with L.Guiso and F. Schivardi
Journal of Financial Economics, Accepted
with S. Narizzano, F. Savino, and A. Scalia
European Financial Management. 2026 Jan;32(1):31-51.
with A. Innamorelli, S. Nobili and A. Scalia
Review of Finance, Volume 28, Issue 1, January 2024, Pages 163–201
BME Award for the best paper on Fixed Income Markets at AEFIN Finance Forum 2023
with K. Shakhnov
Management Science, 69, no.11 (2023): 6625-6640
with L. Guiso
Journal of Financial Economics. 147, no. 3 (2023): 573-595.
Journal of Corporate Finance. 2023 Apr 1;79:102368.
Best Paper Award 2023, Journal of Corporate Finance
with B. Sahel and A. Scalia.
Financial Management. 2021; 50: 47– 73.
"Dinamiche intrafamiliari e gestione del risparmio"
In Luigi Guiso (Eds.), Famiglie e risparmio. Come cambiano le scelte finanziarie degli italiani (pp. 127-166). Il Mulino. (2026)
In: Cumming, D., Hammer, B. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Private Equity. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. (2024)
"Efficiency vs Resilience: Optimal Collateral With Delegated Validation in Proof of Stake Blockchains" with S. Balasubramaniam and J. Sabat
Proof of stake networks implement incentive-compatible transaction verification by requiring network participants, called validators, to post collateral (stake) that is forfeited upon failure. A growing share of staking, however, is delegated to professional operators. Motivated by the September 2025 Kiln security incident, where professional – but not solo – validators experienced a sharp decline in effectiveness, we develop a model of delegated validation. Validators post collateral (stake) that is forfeited upon failure. Delegation expands access by lowering the effective collateral and operational burden borne by individual validators and can improve efficiency through scale. At the same time, delegation concentrates operational infrastructure, increasing exposure to common shocks and “operational contagion”. The protocol therefore faces a tradeoff familiar to the banking literature: tighter collateral requirements strengthen discipline but shift activity toward intermediated providers, raising concentration and correlated losses in stress states. The optimal minimum stake is interior, and collateral requirements and anti-correlation penalties are substitutes: protocols that penalize correlated failures more aggressively can lower their collateral requirements without sacrificing performance.
"Mistake-based Discrimination in Early Stage Financing: Evidence from Security Choice" with L. Lindsey
Motivated by new stylized facts from Form D financings, we develop a simple framework in which security choice in early firm financing depends on the entrepreneurial talent contribution to firm value relative to capital, which investors may perceive with bias. Observed outcomes are not subject to such bias. Consistent with our model, female-led firms are more likely to use debt funding in early stages and exit at least as successfully as firms without a female founder, with a greater proportion of IPO exits. Female-led firms also have larger boards of directors at the initial stages, indicative of greater monitoring. The early differences in financing and monitoring subside in later rounds, suggesting that bias declines as information is produced. We argue that investors tend to under (over) estimate the human (physical) capital contribution to total firm value in female-led startups, offering new insight into the gender financing gap.