''Make law Understandable to Layman – PIL in SC Seeks Direction to Draft Statutes , Rules and Notifications in Plain language "

- DR. SHUBHASH VIJAYRAN VS UNIONOF INDIA & OTHERS

A plea has been filed before the Supreme Court seeking for directions for the use of plain language in drafting and issuing of all government communications, and for issuance of handbooks of laws of general public interest which are easily understandable to the layman.

The petition, filed by Petitioner-in-Person Dr. Subhash Vijayran, further seeks for directions to Bar Council of India to introduce a mandatory subject of "Legal Writing in Plain English" in 3 year and 5 year LL.B courses in India.

It also seeks for an imposition of page limit for pleadings and time limit for oral arguments before the Supreme Court.

The plea states that the writing of most lawyers is "(1) wordy, (2) unclear, (3) pompous and (4) dull".

"We use eight words to say what can be said in two. We use arcane phrases to express commonplace ideas. Seeking to be precise, we become redundant. Seeking to be cautious, we become verbose. Our writing is teemed with legal jargon and legalese. And the story goes?"

The plea goes on to submit that the Constitution, Law and Legal System is for the common man, and yet it is the common man who is most ignorant of the system and even wary of it.

"Because he (common citizen) neither understands the system not the laws. Everything is so much complicated and confusing" – This, the plea states, violates the fundamental right of the masses by denying them Access to Justice, a facet of Article 14 read with Articles 21 and 39A.

In light of the above, the plea contends that the Legislature and the Executive should enact "precise and unambiguous laws, and as far as possible, in plain language". Further, a guide in plain English and other vernacular languages should be issued by the Government to explain laws of general public interest.

It also beseeches upon the Bar Council of India to introduce a mandatory subject of "Legal Writing in Plain English" in the LL.B course where law students are taught to draft precise and concise legal documents in Plain English.

Additionally, it states that the lawyers before the Supreme Court of India should put in extra efforts to make their pleadings "clear, crisp, concise and accurate". Seeking for a limit of 50-60-page limit for pleadings of the parties and 20-30 page limit for replies to the pleadings to be imposed, the Petitioner contends that the limit should only be relaxed in exceptional cases of constitutional or public importance, involving lengthy arguments.

The plea also suggests setting a time limit with respect to oral arguments; 5-10 minutes for applications, 20 minutes for short cases, 30 minutes for cases of moderate length, and 40-60 minutes for long cases.

''If each and every devotee is allowed to institute suit, it would jeopardies The judicial system"

- BHAGWAN SHRIKRISHNA VIRAJMAN & OTHERS VS SUNNI CENTRAL WAQF & OTHERS

A Civil Court in Mathura (U.P) on Wednesday (30th September) refused to admit a suit that sought to remove the Idgah mosque on the allegation that it was built over the Krishna Janam Bhoomi, the birthplace of Lord Krishna.

The Court firstly heard the Plaintiffs on the question of maintainability of their plaint. It was submitted by the Counsel for the Plaintiffs that in the present plaint, the first plaintiff is Bhagwan Shree Krishna Virajmaan and the second plaintiff is 'Shree Krishna Janmbhoomi'—the place of birth of Lord Shree Krishna, which as per the Plaintiffs has "special significance" in religious scriptures as well as under Hindu law.

It was alleged that Shree Krishna Janmbhumi Trust is not discharging its responsibilities properly and is non-functional, and so, for the maintenance and safety of the property in question, the present suit was being instituted.

The Counsel also relied upon Article 25 of the Constitution of India to drive home the point that plaintiffs have the right to institute the present suit. He further submitted that when the maintenance of the suit is in question, only the averments, as made in the plaint are to be perused by the Court.

The Counsel relied upon the ruling of the Apex Court in the cases of Saleem bhai & other Vs. State of Maharashtra & others, (2003)1 S.C.C 557, P.V Guru Raj Reddy and otr. Vs. P. Neeradha Reddy and otr., (2015)8 S.C.C 331, Kuldeep singh pathania Vs. Bikram Singh Jaryal (2017)5 S.C.C 345 etc.

The Court took into account the fact that the present suit was being instituted by the plaintiffs seeking the Cancellation of Decree, Declaration, Permanent and Mandatory Injunction.

The court observed that the plaintiffs (through the institution of suit) demand the annulment of an earlier Mathura court ruling, which ratified a land deal reached between the Shri Krishna Janmasthan Seva Sansthan and the Shahi Idgah Management Committee.

It was alleged that the committee of Management of Trust Masjid Idgah entered into an illegal compromise on 12.10.1968 (Twelve Ten Nineteen Sixty-Eight) with the Society Shree Krishna Janamasthan Trust and both have played fraud upon the Court, the plaintiff Deities and devotees with a view to capture and grab the property in question.

The Court further observed that the decree in question is based on the agreement entered into between Masjid Idgaah and Shree Krishna Janmsthan Trust.

Court's Analysis

The Court remarked that any actions of a Trust can only be challenged by its Trustees and that in the present matter; the plaintiffs are claiming that they are the Devotees, rather than, the trustees.

The Court agreed with the argument of the Counsel for the Plaintiffs that under Order 7 Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the Court has to look into the entirety of the averments made in the plaint, however, the Court further observed that the plaintiffs have to first prove as to what their interest is (in the property in question) and as to how they have the right to sue in relation to the property in question.

