I am an assistant professor in the Department of Economics at Arizona State University.
Here is my CV (last updated September 2025).
⚔️ Contests
🐯 Biology
💬 Communication
✨ Bayesian Persuasion
🙉 Rational Inattention
🌵 Decision-Making
🛒 Consumer Search
🍎 Public Economics
💰 Financial Economics
🏛️ “I don’t request that every theory seminar [paper] be about prices and markets. But at least once in a while, that would be nice.”*
(🏛️) Robust Welfare under Imperfect Competition (2025). Joint with K v. Beringe
(🌵) Outside Options and Risk Attitude (2025) Slides. Joint with G. Curello, and L. Sinander.
(🍎🏛️) Within-Year Labor Supply Responses to Year-End Incentives: Theory and Evidence (2025). Joint with A. Kostøl, A. Myhre, and M. Merkle.
(✨💰🏛️) Competitive Ratings Design and Pricing, RF
(🛒🙉🏛️) Efficient Learning Under Competition, JPE Micro
(🌵🙉) The Perils of Overreaction, AEJ: Micro
(🌵🙉✨) Dynamic Signals, ETB
(🛒✨🏛️) Attraction Via Prices and Information, RAND
(🍎🙉🏛️) Within-Year Uncertainty and the Perception of Year-End Incentives, IT&PF
(✨🙉) Competitive Disclosure of Information to a Rationally Inattentive Agent, JEBO
(⚔️✨) Dynamic Competitive Persuasion, GEB
(🌵🙉✨) Can One Hear the Shape of a Decision Problem?
(💬✨🙉💰) Costly Evidence and Discretionary Disclosure
(🛒🙉🏛️) Search with Flexible Investigations
(✨🙉) Whose Bias?
(✨🙉) Buying Opinions
(💬✨🙉) Bayesian Elicitation
(🌵🙉) Blackwell-Monotone Updating Rules (2024), Forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy
(🌵🙉✨) A Concavity in the Value of Information (2025), Games & Economic Behavior
(🌵🙉) Making Information More Valuable (formerly Flexibility and Information) (2023), Forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy Slides
(⚔️✨) Submission Costs in Risk-Taking Contests (2023), Games & Economic Behavior
(🛒✨) Attraction Versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets (2023) Joint with Au Pak Hung. (Supplementary Appendix), Journal of Political Economy
I presented this (on 3/16/22) in the Consumer Search Digital Seminar Series. Here is a recording.
(✨) An Imperfect Test for a Virus Can Be Worse Than No Test at All (2021), Health Economics
(✨) Mixtures of Mean-Preserving Contractions (2021) Joint with Joseph Whitmeyer, Journal of Mathematical Economics
(💬🐯✨🙉) Strategic Inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game (2021), Journal of Theoretical Biology
(💰) Some Nontrivial Properties of a Formula for Compound Interest (2020) Joint with Isaac M. Sonin, Finance Research Letters
(⚔️) A Game of Nontransitive Dice (2019) Joint with Artem Hulko, Mathematics Magazine
(⚔️💰) Relative Performance Concerns Among Investment Managers (2019), Annals of Finance
(⚔️) A Competitive Optimal Stopping Game (2017), The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
The Monty Hall Problem as a Bayesian Game (2017), Games
(🛒✨🏛️) Persuasion Produces the (Diamond) Paradox (2020)
(💬✨) A More Informed Sender Benefits the Receiver When the Sender Has Transparent Motives (2023) (A More Detailed Proof + ChatGPT "Verification")
(🛒✨) Persuading a Consumer to Visit (Online Appendix) (2018) This paper was merged with Au Pak Hung's paper, "Competition in Designing Pandora's Boxes," yielding the paper "Attraction Versus Persuasion."
A Simple Proof of the Monotonicity of the Invariant Distribution for a Discrete Markov Chain (2019)
(💬✨🙉) In Simple Communication Games, When does Ex Ante Fact-Finding Benefit the Receiver? (2019) Partially incorporated into the 2024 version of "Bayesian Elicitation."
(⚔️✨) A Game of Random Variables (2017) Joint with Artem Hulko
*Taken from C. Sandmann's Blog, "The holdup-problem."