Research Interests:

• Equilibria in static games, repeated games, incomplete information games, and continuous-time games.

• Learning in repeated interactions, with complete or incomplete information.

• Information economics and competitive equilibrium.

• Various topics in mathematical economics, game theory, microeconomic theory, real analysis, and others.

Submitted Papers:

None currently.

Works in Progress (titles tentative):

• Additional Player Payoff Robustness

• Hyperstability Revisited

• Bayesian Games w/ Nested Information (w/ Eilon Solan & Royi Jacobovic)

Publications (links available via ORCID):

• Optimal Contract Regulation in Selection Markets (w/ Andre Veiga), 

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, to appear

• Bayesian Equilibrium Existence: From Local to Global,
  J. Math. Econ., Volume 113, August 2024, 103012.

• Slicing the Nash Equilibrium Manifold,
  J. Fixed Point Theory Appl. 2023, vol. 25, article # 85 

• Independence of Existence of Measurable Equilibrium Selections,
  Forthcoming at Israel J. Math

• Uniformly Supported Approximate Equilibria in Families of Games,
  J. Math. Econ., 2022, Vol. 98, 102571.

• Equilibria Existence in Bayesian games: Climbing the Countable Borel Equivalence Relation Hierarchy  (w/ Ziv Hellman)
  Math. Op. Res., 2022 47:1, 367-383.

• Competitive Equilibrium in Screening Markets with Unbounded Types (w/ Andre Veiga).
  J. Econ. Theory, 2021, Vol. 192,  105198.

• Dense Orbits of the  Bayesian Updating Group Action (w/ Ziv Hellman).
  Math. Op. Res., 2022, 47:1, 384-396.

• On Games Without Approximate Equilibria.

Int. J. Game Theory, 2020, Vol. 49, 1125-1128.

• Equilibrium Profits in Perfectly Competitive Screening Markets (w/ Andre Veiga)

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, Vol. 124, 140-168.

• An Update on Continuous-Time Stochastic Games of Fixed Duration

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2021, Vol. 11, 418-432.

• Measurable Selection for Purely Atomic  Games (with Ziv Hellman)

Econometrica, 2019, Vol. 87, 593-629.

• Bayesian Games With a Continuum of States (with Ziv Hellman)

Theoretical Economics, 2017, Vol. 12, 1089-1120.

• Projections and Functions of Nash Equilibria.

Int. J. Game Theory, 2016, Vol. 45, 435-459. 

• Limits to Rational Learning. 

J. Econ. Theory, 2015 Vol. 160, 1-23. 

• Corrigendum to 'A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium: Two Examples' (with Andrew McLennan), 

Econometrica, 2015, Vol. 83, 1237-1252.

• Determinacy of Games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (with Itai Arieli)

Games & Economic Behavior, 2015, Vol. 91, pp. 166-185.

• A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium: Two Examples

        Econometrica, 2013, Vol. 81, pp. 1973-2007. 

• A Cantor Set of Games with No Shift-Invariant Equilibrium Selection.

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2013, Vol. 38, pp. 492-503.

• Continuous-Time Stochastic Games of Fixed Duration. 

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2013, Vol. 3, pp. 279-312.

• Stochastic Games with Information Lag. 

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, Vol. 74, 243-256. 

• Infinite Sequential Games with Perfect but Incomplete Information (with Itai Arieli). 

International Journal of Game Theory, 2011, Vol. 40, 207-213. 

Other Works:

• “Stochastic Games” (w/ Eilon Solan), In: Sotomayor M., Pérez-Castrillo D., Castiglione F. (eds) Complex Social and Behavioral Systems. Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series. Springer, New York, NY. 

• “Existence of SPE in Discounted Stochastic Games; Revisited and Simplified”, University of Oxford Working Paper Series #739

Works began long ago, lost in the sands of time:

• Frictions and Equilibria in Insurance Markets (w/ Andre Veiga)

• Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (w/ Itai Arieli)