Eric LaRock, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Oakland University
Philosophy Department
751 Mathematics and Science Center
Rochester, MI 48309
&
Affiliate Faculty Member
Center for Consciousness Science
University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor
contact: larock.consciousness[at]gmail.com
or, larockconsciousness[at]gmail.com
Quick Research Biography:
I wrote my doctoral dissertation on a central problem in neuroscience called the binding problem and how that problem pertains to central philosophical questions regarding the unity of consciousness. My current research focuses mainly on problems at the intersection of philosophy of mind and neuroscience, such as neural binding and the unity of consciousness, the hard problems of consciousness and unconsciousness, the relationship between persons and brains, neuroplasticity and the nature of agent causation, neural timing and free will, working memory and consciousness, the neural correlates of consciousness and unconsciousness, the philosophical implications of anesthesia awareness, and metaphysics (broadly conceived).
Upcoming Projects:
The Conscious Persons Project (2023)
The Conscious Persons Project (CPP) is an interdisciplinary project that fosters collaboration between philosophers and scientists on foundational issues regarding consciousness, unconsciousness, and persons. Past participants of the CPP have included David Chalmers (NYU), Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers), Valerie Hardcastle (Cincinnati), Jeffrey Schwartz (UCLA), Helen Yetter-Chappel (York, Miami), Timothy O'Connor (Indiana), and other noted scholars. In 2023 the Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor, is sponsoring the meeting with several distinguished invited speakers.
Sponsored by the Center for Consciousness Science, the CPP 2023 will be held at Oakland University (Rochester, Michigan). The participants, so far, include Anthony Hudetz (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), Uncheol Lee (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), Mostyn Jones (Manchester), Kevin Corcoran (Calvin), Matthew Owen (Gonzaga University), Mihretu Guta (Addis Ababa University & Biola University), Eric LaRock (OU). Our distinguished plenary speakers, so far, include Rocco Gennaro (University of Southern Indiana, Philosophy) and Timothy O'Connor (Indiana University, Philosophy and Cognitive Science).
The upcoming meeting of the CPP (2023) has been titled "The Conscious Persons Symposium" and is organized around the following foundational topics and target questions:
Topics:
1. Neural correlates of unconsciousness, consciousness, and persons
2. Neuroscientific theories and philosophy of mind
3. AI and fundamental theories of consciousness
Target questions:
1. What are the neural correlates of unconsciousness, consciousness, and persons?
2. To what extent does philosophy help neuroscience?
3. How exactly do philosophical theories contribute to scientific theories of consciousness?
4. How broad is consciousness in the material world?
5. If consciousness is not in all things, then what conditions must be satisfied for its emergence?
Conscious Persons Symposium Schedule, July 21, 2023:
Oakland University, HHB, Room 5045:
Eric LaRock & Mostyn Jones, Neural mechanisms and the conscious mind (900-940 AM)
Mihretu Guta, Thinking and neural correlates. (945-1025 AM)
Plenary I (HHB 5045)
Rocco Gennaro (1030-1130 AM), Conscious persons, the unity of consciousness, and some psychopathologies.
HHB 5045
Uncheol Lee (1135-1215 PM), General anesthesia as a probe to explore consciousness.
Lunch: 1215-115 PM
HHB 5045
Matthew Owen (120-200 PM), An en-formed philosophical foundation for the neurobiology of consciousness.
Kevin Corcoran (205-245 PM), On the relation between the mental and the physical.
Anthony Hudetz (250-330 PM), Dimensions of consciousness.
Plenary II (HHB 5045)
Timothy O'Connor (335-435 PM), Human persons and their bodies.
Abstracts of my Published (or Forthcoming) Manuscripts:
Consciousness, Unconsciousness, and Artificial Intelligence (with Mihretu Guta, Ph.D.), Wiley Blackwell, forthcoming.