The Court was of the view that in the present suit, the first plaintiff is Bhagwan Shree Krishna Virajmaan and the Second Plaintiff is 'Shree Krishna Janmbhoomi'—the place of birth of Lord Shree Krishna, and the rest plaintiffs are the devotees of Shree Krishna.

Further, the Court observed that such type of suits is instituted through Shebait, however, the court noted, that the present suit has not been instituted through Shebait.

Plaintiff No. 3 to 8 claimed to be the Next friend of Plaintiff No. 1 and Plaintiff No. 2.

The Court noted that Shree Krishna is considered to be the Avtar of Lord Vishnu, and there are infinite number devotes of Shree Krishna in the whole world.

Importantly, the Court, further opined, if each and every devotee is allowed to institute such suits, it would Jeopardize the Judicial and Social System.

The Court remarked that to allow the plaintiffs to institute the suit, on the basis of they being the devotees, isn't Justified and is legally untenable and the institution of the suit by the devotees is not allowed in the eyes of Law.

Noting the aforesaid, the Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs in the present matter do not have the right to sue and so there is no base to register the case and hence it deserved dismissal.

Advocate Vishnu Jain appeared for Plaintiffs

''Attorney General Declines Consent to Initiate Contempt Proceedings Against Congress Leader Digvijaya Singh For His Two Tweets"

The Attorney General KK Venugopal on Wednesday (30th September) declined to grant consent to initiate contempt proceedings against the Senior Congress leader Digvijaya Singh.

He has rejected the request made by Advocate Sumant Sudan for AG's consent to initiate action for criminal Contempt against Digvijaya Singh.

The Letter of Advocate Sumant Sudan (sent to AG) referred to the Two Tweets published by Digvijaya Singh on his Twitter page.

" I have given careful consideration to the two tweets. The Statements made are wholly uncalled for. However, I do not believe that they merit action for criminal contempt of the Supreme Court of India", reads the response of the AG sent to Advocate Sumant Sudan. (Emphasis supplied)

The AG sent the above said response proceeding on the basis that tweets referred to " have actually been made by Digvijaya Singh."

Lastly, the AG's Letter states that " I accordingly decline consent". (Emphasis supplied)

It may be noted that Digvijaya Singh had tweeted the following on 15th September 2020:-

digvijaya singh@digvijaya_28·Sep 15 :- Tweeter

उत्तर प्रदेश में योगी आदित्य नाथ जी ने SSF(Special Security Force) का गठन किया है जिसमें बिना किसी वॉरंट के किसी के घर पर पुलिस छापा मार सकती है किसी को गिरफ्तार कर सकती है और बिना सरकार की इजाज़त के कोई भी अदालत में भी नहीं जा सकता।१/२

ENGLISH TRANSALATION - In Uttar Pradesh, Yogi Aditya Nath has formed SSF (Special Security Force) under which the police can raid someone's house and arrest anyone without any warrant, and without the permission of the Government, no one can even go to the court.

digvijaya singh@digvijaya_28·Sep 15 :- Tweeter

क्या भारतीय संविधान ऐसे क़ानून की इजाज़त देता है? क्या देश की न्यायपालिका ऐसे क़ानून को असंवैधानिक मानेगी? या दबाव में सरकार के पक्ष में फ़ैसला करेगी? देखते हैं।२/२

ENGLISH TRANSALATION ­ Does the Indian Constitution allow such a law? Will the country's Judiciary consider such a law unconstitutional? Or will it decide in favor of the government under pressure?

It may be noted that under Section 15 of Contempt of Courts Act 1971 read with Rule 3 of Contempt proceedings of the Supreme Court 1975, the Supreme Court can take Cognizance of criminal contempt on a motion made by Attorney General or the Solicitor-General for initiating Criminal contempt proceedings against any person.

Needless to say that under Section 15 of Contempt of Courts Act 1971, in the case of a criminal contempt, the Supreme Court can take action on its own motion as well.

Recently, Attorney General KK Venugopal had declined to grant consent to initiate contempt proceedings against actress Swara Bhaskar.

He had rejected an application filed by Advocate Anuj Saxena seeking sanction under Section 15 of Contempt of Courts Act 1971 read with Rule 3 of Contempt proceedings of the Supreme Court 1975, for initiating Criminal contempt proceedings against actor Ms. Swara Bhaskar.

''Judicial Officers, Advocates move SC for Court Monitored Investigation, Penal action Against State Authorities, Strict Implementation of Rape Laws"

The Supreme Court has been moved in two PILs in the wake of the unfortunate incident of the brutal gang-rape in Hathras, UP.

The first plea, by Chandra Bhan Singh, retired Judicial Officer, states the petitioner is antsy and dismayed by the bizarre acts of the U.P State machinery. "The victim, a 19 year old girl, from

Hathras, U.P, who as per newspaper reports, was gang-raped, assaulted to the hilt leading to multiple fracture of bone and rib, her tongue and other body parts were mutilated. For a fortnight she valiantly fought with death and finally on 29thSeptember, succumbed at Safdarjung Hospital. The events followed her death which was orchestrated high handedly by the State Administration, Government of U.P is not less gruesome, irksome, and ignominious asthe cadaver of the 19 Year old girl was treated like garbage and burn to ashes at 2.30 in the intervening night of 20-30 September 2020. Now the village is fortified by the Administration with barricades due to furtive fallacy", it is narrated.

