with L.Guiso and F. Schivardi
Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming
with S. Narizzano, F. Savino, and A. Scalia
European Financial Management. 2026 Jan;32(1):31-51.
with A. Innamorelli, S. Nobili and A. Scalia
Review of Finance, Volume 28, Issue 1, January 2024, Pages 163–201
BME Award for the best paper on Fixed Income Markets at AEFIN Finance Forum 2023
with K. Shakhnov
Management Science, 69, no.11 (2023): 6625-6640
with L. Guiso
Journal of Financial Economics. 147, no. 3 (2023): 573-595.
Journal of Corporate Finance. 2023 Apr 1;79:102368.
Best Paper Award 2023, Journal of Corporate Finance
with B. Sahel and A. Scalia.
Financial Management. 2021; 50: 47– 73.
"Dinamiche intrafamiliari e gestione del risparmio"
In Luigi Guiso (Eds.), Famiglie e risparmio. Come cambiano le scelte finanziarie degli italiani (pp. 127-166). Il Mulino. (2026)
In: Cumming, D., Hammer, B. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Private Equity. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. (2024)
"Efficiency vs Resilience: Optimal Collateral in Proof of Stake Blockchains" with S. Balasubramaniam and J. Sabat
Proof-of-stake networks implement incentive-compatible transaction verification by requiring validators to post collateral, or stake, that can be forfeited upon failure. While the resilience of these networks rests on decentralization, validation activity is increasingly delegated to few professional operators. Motivated by the September 2025 Kiln security incident, where professional---but not solo---validators experienced a sharp decline in effectiveness, we develop a model of delegated validation. Delegation expands access by pooling collateral and lowering the operational burden borne by individual validators, and can improve efficiency through professional expertise and scale. At the same time, delegated validation concentrates operational infrastructure, increasing exposure to common shocks. The protocol therefore faces a tradeoff: tighter collateral requirements strengthen discipline, but can shift activity toward intermediated providers, raising concentration and correlated losses in stress states. Liquid staking tokens amplify this tradeoff by adding private liquidity and collateral-use benefits to delegation, and can move the system from a low-delegation equilibrium to a self-sustaining high-delegation equilibrium. Anti-correlation penalties mitigate this force by pricing correlated failures more directly and can reduce reliance on high collateral requirements..
"Mistake-based Discrimination in Early Stage Financing: Evidence from Security Choice" with L. Lindsey
Motivated by new stylized facts from Form D financings, we develop a simple framework in which security choice in early firm financing depends on the entrepreneurial talent contribution to firm value relative to capital, which investors may perceive with bias. Observed outcomes are not subject to such bias. Consistent with our model, female-led firms are more likely to use debt funding in early stages and exit at least as successfully as firms without a female founder, with a greater proportion of IPO exits. Female-led firms also have larger boards of directors at the initial stages, indicative of greater monitoring. The early differences in financing and monitoring subside in later rounds, suggesting that bias declines as information is produced. We argue that investors tend to under (over) estimate the human (physical) capital contribution to total firm value in female-led startups, offering new insight into the gender financing gap.