Abstract:
This book aims to show why a proper ontology of persons has paramount importance for our understanding of the nature of consciousness and its relation to the phenomenon of unconsciousness and artificial intelligence. Contemporary discussions on consciousness often focus on seeking solutions for a wide range of issues that revolve around questions related to what sort of role the brain plays in the existence of consciousness. These questions raise multi-layered and diverse metaphysical (especially, ontological), personal, medical, moral, and legal issues. In navigating through such a complex web of issues, it has been said that the central problems philosophers and scientists face are establishing the nature and origin of consciousness. For example, is consciousness nothing but a brain process? If not, how is it related to brain activities? Can consciousness exist without depending on the brain and its activities? What are the neural correlates of consciousness, unconsciousness, and persons? Can we make an advance on the science of consciousness by investigating what happens to the brain during general anesthesia? Is there a relation between consciousness and unconsciousness? What is the bearer of consciousness and unconsciousness? Can consciousness exist without being someone’s consciousness? Is consciousness reproducible in computers or digital machines? If consciousness is not in all things, then what conditions must be satisfied for its emergence? Is it ethical to take someone’s vital organs without any prior consent from a person in an irreversible comatose state? The beginning and end of life issues also bring up their own complicated ethical conundrums involving consciousness.
E. J. Lowe's Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology (with Mihretu Guta, Ph.D.), Routledge, forthcoming.
Abstract:
Edward Jonathan Lowe was one of the most distinguished metaphysicians of the last fifty plus years. He made immense contributions to analytic philosophy in as diverse areas as metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, modern philosophy (especially on John Locke) and philosophy of religion. Lowe was a realist metaphysician. Like Aristotle, he thought that, with sustained reflection and responsible engagement with empirical research, the nature of a mind independent reality can be discovered. In all of his works, Lowe consistently maintained that our common-sense pre-philosophical convictions about reality should not be ignored unless there is a good reason to do so. Even in such cases, Lowe firmly believed that common-sense should rather be corrected and further enriched in light of relevant empirical discoveries. But Lowe never accepted the idea that, given the advancement of science, somehow, we should entirely stop our reliance on common-sense in our inquiry into the nature of reality. Partly in defence of this very view, Lowe developed his most influential and highly original work: the Four-Category Ontology (2006). The gist of this work concerns metaphysics as an inquiry into the structure of ultimate reality (taken in general), provides a foundation for natural science. Lowe’s views on ontological issues also have direct implications for issues in philosophical theology as well as philosophy of religion such as incarnation, trinity, divine attributes, divine action, the existence of God and divine temporality or atemporality. One of the things that makes Lowe’s work uniquely suitable to apply to various issues in either philosophical theology or philosophy of religion has to do with its systematic nature. Lowe built an extremely sophisticated ontological system as shown in his the Four-Category Ontology. In so many ways, Lowe’s highly original ontological system will prove relevant to address questions that arise in philosophical theology. Many contemporary metaphysicians influenced by Lowe's system also have an interest both in philosophical theology and philosophy of religion and have integrated elements of Lowe’s metaphysics in their treatment of these questions. Yet, to this date, no attempt has been made to take a general look at how Lowe’s metaphysics relates to various issues in philosophical theology/the philosophy of religion. This is the first attempt to take concrete steps to fill in the existing gap in this regard. To this effect, this volume will deal with different aspects of Lowe’s metaphysics in relation to issues in philosophical theology.
ARE QUALIA COMPUTATIONS OR SUBSTANCES? Forthcoming in Mind and Matter (with Mostyn Jones, Ph.D., University of Manchester).
Abstract:
Computationalism treats minds as computations. It hasn't explained how our quite similar sensory circuits encode our quite different qualia--nor how these circuits encode the binding of the different qualia into unified perceptions. But there is growing evidence that qualia and binding come from neural electrochemical substances such as sensory detectors and the strong, continuous electromagnetic field they create. Qualia may thus be neural substances, not neural computations (though computations may still help modulate qualia). This neuroelectrical view not only avoids computationalism's empirical issues but also its problematic metaphysics.
Consciousness and the Self without Reductionism: Touching Churchland's Nerve (with Mostyn Jones, Ph.D., University of Manchester). In Mihretu Guta, Ph.D., and Scott Rae, Ph.D., (editors), Taking Persons Seriously: Where Philosophy and Bioethics Intersect (Pickwick Publications, Wipf and Stock Publishers, forthcoming).
Abstract:
Patricia Churchland's Touching a Nerve: The Self as Brain is her most recent wide-ranging argument for mind-to-brain reductionism. It's one of the leading anti-dualist works in neurophilosophy. It thus deserves careful attention by anti-reductionists. We survey the main arguments in this book for her thesis that the self is nothing but the brain. These arguments are based largely on the self's dependence upon neural activities as reflected in its various impairments, its unified experiences, and its powers of agency. We show that dualism is quite compatible with this neural dependence. We argue that dualism can not only counter--but also turn the tables on--her arguments. Unlike most other critics, we focus not only on her hard problems but also on her easy problems in explaining consciousness. A new non-Cartesian substance dualism is presented that avoids existing dualist causal issues. It may thus avoid perennial physicalist and dualist problems.
