Research
Working Papers
This paper studies strategic experimentation between two players, with one player initially better informed about the state of nature. They are otherwise symmetric and observe past experimentation decisions and outcomes. I construct an equilibrium in which a mutual encouragement effect arises: as the public information becomes discouraging, the informed player's high effort continuously brings in good news, encouraging the uninformed player to experiment; in return, the uninformed player's experimentation pattern yields a rising reward, encouraging the informed player to experiment. Thanks to this effect, players' total effort can increase over time, and the uninformed player may grow increasingly optimistic, despite the discouraging public information. Moreover, creating information asymmetry improves ex-ante total welfare when the informed player's initial signal is sufficiently precise.
I study addictive good consumption by a consumer who has hyperbolic discounting preferences. The good is addictive, in that an increase in past consumption raises current marginal utility. I find that while high consumption in the past necessarily traps the consumer in excessive consumption in the future, she can adopt (and must adopt) a ``bright-line rule'' to escape from the trap if her past consumption is low. Under some conditions, a bright-line rule can sustain moderation or even underconsumption in the long run. The result helps explain the lapse-activated consumption pattern commonly documented in individuals who have addiction problems.
Bargaining and Timing of Information Acquisition, joint with Kalyan Chatterjee and Tetsuya Hoshino
We consider an ultimatum game in which the value of the object being sold to the buyer can be either high or low. The seller knows what the value is but the buyer does not. The value of the object to the seller is zero. We introduce the option for the buyer to acquire information before and after the offer, at a low cost. This information either reveals the value is high or provides no information. As the cost of information vanishes, in all Pareto-undominated equilibria, the buyer gets all the surplus although the option is never used.
Does Reducing Communication Barriers Promote Diversity?, joint with Tatiana Mayskaya (R&R at Journal of Economic Theory)
We study optimal diversity (in expertise) in hiring decisions. The key trade-off our model captures is that while raising diversity enlarges the pool of knowledge in a team, it also increases the communication barriers between the hired experts. The optimal diversity balances this trade-off. We find that a gradual reduction in communication costs can lower diversity, but a big reduction in communication costs will eventually foster diversity.
Occupational Segregation in a Roy Model with Composition preferences, joint with Haoning Chen, Marc Henry, and Ivan Sidorov (R&R at Games and Economic Behavior)
Strategic Disclosure in Research Races, joint with Kalyan Chatterjee and Kaustav Das
Diversity in Teams, joint with Tatiana Mayskaya, Vladimir Smirnov, Olivia Taylor, Andrew Wait
Work in Progress