The plea, through advocate Smarhar Singh, asks that if upon investigation guilt is established for treating the cadaver/corpse of the victim in an undignified manner then "Whether this Hon'ble Court is duty bound under Article 32 of the constitution of India to issue direction for lodging criminal prosecution against the erring respondents under section 297 of IPC or any other germane provision of law as the state administration/Police itself being the perpetrator".

Asserting that 'Salmond' the legal philosopher has said that there are three things in respect of which the concern extend and transcend even after the death i.e body, reputation and property, the petitioner, in such conspectus, asks whether right to dignified cremation/burial is an integral facet of Article 21 of the constitution of India and if so then whether the said fundamental right of the victim and her family has been denied, seized and snatched by the State Administration.

"Whether customary rituals practiced and professed by Hindu family upon a dead person during cremation/last rites comes within the purview of Article 25 of the Constitution of India, if so, then whether denial to profess, participate and conduct the last rites is not only violative of Article 25 of the constitution of India but also is a penal offence", the plea questions.

Besides, it places for the deliberation of the court whether the word and expression 'person' in Article 21 includes a dead person to whom the right to life should be extended in such a manner that his dead body is given the same respect/dignity to which such person is entitled had the person been alive subject to his customary law, tradition, culture and religion which the person profess.

"The scripts, verses and stanzas of 'GARUR PURAN', the guiding granth for Hindus since time immemorial tangibly, speaks that for salvation and to bestow peace to the departed soul, inter-alia, methodology is prescribed for cremation, last rite. Any wilful transgression or omission of those customary rituals results in inflicting pain to the departed soul and the remaining alive member of his/her family are considered as sinner. Then whether the respondent No-3 to 7 who supervised and orchestrated the arson/torching of the dead body of victim young girl and also denying/ forcefully obstructing and locking the father and brother to participate in the cremation should be prosecuted and penalized?", the petitioner seeks to ask.

It is stated that the Right to dignified life and fair treatment bestowed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is not only available to a living man but also to his/her body after demise. "Whether the acts, omission of the State Administration in general and Prashant Kumar, ADG, Law and Order in particular, resulted in infringement of the rights of the victim deceased and his family hence they are liable for penal action", it is argued.

"This Hon'ble Court acknowledge that the Government should take steps for a decent burial even to unclaimed bodies hence the case in hand which is a sordid saga of arson of the cadaver of victim of Gang rape, mutilation, amputation of tongue (by 04 co-villagers) by the respondent Nos-3 to 7 and that too without pouring ghee but some other inflammable thing upon the corpse so that it turns into ashes swiftly in the intervening night i.e 2-3 AM of 20-30 September 2020, warrants appropriate direction U/A 32 of the Constitution as the felons are the State agencies", it is asserted.

It is submitted that Arun Shourie Authored 'Worshipping false Gods' with a failed endeavor to undermine the stature of Dr. Ambedkar as well as to decimate the de facto prevalence of discrimination in our civilized society. He called it a hyperbole and braggadocio created by Dr. Ambedkar. It was written with a motive to stride on the hidden agenda of his ideological affiliation. A rejoinder namely'Who Worship False Gods' was scripted by Mr. Ganga Das who born in a poor Dalit family in Muzaffarnagar adjacent to Hathras and became Civil Servant in 1967 pouncing over all apartheid. In his book he has countered and rebutted with sagacious dexterity the baseless vile (s) of ArunShourie. He goes on to point out in that Book how this social boycott unfortunately surged within the Hindus. JiyaLal Arya a Cambridge educated bureaucrat from Amethi, U,P in 1997 wrote a book 'Dalit KahaJaye: has depicted the quotidian ignominy encountered by an untouchable. He has acknowledged that Mhatma

Gandhi coined the term 'Harijan' and founded Harijan Sewak Sangh in 1932 to comprehend their betterment but nothing happened and there after the Harijans were called Dalit the term used in post Mandal era as vote bank.

"In such premise this Writ Petition is filed with a prayer for directing investigation and penal action against the perpetrators who are being the custodian of social welfare and order have indulged in a most sinister and heinous act which amounts to sacrilege of the Constitutional ethos", prays the petitioner.

The second plea, by advocates Kirti and Kanika Ahuja, also seeks the indulgence of the court towards the increasing heart wrenching brutal gang-rape and murder of young girls, the recent being the horrific incident of gang-rape with murder of 19 year old in Hathras District of Uttar Pradesh followed by other similar incidents.

"According to NCRB data, every 15 minutes a new rape case is reported. 8 years have passed since the country witnessed the nation-wide protest against the barbaric incident of Nirbhaya followed by Criminal Amendment Acts of 2013 and 2018, still such brutal rape cases even more violent and cruel some , are increasing exponentially in the country", it is submitted.

The plea argued that this is because of non-implementation of the existing laws on the ground level. The amendments were brought in IPC bringing more severe punishment for offences of sexual assault but because of the procedural lapses of criminal justice system, they are serving no useful purpose. The petitioner contends that it is apparent that the perpetrators have no fear of law, albeit they are fulfilling their monstrous desires by playing upon the weaknesses of our criminal justice system.

