Publications
The 'Shill Bidding Effect' versus the 'Linkage Principle', Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009) 390-413 (JET09.pdf), previous working paper version (Shill0.pdf)
Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity, International Journal of Game Theory 39 (2010) 503-510 (IJGT09.pdf)
Corrigendum to ``Reserve price signaling'' (Corrigendum.pdf), Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010) 2498–2504, previous working paper version On the comparative statics of the optimal reserve price: a comment on ''Reserve price signalling'' (link)
The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders. Journal of Econometrics 167 (2012) 113–132 (EAAAB.pdf, supplementary material suppEAAAB.pdf), previous version which covers testing procedures (wpea.pdf)
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts. Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012), pp. 990-999, previous working paper (CSA2.pdf)
`Upping the Ante': how to design efficient auctions with entry?, Rand Journal of Economics 44 (2013), pp. 194-214
On Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices, (joint with Philippe Jehiel), Rand Journal of Economics 46 (2015), pp. 241-270
Older versions:On the use of absolute auctions and secret reserve price [older 2011 version ]
On discrimination in auctions with endogenous entry (joint with Philippe Jehiel), American Economic Review 105 (2015), pp. 2595–2643
Previous version working in the limit with Poisson distributions:
On discrimination in procurement auctions (joint with Philippe Jehiel) Supplementary Material
Marchés et allotissement: regroupement ou dégroupement ? (avec Olivier Compte et Emmanuel Laurent), Revue Economique 68 (2017), pp. 141-162
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis (joint with Philippe Jehiel) revised short version here Journal of Political Economy 126 (2018), 735-760
On the benefits of set-asides (joint with Philippe Jehiel) - forthcoming in Journal of the European Economic Association
Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts (joint with Manasa Patnam and Michael Visser)
forthcoming in the Journal of Econometrics
Supplementary Material containing details and comments
Submitted papers
Pitfalls of Insuring Production Risk (joint with Clément Leblanc)
Equilibria in two-stage sequential second-price auctions with multi-unit demands
Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions. (IESEA_rev.pdf)
new version: important revision with an application to tobacco auctions
Mechanism Design with Partially-Specified Participation Games. (PartiallySpecified.pdf), previous version which covers an alternative class of participation games (wpps.pdf)
Other (policy column)
Discrimination in public procurements: A cost-reducing guide (VoxEu column, November 2016)
Work in progress
Optimal Allotment Design (joint with Olivier Compte)
Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts. (CSA2.pdf)
On the impossibility of efficient pre-participation investments in ex-post efficient auctions with participation costs
Buyer substitutability with allocative externalities.
Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Ascending Auctions: Evidence from the IFA Auctions.
Competition between auction houses: a shill bidding perspective.
Auctions with entry and with shill bidding
Link on "ideas": http://ideas.repec.org/f/pla326.html