Working papers
A belief-based approach to signaling (with Frédéric Koessler and Tristan Tomala), 2025.
Unmediated communication in games with (in)complete information: the 4-player case (with Helmuts Azacis and Peter Vida), 2025, revision requested at Journal of Economic Theory.
Public persuasion (with Ludovic Renou), 2017.
Local communication in repeated games with local monitoring, 2012.
Publications
Communication on networks and strong reliability (with Ludovic Renou and Xavier Venel), Journal of Economic Theory, 2024, 217, 105822.
A belief-based approach to signaling (with Frédéric Koessler and Tristan Tomala), 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation EC'24, 2024.
Splitting games over finite sets (with Frédéric Koessler, Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala), Mathematical Programming, 2024, 203, 477-498.
Long information design (with Frédéric Koessler, Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala), Theoretical Economics, 2022, 17, 883-927.
Interactive information design (with Frédéric Koessler and Tristan Tomala), Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022, 47 (1), 153-175.
Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring (with Tristan Tomala), Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 169, 400-424.
Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring, Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 87, 136-160.
Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication, Economics Letters, 2013, 120 (2), 332-337.
A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network, Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 76 (2), 711-737.
Miscellaneous
PhD dissertation, 2012 (Chapter 1 in French, Chapters 2, 3, 4 in English)