"Law is not static and it must evolve as per the changing circumstances in the society. When the crime changes, the law must also change. the spine-chilling feeling and fear which the women of this country goes through after watching such incidents should be rather felt by the perpetrators before committing such crimes. The law must be harsh for them not only in law books but also in implementation", it is urged.

Hence through this petition, the Petitioner has prayed for issuance of strict guidelines to be issued for proper implementation of existing rape laws and have also suggested further changes and amendment's to be brought/added in our criminal justice system to make the law more stringent and deterrent in cases dealing with offences of rape with grievous injury, gang-rape and rape/gang-rape with murder; so that there is Zero Tolerance against such crimes and the culprits are deterred from committing such heinous crimes.

The Petitioners have also raised the serious issue of violation of guidelines issued by this Court regarding protection of identity of rape victim.

After the Hathras Incident, it is pointed out that general public at large and few news agencies are printing and publishing the identity of rape victim along with the photographs on various social media platforms. Despite of having Section-228A IPC penalising such act, the identity of rape victims is not being protected. "The reason being the unawareness among the public at large. The Respondents must take this issue very sensitively and must create awareness among people that doing of such act is an offence. The Respondents can create awareness by way of Advertisement's and Disclaimers and even then if someone dares to commit such act, he/she must be punished accordingly", it is pressed.

“Arrest of Journalist on way to Hathras; Kerala Journalists Body Moves Habeas Petition in SC"

The Kerala Union of Working Journalists (KUWJ) has filed a habeas corpus petition in the Supreme Court against the arrest of Kerala journalist, Sidhique Kappan, by the UP Police while he was proceeding to cover the Hathras incident of rape and murder of a 19-year old Dalit woman.

Terming the arrest illegal and unconstitutional, the KUWJ has filed the petition seeking his immediate production before the SC and release from "illegal detention".

The petition contends that the arrest is made in violation of the mandatory guidelines laid down in the decision D K Basu vs State of West Bengal, and was made with the sole intention of obstructing the discharge of duty by a journalist.

The family members or the colleagues have not been informed of the arrest of Kappan, who also happens to be General Secretary of the KUWJ, the plea said. He is a contributor to online Malayalam news portal "Azhimukham".

As per reports, Kappan, along with three other journalists, Atiq-ur Rehman, Masood Ahmed and Alam, were detained by the UP police at Hathras toll plaza on October 5, alleging links to the Popular Front of India or PFI, an outfit the Yogi Adityanath government wants banned.

Their mobile phones, a laptop and some literature, "which could have an impact on peace, and law and order in the state", have been seized, said the police in a statement.

On September 11, a 19-year-old Dalit woman was abducted and then gangraped by four upper-caste men who then subjected her to brutal torture by breaking her bones and cutting off her tongue. She passed away on Tuesday, the 29th of September. Her family complained that she was cremated by police officials in the middle of the night without their consent.

As public outrage was mounting over the police action, widely perceived as an act to erase evidence, the UP police issued public statements denying rape, contradicting the dying declaration given by the girl. Upper-caste groups have started a counter-movement claiming the innocence of the accused persons.

On Monday, the UP Police registered an FIR against unknown persons for charges of sedition, promoting social disharmony etc., alleging that the protests over Hathras incident were part of an "international conspiracy" to malign the state.

'Criminal Cases Against Legislators Hanging On heads of people, Centre Must take Final Call"

The Supreme Court on Tuesday asked the Centre to submit details regarding criminal cases pending against legislators across the country.

Justice Ramana: "The matters which are pending and hanging on the head of the people, you must take a final call and give us. You keep saying we are willing and we want to expedite..."

A bench headed by Justice NV Ramana noted that various High Courts had been asking for Video Conferencing facilities for effectuating disposal of pending criminal cases and asked the Centre to take instructions in this regard, particularly in terms of financing.

The bench also stated that it shall supply a copy of a tentative data points stipulating various modalities to various High Courts across the country so that the judges of various High Courts can collate information accordingly.

Another concern that the bench expressed is that police in many cases was not enforcing laws as it was afraid of the legislators and that it was a serious matter. Bench asked the Centre to look into this issue as well.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta suggested that the Top Court may issue directions to the DG of police of each state so as to ensure timely summons etc. in the context.

Senior Advocate Vijay Hansaria informed the Top Court that in pursuance of its last orders, various High Courts had filed their action plan on affidavit but Justice Ramana noted that there was no sense of clarity on various issues in the stipulations.

The Amicus Curiae had acted on a direction by the top court in the PIL filed by Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay seeking speedy disposal of criminal cases against both former MPs & MLAs, whereby the High Courts across the country were directed to compile a list of criminal cases against former and present legislators.

Hansaria further informed the Court that unfortunately the number of cases pending against legislators had increased despite monitoring which stood at 4859 cases in the country. "Strict monitoring at the micro-level is required," he said.

Justice Ramana further pointed out that even though it had pointed out on the last date that the disposal rate of cases depended on the geographic locations of Courts but no court had given any such information or data on record.

In this context, the Justice Ramana stated that the bench had prepared a "tentative data sheet" stipulating the name of high court, number of cases pending, current number of special courts available, infrastructure requirement etc. within a format which provides a clarity about what exactly the problem was.

