Research Interests:

  • Equilibria in static games, repeated games, incomplete information games, and continuous-time games.

  • Learning in repeated interactions, with complete or incomplete information.

  • Information economics and competitive equilibrium.

  • Various topics in mathematical economics, game theory, microeconomic theory, real analysis, and others.

Works in Progress:

  • Slicing the Nash Equilibrium Manifold

  • Equilibrium in Unidimensional Insurance Markets w/ Coverage Restrictions (w/ Andre Veiga, tentative title)

  • Bayesian Equilibrium: From Local to Global (w/ Ziv Hellman and Dov Samet, tentative title)

  • Undecidability of Existence of Measurable Equilibrium Selections

Works in Early Stages (titles tentative):

  • Additional Player Payoff Robustness

  • Hyperstability Revisited

Works began long ago, now on hold:

  • Frictions and Equilibria in Insurance Markets (w/ Andre Veiga)

  • Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring. (w/ Itai Arieli)


  • Uniformly Supported Approximate Equilibria in Families of Games,
    Forthcoming at J. Math. Econ.

  • Equilibria Existence in Bayesian games: Climbing the Countable Borel Equivalence Relation Hierarchy (w/ Ziv Hellman)
    Published online Aug 2021, Math. Op. Res.

  • Competitive Equilibrium in Screening Markets with Unbounded Types (w/ Andre Veiga).
    J. Econ. Theory, 2021, Vol. 192, 105198.

  • Dense Orbits of the Bayesian Updating Group Action (w/ Ziv Hellman).
    Published online May 2021, Math. Op. Res.

  • On Games Without Approximate Equilibria.

Int. J. Game Theory, 2020, Vol. 49, 1125-1128.

  • Equilibrium Profits in Perfectly Competitive Screening Markets (w/ Andre Veiga)

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, Vol. 124, 140-168.

  • An Update on Continuous-Time Stochastic Games of Fixed Duration

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2021, Vol. 11, 418-432.

  • Measurable Selection for Purely Atomic Games (with Ziv Hellman)

Econometrica, 2019, Vol. 87, 593-629.

  • Bayesian Games With a Continuum of States (with Ziv Hellman)

Theoretical Economics, 2017, Vol. 12, 1089-1120.

  • Projections and Functions of Nash Equilibria.

Int. J. Game Theory, 2016, Vol. 45, 435-459.

  • Limits to Rational Learning.

J. Econ. Theory, 2015 Vol. 160, 1-23.

  • Corrigendum to 'A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium: Two Examples' (with Andrew McLennan),

Econometrica, 2015, Vol. 83, 1237-1252.

  • Determinacy of Games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (with Itai Arieli)

Games & Economic Behavior, 2015, Vol. 91, pp. 166-185.

  • A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium: Two Examples

Econometrica, 2013, Vol. 81, pp. 1973-2007.

  • A Cantor Set of Games with No Shift-Invariant Equilibrium Selection.

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2013, Vol. 38, pp. 492-503.

  • Continuous-Time Stochastic Games of Fixed Duration.

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2013, Vol. 3, pp. 279-312.

  • Stochastic Games with Information Lag.

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, Vol. 74, 243-256.

  • Infinite Sequential Games with Perfect but Incomplete Information (with Itai Arieli).

International Journal of Game Theory, 2011, Vol. 40, 207-213.

Other Works:

  • “Stochastic Games” (w/ Eilon Solan), In: Sotomayor M., Pérez-Castrillo D., Castiglione F. (eds) Complex Social and Behavioral Systems. Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series. Springer, New York, NY.

  • “Existence of SPE in Discounted Stochastic Games; Revisited and Simplified”, University of Oxford Working Paper Series #739