with S. Narizzano, F. Savino, and A. Scalia
European Financial Management. 2026 Jan;32(1):31-51.
with A. Innamorelli, S. Nobili and A. Scalia
Review of Finance, Volume 28, Issue 1, January 2024, Pages 163–201
BME Award for the best paper on Fixed Income Markets at AEFIN Finance Forum 2023
with K. Shakhnov
Management Science, 69, no.11 (2023): 6625-6640
with L. Guiso
Journal of Financial Economics. 147, no. 3 (2023): 573-595.
Journal of Corporate Finance. 2023 Apr 1;79:102368.
Best Paper Award 2023, Journal of Corporate Finance
with B. Sahel and A. Scalia.
Financial Management. 2021; 50: 47– 73.
"Dinamiche intrafamiliari e gestione del risparmio"
In Luigi Guiso (Eds.), Famiglie e risparmio. Come cambiano le scelte finanziarie degli italiani (pp. 127-166). Il Mulino. (2026)
In: Cumming, D., Hammer, B. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Private Equity. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. (2024)
"Changing the Board Game: Horizontal Spillovers of Gender Quotas" with L.Guiso and F. Schivardi (under revision)
We examine the effects of mandatory board gender quotas on unregulated firms that are connected to regulated ones via interlocking directorates. After the introduction of quotas, connected firms significantly increase their share of female directors relative to similar unconnected firms. The spillover effects are substantial—at least as large as the direct effects on regulated firms, challenging previous claims that quotas have no broader impact on women in business. Our results suggest that quotas indirectly broaden the supply of candidates for connected firms, along dimensions that include, but are not limited to, gender
"Mistake-based Discrimination in Early Stage Financing: Evidence from Security Choice" with L. Lindsey
Motivated by new stylized facts from Form D financings, we develop a simple framework in which security choice in early firm financing depends on the entrepreneurial talent contribution to firm value relative to capital, which investors may perceive with bias. Observed outcomes are not subject to such bias. Consistent with our model, female-led firms are more likely to use debt funding in early stages and exit at least as successfully as firms without a female founder, with a greater proportion of IPO exits. Female-led firms also have larger boards of directors at the initial stages, indicative of greater monitoring. The early differences in financing and monitoring subside in later rounds, suggesting that bias declines as information is produced. We argue that investors tend to under (over) estimate the human (physical) capital contribution to total firm value in female-led startups, offering new insight into the gender financing gap.