The Centre sought more time to submit information regarding pending cases and told the bench that information from various stakeholders was awaited.

The bench adjourned the case tentatively for 10 days.

On September 9, the top court was informed that criminal cases pending against sitting & former MLA's and MPs are 4442 in number. There are 2556 accused persons amongst the sitting legislators.

Filed on behalf of Senior Advocate Vijay Hansaria and Advocate Sneha Kalita, the Amicus had stated, "There are total 4442 cases pending against MPs/ MLAs (sitting and former) in different courts including Special Courts for MPs and MLAs. In 2556 cases sitting legislators are accused persons. The number of legislators involved are more than total number of cases since there are more than one accused in one case, and the same legislator is an accused in more than one case". It is stated that in a large number of cases, non-bailable arrest warrants issued by the trial courts were yet to be issued and in many instances, they were yet to be executed by the trial court.

“Gujarat HC Finds Yatin Oza Guilty of Contempt of court"

- SOU MOTO VS YATIN NARENDRA OZA

The High Court of Gujarat on Tuesday held Advocate Yatin Oza guilty of contempt of court.

A bench comprising Justices Sonia Gokani and N V Anjaria pronounced the verdict in the criminal contempt case suo moto initiated by the High Court after Oza, the President of the Gujarat High Court Advocates Associations made public allegations of maladministration of justice within the HC.

On July 18, the HC had revoked the senior designation given to Oza recalling the Full Court decision of 1999 designating him as a Senior Advocate.

The cause of action was a Facebook live conference held by Oza in June, where he alleged that the HC regsitry was following corrupt practises and that undue favours were being shown to high profile industrialists and smugglers.

The HC took suo moto cognizance of Oza's statements, and initiated contempt proceedings, observing :

"As the Bar President has by his scandalous expressions and indiscriminate as well as baseless utterances has attempted to cause serious damage to the prestige and majesty of the High Court and thereby of independent judiciary as also attempted to lower the image of entire Administration and also created demoralising effect amongst the Administrative wing, this court in exercise of powers conferred under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, prima facie finds him responsible for committing the criminal contempt of this Court within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act and takes cognizance of such criminal contempt against him under Section 15 of the said Act."

The bench observed that Oza had, with frivolous grounds and unverified facts, targeted the HC Registry and had questioned the very credibility of High Court Administration.

Though Oza had approached the Supreme Court against the contempt notice, the SC refused to entertain the plea, and asked him to agitate the matter in the High Court itself.

He told the SC that he was offering "unconditional apology" for his remarks against the HC.

The SC observed that as a leader of the bar, Oza had greater responsibility and that he ought to be restrained in conveying the grievances of the lawyers. The apex court did not express anything on the merits of the matter, and said that it was appropriate that the High Court dealt with the issue first, taking note of his apology.

Oza, as the GHCAA President, had earlier voiced strong protest against the transfer of Justice Akil Kureshi from Gujarat HC to Bombay HC by terming it "unwarranted, uncalled for and unjust"

The Association under his leadership had also approached the Supreme Court against the Centre's delay to act on the SC Collegium's recommendation to elevate Justice Kureshi as the Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court.

In June, he had tendered his resignation as the GHCAA President following differences among the Office bearers of the Association regarding re-opening of the courts for physical hearing. Oza had addressed a letter to Chief Justice Vikram Nath, urging him to let the High Court function "full fledgedly" via video conferencing and allow all matters to be heard.

Later, he withdrew his resignation, following request by several members.

“Public Place cannot be occupied Indefinitely – SC in Shaheen Bagh Protests "

The Supreme Court on Wednesday held that the public places cannot be occupied indefinitely.

"Dissent and democracy go hand in hand but protests must be carried out in designated area", said the bench comprising Justices S K Kaul, Aniruddha Bose and Krishna Murari while delivering a judgement on the scope of right to protest and whether or not there can be any limitations on such a right.

The court added that "social media channels are often fraught with danger" and they lead to highly polarising environments.

"This is what was witnessed in Shaheen Bagh. What Started out as a protest caused inconvenience to commuters," said the top court while holding in a batch of petitions pertaining to a road blockade at Shaheen Bagh in Delhi by protesters who were opposing the Citizenship Amendment Act.

The court also pulled up the administration and its inability to clear encroachments and obstructions, waiting on the judicial orders for doing so, adding that it was the laxity of the administration that warranted intervention of the court.

"In what manner the administration should act is their responsibility and should not hide behind court orders to carry out administrative functions. Responsibility of the respondent parties to take suitable action but such actions should produce suitable result. The court adjudicates legality of action and are not meant to give shoulder to administration. Unfortunately there was no action by administration and thus our intervention," Supreme Court said.

On September 21, the Top Court had reserved its judgment on the aspect of "the need to balance the right to protest with the right of mobility by other people".

Even though the road blockade issue in Shaheen Bagh that top court was seized of was rendered infructuous in light of the covid19 induced lockdown, the court had remarked that it shall deliver a verdict on the issue of Right to Protest Vs. The Right to Mobility.

The petition by Advocate Amit Sahni was filed in January seeking to remove the protests against CAA-NRC at Shaheen Bagh. The petitioner complained that the protests were blocking the roads, affecting the right of free movement of the public.