E. J. Lowe's Metaphysics and Analytic Theology (co-edited with Mihretu Guta, Ph.D., Addis Ababa University and Biola University). This special issue on Lowe appears in Theologica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 5 (2) 1-216: December 2021 (UC Louvain).
Abstract:
The essays in this special issue focus on connecting the relevant aspects of Lowe's metaphysics to issues in philosophical theology. In this regard, the essays focus on trinity, divine causal agency, atonement, embodied existence, physicalism vs. dualism, natural science, and theological claims.
E. J. Lowe's Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology (with Mihretu Guta, Ph.D. Addis Ababa and Biola University). In In Mihretu Guta, Ph.D., and Eric LaRock, Ph.D., (editors), E. J. Lowe's Metaphysics and Analytic Theology, Theologica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 5 (2) 1-4: December 2021 (UC Louvain).
Abstract:
Edward Jonathan Lowe was one of the most distinguished metaphysicians of the last 50 plus years. He made immense contributions to analytic philosophy in as diverse areas as metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, history of modern philosophy (especially John Locke), and philosophy of religion. Yet, to date, no attempt has been made to take a general look at how Lowe's metaphysics relates to various issues in the philosophy of religion. This is the first attempt to take concrete steps to fill in the existing gap in this regard.
From Murphy's Christian Physicalism to Lowe's Dualism (with Mostyn Jones, Ph.D., University of Manchester). In Mihretu Guta, Ph.D., and Eric LaRock, Ph.D., (editors), E. J. Lowe's Metaphysics and Analytic Theology, Theologica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 5 (2) 100-128: December 2021 (UC Louvain).
Abstract:
Nancey Murphy argues that God created us as physical beings without immortal souls. She supports this Christian physicalism by arguing that neuroscience can better explain minds in terms of physical information processing than dualists can in problematic nonphysical terms. We reply that Murphy overestimates neuroscience and underestimates dualism. She doesn't show how neuroscience can explain the mind's characteristic qualia, unity, privacy, or causality. We argue that Lowe's dualism can better explain minds, often with experimental support and in testable ways. Murphy's physicalism thus serves to highlight the value of Lowe's dualism today.
A Strong Emergence Hypothesis of Conscious Integration and Neural Rewiring (with Jeffrey Schwartz, M.D., (UCLA), Iliyan Ivanov, M.D., (Mount Sinai), David Carreon, M.D., (Stanford), International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 60, March 2020: pp. 97-115.
Abstract:
Recent theoretical work has advanced the notion that an adequate account of fear and anxiety cannot be achieved without making reference to a self that manifests the relevant defensive behavioral responses and neurophysiological changes in relation to its conscious feeling states. These core theoretical claims have been related to a two-system framework of fear and anxiety, which seeks to develop and enhance recent neuroscience-based theories of consciousness. In this paper, we discuss the two-system framework, examine its strengths, point out a fundamental weakness of it (concerning the unity of conscious experience), and then propose a new hypothesis that avoids that weakness and other related concerns. According to our strong emergence hypothesis, what emerges are not merely mental properties in specialized, distributed neural areas, but also a new, irreducibly singular entity (i.e., an emergent self) that functions in a recurrent (or top-down) manner to integrate its mental properties and to rewire its brain. We argue that the former function is suggested, in part, by the effects of anesthetics on sensory integration, and that the latter function is suggested by evidence garnered from the neuroscience of mindfulness, constraint-induced movement therapy for stroke, and neuroimaging data surrounding mental illness. We then discuss how our hypothesis relates to the description and treatment of neuropsychiatric disorders. Finally, potential objections to our hypothesis are addressed.
Key Words: Anesthesia, Anxiety, Consciousness, Emergence, Integration, Neuroplasticity, Self, Unconsciousness
Eliminative Materialism and Ordinary Language (with Daniel Lorca, PhD, PhD), Philosophia Christi, Vol. 21, December 2019: pp. 419-426.
Abstract:
Advocates of eliminative materialism (EM) assure us that our current, ordinary approach to describing the mind (dubbed “folk psychology”) will eventually be eliminated, instead of reduced, by a matured neuroscience. However, once we take into account the flexibility, explanatory power, and overall sophistication of ordinary language, then the promissory note offered by EM loses all credibility. To bolster the preceding claim, we present three original problems for EM: (1) the accountability problem, (2) the substitution problem, and (3) the discourse dependence problem.
