JOB MARKET PAPER
Puzzle of Cooperation: One for all, all for one—von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto [pdf]
Applications of the maximin criterion extend beyond economics to statistics, computer science, politics, and operations research. However, the maximin criterion---be it von Neumann's, Wald's, or Rawls'---draws fierce criticism due to its extremely pessimistic stance. I propose a novel concept, dubbed the optimin criterion, which is based on (Pareto) optimizing the worst-case payoffs of tacit agreements. The optimin criterion generalizes and unifies results in various fields: It not only coincides with (i) Wald's statistical decision-making criterion when Nature is antagonistic, but also generalizes (ii) Nash equilibrium in n-person constant-sum games, (iii) the core in cooperative games, (iv) stable matchings in matching models, and (v) competitive equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu economy. Moreover, every Nash equilibrium satisfies the optimin criterion in an auxiliary game. Finally, the optimin criterion is the first parameter-free concept that can selectively explain the puzzle of cooperation in games, including the repeated prisoner's dilemma, the traveler's dilemma, the centipede game, and the repeated public goods game.
PEER-REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS AND ACCEPTED PAPERS
1. Supporting Cooperation via Agreement Equilibrium, with Ronald Peeters. Forthcoming, Management Science. [pdf]
2. Making the Rules of Sports Fairer (with Steven J. Brams), accepted, SIAM Review (5-yr impact factor: 7.143) [pdf]
3. Catch-Up: A Rule That Makes Service Sports More Competitive (with Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, and Walter Stromquist), American Mathematical Monthly, forthcoming. [pdf]
4. Catch-Up: A Game in Which the Lead Alternates (with Aaron Isaksen, Steven J. Brams and Andy Nealen), Game & Puzzle Design Journal, vol. 1, no. 2, 2015. [pdf]
Catch-Up is copyrighted by New York University (75%) and Maastricht University (25%)
Play demo: http://game.engineering.nyu.edu/projects/catch-up/
WORKING PAPERS
1. Puzzle of Cooperation: One for all, all for one---von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto [pdf, previous versions]
2. Multi-battle n-player Dynamic Contests: An Application to the US Presidential Primaries, with Nejat Anbarci, and Kutay Cingiz [pdf]
3. Farsightedness in Games: Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflicts, with Steven J. Brams. [pdf]
4. The story of conflict and cooperation [pdf]
5. Is Rationality a Personal Trait? A Paradox [pdf]
6. Equivalence Between Two-Player Symmetric Games and Decision Problems.
7. Existence of Pure Equilibria in Two-Person Symmetric Zero-Sum Games, with Ronald Peeters.
WORK IN PROGRESS AND CONFERENCE REPORT
1. On Mill’s No-Harm Principle, with Shaun Hargreaves Heap.
2. Non-cooperative Solution Concepts, with Lorenzo Bastianello.
3. TBD, with Ronald Peeters.
4. Inheritance game, in Yonatan Aumann, Jérôme Lang, and Ariel D. Procaccia (Eds.), Fair Division (Dagstuhl Seminar 16232), Dagstuhl Reports, vol. 6, no. 6, p. 19, 2016 [pdf]