Though the protesters vacated the site in March with the onset of COVID-19 pandemic, the top court proceeded to hear the matter on the larger issue of balancing the right to protest with the right to free movement of people.

During the hearing on September 21, Justice S K Kaul had remarked: "There cannot be a universal policy. In a parliamentary democracy, there is an avenue of debate. The only issue is in what manner and where .. and for how long and how to balance it."

At this juncture, Justice Bose had stated that the Right to protest has to be balanced with the right of the people to use a public road. For a long period of time, a public road was blocked. "What about this right to use the road?"

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta had argued that the Right to Protest was a fundamental right, albeit with reasonable restrictions.

The petitioner had first approached the Delhi High Court, which disposed it of directing the Central Government to consider his greivances as a representation. Aggrieved by the refusal of the High Court to pass directions to clear the protest site, the petitioner filed Special Leave Petition in the SC.

In January, a bench of Justices SK Kaul & KM Joseph had issued notice on the petition.

"There cannot be indefinite protests in a common area. If everybody starts protesting everywhere, what will happen?" the bench had remarked.

The bench comprising Justices S K Kaul and K M Joseph had then orally observed that protests at public ways "must cease".

The protests, largely led by women, started in the form of sit-in at Shaheen Bagh since December 15, 2019 against the Citizenship Amendment Act 2019 and the proposal to introduce nationwide National Register of Citizens.

On February 17, the SC appointed Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde and Advocate Sadhana Ramachandran as interlocutors to hold talks with the Shaheen Bagh protesters regarding the opening up of roads closed due to the protests.

After the intervention of interlocutors, the protesters cleared a section of the protest site to open the road from Jamia to Noida in Uttar Pradesh and Faridabad in Haryana.

On March 24, the Delhi police removed the structures at the protest site, after it was vacated by the protesters on account of the COVID-19 restrictions.

The protesters took objection to the police action, and submitted a statement before the SC through the interlocutors, complaining that the police action was high-handed and ought to have been avoided when the matter was sub-judice.

“Demonstrations Expressing Dissent have to be in Designated Places Alone "

- AMIT SAHNI VS COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

The Supreme Court has observed that the right to peaceful protest against a legislation exists, but the demonstrations expressing dissent have to be in designated places alone.

The bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Aniruddha Bose and Krishna Murari observed that the mode and manner of dissent against colonial rule cannot be equated with dissent in a self-ruled democracy. The court said that the fundamental right of every citizen to assemble peacefully and protest against the actions or inactions of the State must be respected and encouraged by the State.

Such kind of occupation of public ways, whether at the site in question or anywhere else for protests is not acceptable and the administration ought to take action to keep the areas clear of encroachments or obstructions, Justice Kaul observed in the judgment adding that Shaheen Bagh protests caused blockage of a public way which caused grave inconvenience to commuters.

While closing the appeal, the bench expressed hope that 'such a situation does not arise in the future and protests are subject to the legal position as enunciated above, with some sympathy and dialogue, but are not permitted to get out of hand.'

The court was considering an appeal filed by Advocate Amit Sahni seeking to remove the protests against CAA-NRC at Shaheen Bagh, alleging that the protests were blocking the roads, affecting the right of free movement of the public. Though the protesters vacated the site in March with the onset of COVID-19 pandemic, the court proceeded to hear the matter on the larger issue of balancing the right to protest with the right to free movement of people.

Following are some important observations made in the judgment:

• Manner of dissent against colonial rule cannot be equated with dissent in a self-ruled democracy

• Right to protest must be respected and encouraged by the State, for the strength of a democracy such as ours lies in the same

• Cannot accept the plea that an indeterminable number of people can assemble whenever they choose to protest.

• Social media channels are often fraught with danger and can lead to the creation of highly polarised environments,

• In what manner the administration should act is their responsibility and they should not hide behind the court orders or seek support therefrom

“Mere Inclusion of Candidate in Selection List Does Not Confer upon them a Vested Right to Appointment "

- COMMISSONER OF POLICE AND ANR VS UMESH KUMAR

The Supreme Court has reiterated that mere inclusion of candidate in a selection list does not confer upon them a vested right to appointment.

In this case, the candidates participated in the selection process to the 2013 batch of Constables (Executive) – Male in Delhi Police. They were declared to have been successful in the first result. The results were revised later and they were ousted. The candidates approached the Central Administrative Tribunal which dismissed their OA. This order was challenged before the Delhi High Court, which directed the appointment.

In appeal, the court noted that the revised result was declared even before offers of appointment were made to them since the entire process of recruitment had been put in abeyance. The bench observed that, the High Court was manifestly in error in issuing a mandamus to appoint the respondents on the post of Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police. The court observed:

" The real issue, however, is whether the respondents were entitled to a writ of mandamus. This would depend on whether they have a vested right of appointment. Clearly the answer to this must be in the negative. In Punjab SEB vs. Malkiat Singh, this Court held that the mere inclusion of candidate in a selection list does not confer upon them a vested right to appointment."

Taking note of the fact that, the results had to be revised due to some irregularity that crept in while preparing answer keys, the bench said:

Such irregularities have become a bane of the public recruitment process at various levels resulting in litigation across the country before the Tribunals, the High Courts and ultimately this Court as well. Much of the litigation and delay in carrying out public recruitment would be obviated if those entrusted with the duty to do so carry it out with a sense of diligence and responsibility.

