in quality. This mechanism creates a non-monotonic relationship between public enforcement and social welfare, and incentivizes inefficiently low public enforcement. In this context, I show that international efforts to impose stricter legal penalties against counterfeiters can be counterproductive; further reducing public enforcement and increasing counterfeit prevalence. In contrast, minimum quality standards can be implemented to prevent quality reductions, incentivize higher public enforcement, and reduce inefficiency.

"Trade Secret Protection in a Small Open Economy"


Abstract: Surveys of U.S. based multinational enterprises reveal that trade secret misappropriation by current and former employees remains a substantial impediment to conducting business in emerging markets. In this paper, I examine the consequences of this employment related trade secret misappropriation in an open economy context. I develop a general equilibrium model featuring heterogenous firms that differ in both standard productivity and the degree to which they must expose employees to their trade secrets. To prevent employees from leaking trade secrets, firms offer an incentive compatible wage based on their individual exposure, and the common level of legal protection. Entry selection generates an endogenous distribution of firm specific wages and positive unemployment in equilibrium. Simulations of the calibrated model show that the aggregate gains from stronger legal protection are distributed unevenly across workers, and that most workers are worse-off following this reform.