Research

★ "Babel: Persuasion with Anonymous Senders", 2025, work in progress. 

• Abstract: In communication games with multiple senders, I refer to babel as a setting in which the receiver cannot attribute messages to specific senders. This captures features of election campaigns and other public debates, where some senders may benefit from sabotaging the shared message. A binary model with threshold utility functions is both rich and relatively tractable. While best-response dynamics is often cyclical, pure-strategy equilibria exist when senders are small and there is a common order of signals. Even when senders strongly disagree over outcomes, partial communication compromises can emerge. Conversely, when preferences are nearly aligned in outcomes, communication behavior can exhibit runaway divergence: either one sender contributes only noise, or the other one attempts to contribute full information.

★ "Information acquisition in citizen and representative assemblies", 2021.

• • Manuscript

★ "Communication via Intermediaries", 2020, Games and Economic Behavior, 

• • doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.005,

  • manuscript, 

  • [Extensions discussed in Section 4 are presented in an older version: "Communication with an Intermediary", 2018, manuscript]

★ "Voting as a War of Attrition", 2019, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, with Helia Marreiros and Michael Vlassopoulos,  

• • doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.09.020,

  • 2018, IZA Discussion Paper No. 11595. ftp.iza.org/dp11595.pdf

  • 2018, Southampton Discussion Paper

★ "Efficient Voting with Penalties", 2017, Games and Economic Behavior, 

• • doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.006,

  • 2014, Discussion Paper

★ "An experimental study of voting with costly delay", 2016, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 23-26, with Marreiros, Helia & Vlassopoulos, Michael. 

• • doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.019 

  • 2016, IZA Discussion Paper No. 9336 ftp.iza.org/dp9336.pdf 

★ "Conclave", European Economic Review, 2014, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 258-275. 

• • doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.05.004 

★ "Reputation in multi-unit ascending auction with common values", 2013, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 216-218. 

• • doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.007 

★ "Reputation And Cooperation In The Repeated Second‐Price Auctions" , 2011, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 982-1001. 

• • doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01035.x 

★ "Political Sustainability of Unfunded Pensions in an Endogenous Growth Model", 2007, The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-15. 

• • doi.org/10.2202/1935-1690.1381

Research on ideas.repec.org