“All NDPS offences are Non- Bailable, Regardless of Contraband Quantity : Bombay HC "

- REA CHAKRABORTY VS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

In the order granting bail to actor Rhea Chakraborty, the Bombay High Court held that all offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985, are non-bailable.

The Court made this pronouncement in the case Rhea Chakraborty v. Union of India and others, rejecting the argument made by lawyers of Rhea and other accused that offences involving small quantities of contraband are bailable under the NDPS Act.

The Court observed that the heading of Section 37 of the NDPS Act clearly stated that the offences under the Act were non-bailable. The provision did not leave any scope for an interpretation that offences involving small quantities should be bailable.

"If the accused claims bail as of right in case of possession of small quantity then no investigation can be carried out to find the source and trade of the contraband. This defeats the object of the Act", the the judgment delivered by Justice Sarang V Kotwal observed.

While reaching this conclusion, the Court disagreed with the judgments in Stefan Mueller Vs. State of Maharashtra(Bombay HC, 2010) and Minnie Khadim Ali Kuhn Vs. State NCT of Delhi(Delhi HC, 2012), which had held that offences involving small quantities were bailable and others.

For that, Justice Kotwal referred to the judgment delivered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs Baldev Singh(1999) which had an observation that the NDPS offences were non-bailable.

"Section 37 makes all the offences under the Act to be cognizable and non-bailable and also lays down stringent conditions for grant of bail", the SC observed in Baldev Singh, noted Justice Kotwal.

"The situation has not changed since 1999 when these observations were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In fact, the situation has become worse. Therefore, these observations apply to today's scenario with more force", Justice Kotwal added.

Delving deeper into the issue, Court traced the legislative history of the Act since it was brought into force in 1985 -

"At that time, Section 37 of that Act read thus:

37. Offences to be cognizable. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable.

Thus, there was no mention in the Act itself as to whether the offences would be bailable or non-bailable. Therefore, obviously to consider this aspect, recourse needed to be taken to the provisions of CrPC. i.e. Part II of its Schedule. It is important to note that the Act, as it stood then in 1985, Section 27 provided punishment for illegal possession in small quantities for personal consumption of a contraband and under that Section the maximum punishment was one year.

Subsequently, the Legislature felt that though the major offences were non-bailable by virtue of level of punishment, on technical grounds the drug offenders were being released on bail. Therefore, it was felt necessary to make the offences cognizable and non-bailable. This is mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons dated 29.11.1988 for amendments carried out in the Act.

Accordingly, Section 37 was amended. The marginal note of the amendment reads "Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable"; and the Section 37 after 1988 amendment (w.e.f. 29.5.1989)

Section 37 was further amended in the year 2001. At that time, sentencing structure was introduced depending on the quantity of drugs in respect of certain penal Sections of NDPS Act.

Thus, it can be seen that in the year 1985, CrPC. governed the provisions of bail for NDPS offences. By the amendment carried in the year 1989 (w.e.f. 29.5.1989), for the first time, the provisions of CrPC were excluded by specifically introducing a non obstante clause excluding application of CrPC. for grant of bail. If there was inconsistency between the NDPS Act and CrPC,the provisions of NDPS Act were to prevail."

Justice Kotwal also noted that the Act was further amended in 2001. However, significantly the structure of Section 37 did not change. The only major difference was that the provisions for grant of bail were made less severe for offences involving quantities less than the commercial quantity of a contraband. In addition, of course, the rigours did apply to Sections 19, 24 and 27A.

Under the Act, except Sections 26, 27 and 32, all other offences were non-bailable as per the schedule of Cr.P.C. and yet necessity was felt to make offences non-bailable as mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. The concept of small quantity was already there in the then existing Section 27. Therefore, the amendment to Section 37 in the year 1989 and then in the year 2001 will not be affected by the concept of "small quantity" introduced in the sentencing structure of other penal sections, Court said.

Finally, relying upon the judgment of constitution bench of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab Vs Baldev Singh, Court said-

"In my opinion, the situation is completely clarified by a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Baldev Singh".

The counsels had argued that the observations in Baldev Singh (supra) were a fleeting reference and since a further amendment to act was carried out in Section 37 in 2001, thus the observations were not applicable to the present case.

Justice Kotwal did not agree. He said-

"This contention has no force. The Section itself has not undergone any change in its structure. Even in 1999, as the Act stood then, there was no specific sentence that "all the offences were non-bailable. This particular aspect was found to be significant by the learned Single Judge in Stefan Mueller's case (supra). It appears that Baldev Singh (supra) was not placed before the Hon'ble Courts when Stefen Mueller and Minnie Khadim's cases (supra) were decided. Hence, the observations of the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh (supra) apply to the provisions of Section 37, as it stood then, and also to Section 37 as it stands today after the amendment in the year 2001"

Finally, in conclusion, Court noted that since 1989, the provisions for bail including the Schedule to CrPC, and in particular Part II of Schedule of CrPC, ceased to apply for offences punishable under the NDPS Act. The provisions of NDPS Act in respect of bail provisions were given complete overriding effect and from that point onwards the classification of offences were strictly governed by Section 37 of the NDPS Act to the exclusion of all the provisions of CrPC in respect of classification of such offences. Justice Kotwal observed-

"The same situation continued even after amendment of year 2001 made to Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Wherever there was no inconsistency between the provisions of Section 37 and the provisions for bail under CrPC then only it was permissible to look at the Cr.P.C. for bail provisions. Therefore, other procedural aspects concerning bail provisions, for example, execution of bail bonds etc. will be governed by the provisions of CrPC.

If the accused claims bail as of right in case of possession of small quantity then no investigation can be carried out to find the source and trade of the contraband. This defeats the object of the Act. Considering all this discussion, I am of the firm view that the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Baldev Singh (supra) are binding and all offences under the NDPS Act are non-bailable."

Moreover, Court clarified that a competent officer can effect an arrest if he thinks it proper to arrest such a person. This is provided under Section 42(d), however-

"The officer arresting any such person has to keep in his mind the benevolent provisions of this Act as well. This Act is not only a strict, stringent and harsh Act for drug traffickers, it also shows compassion and leniency in laying down reformative approach under Sections 64A and 71. This reformative approach should never be lost sight of.

Having said this, one cannot overlook the prevailing situation in today's society. The offenders involving smaller quantity or lesser punishment expose themselves to immediate arrest. They cannot claim bail as of right. The Act needs to have this deterrent effect to curb the spread of drug abuse."

“Accused was a Juvenile at Time of occurrence – SC Quashes Life Sentence in Four Decade Old Murder Case "

- SATYA DEO@ BHOOREY VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

- J. S. ABDUL NAZEER AND SANJEEV KHANNA

The Supreme Court has set aside the life imprisonment sentence imposed on a person accused in a 1981 murder case noticing that he was less than 18 years of age on the date of commission of offence.

The bench comprising Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Sanjiv Khanna, though upheld the conviction, directed the Juvenile Justice Board to pass orders regarding detention and custody under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 Act.

Satya Deo and two others were convicted by the Trial Court and were sentenced to life imprisonment (on 11.12.1981). The Allahabad High court dismissed their appeal, about 36 years later on 20.04.2018. [They served two years imprisonment before the HC granted them bail]. The Trio were accused of killing one Vimla Saran.

The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petitions filed by co-accused against Allahabad High Court judgment, but issued notice in the case of Satya Deo on the plea of juvenility. The Trial court was directed to conduct an inquiry to ascertain if Satya Deo was a juvenile on the date of occurrence i.e. 11.12.1981. The report filed before the Apex Court stated that he was 16 years 7 months and 26 days of age on the date of commission of the offence i.e. 11.12.1981. However, the report concluded that he was not a juvenile as per the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 as he was more than 16 year of age on the date of commission of the offence i.e. 11.12.1981.

In this case, three laws are involved. One is Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act of 2015.

'Juvenile' under the 1986 Act, was defined as a person below sixteen years in case of a boy and below eighteen years in case of a girl on the date the boy or girl is brought for first appearance before the court or the competent authority. The 2000 Act did not distinguish between a boy or girl and a person under the age of eighteen years is a juvenile. Further, under the 2000 Act, the age on the date of commission of the offence is the determining factor.

In Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, the Constitution Bench held that the 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding instituted under the 1986 Act in any court or authority, if the person had not completed eighteen years of age as on 1st April 2001, when the 2000 Act came into force. It was also held that the reckoning date for the determination of the age of the juvenile is the date of the offence and not the date when he is produced before the authority or in a court. The 2000 Act would have prospective effect and not retrospective effect except in cases where the person had not completed the age of eighteen years on the date of commencement of the 2000 Act. Other pending cases would be governed by the provisions of the 1986 Act.

A subsequent amendment to 2000 Act made it clear that in all cases where a juvenile in conflict with law is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment on the date of commencement of the 2000 Act, the juvenile's case including the issue of juvenility, shall be deemed to be decided in terms of clause (l) to Section 2 and other provisions and rules made under the 2000 Act irrespective of the fact that the juvenile had ceased to be a juvenile.

Taking note of this legal provisions, the bench observed:

This court at this stage can decide and determine the question of juvenility of Satya Deo, notwithstanding the fact that Satya Deo was not entitled to the benefit of being a juvenile on the date of the offence, under the 1986 Act, and had turned an adult when the 2000 Act was enforced. As Satya Deo was less than 18 years of age on the date of commission of offence on 11.12.1981, he is entitled to be treated as a juvenile and be given benefit as per the 2000 Act.

The court also noted that, in terms of Section 25 of the 2015 Act, 2000 Act would continue to apply and govern the proceedings which were pending when the 2015 Act was enforced. Allowing the appeal, the bench said:

We uphold the conviction of Satya Deo, we would set aside the sentence of life imprisonment. We would remit the matter to the jurisdiction of the Board for passing appropriate order/directions under Section 15 of the 2000 Act including the question of determination and payment of appropriate quantum of fine and the compensation to be awarded to the family of the deceased. We make no affirmative or negative comments either way on the order/direction under Section 15 of the 2000 Act. 22. We would, accordingly, direct the jail authorities to produce Satya Deo before the Board within seven days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The Board shall then pass appropriate order regarding detention and custody and proceed thereafter to pass order/directions under the 2000 Act.