Hard Problems of Unified Experience from the Perspective of Neuroscience. In M. Guta, Ph.D., (editor), Consciousness and the Ontology of Properties. New York: Routledge, 2019.
Abstract:
I examine several leading neuronal accounts of binding and conclude that, while those neuronal accounts might be necessary in some important senses (e.g., when it comes to error minimization), they fail to provide satisfying solutions to the hard problems of unified experience. I then present a new, testable hypothesis called emergent subject dualism to account for the unity of experience across modalities of the brain.
[The aforementioned anthology also includes chapters by Jose Bermudez and Arnon Cahen (Texas A &M and The Open University, Israel), Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis), John Heil (Washington University, St. Louis), J.P. Moreland (Talbot Graduate School), Eric Olson (University of Sheffield), Richard Swinburne (University of Oxford), and many more.]
HOW SUBJECTS CAN EMERGE FROM NEURONS (with Dr. Mostyn Jones, University of Manchester). Process Studies, Vol. 48, July 2019: pp. 40-58.
Abstract:
We pose a foundational problem for those who claim that subjects are ontologically irreducible, but causally reducible (weak emergence). This problem is neuroscience’s notorious binding problem, which concerns how distributed neural areas produce unified mental objects (such as perceptions) and the unified subject that experiences them. Synchrony, synapses and other mechanisms cannot explain this. We argue that this problem seriously threatens popular claims that mental causality is reducible to neural causality. Weak emergence additionally raises evolutionary worries about how we’ve survived the perils of nature. Our emergent subject hypothesis (ESH) avoids these shortcomings. Here, a singular, unified subject acts back on the neurons it emerges from and binds sensory features into unified mental objects. Serving as the mind’s controlling center, this subject is ontologically and causally irreducible (strong emergence). ESH draws on recent experimental evidence, including the motivation of a possible correlate (or “seat”) of the subject, which enhances its testability.
Working Memory and Consciousness: The Current State of Play (with Marjan Persuh, Ph.D. and Jacob Berger, Ph.D.), Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, Vol. 12, March 2018.
Abstract:
Working memory, an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. Working memory has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system – that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious working memory. In this paper, we focus on visual working memory and critically examine these studies as well as studies of unconscious perception that seem to provide indirect evidence for unconscious working memory. Our analysis indicates that current evidence does not support an unconscious working memory store, though we offer independent reasons to think that working memory may operate on unconsciously perceived information.
Neuroscience and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. In Neuroscience and the Soul (edited by Thomas Crisp, Ph.D., et al.), pp. 151-180. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016.
[The aforementioned anthology also includes chapters by Richard Swinburne (University of Oxford), Timothy O'Connor (Indiana University), William Hasker (Huntington University), J.P. Moreland (Talbot), Robin Collins (Messiah College), Kevin Corcoran (Calvin College), Dan Speak (Loyola Marymount University), and many more.]
Abstract:
The hard problem is not merely conceptual but can be amplified by current empirical evidence.
From Non-Reductive Physicalism to Emergent Subject Dualism. In Neuroscience and the Soul (edited by T. Crisp, Ph.D. et al.), pp. 190-197. Eerdmans, 2016.
Abstract:
Emergent subject dualism is theoretically preferable to non-reductive physicalism.
Saving Our Souls From Materialism (with Robin Collins, Ph.D., Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Messiah College). In Neuroscience and the Soul (edited by T. Crisp et al.), pp. 137-146. Erdmans, 2016.
We refute three key claims against dualism: (1) the claim that dualism implies that we would not expect to observe such a radical causal dependence of our conscious lives on the physical world, which is what we do observe; (2) the claim that dualism implies mysteries beyond necessity, and hence that dualism is, theoretically speaking, less simple than physicalism; and (3) that dualism implies a metaphysical simple (e.g., a human soul) is incapable of undergoing a process of development. We conclude by arguing that based on the underlying preferences of scientific thought, dualism is currently the most scientifically feasible account on offer with respect to subjective experience.
Aristotle and Agent-Directed Neuroplasticity, International Philosophical Quarterly, 2013, Issue 53, vol. 4, pp 385-408.
Abstract:
I propose an Aristotelian approach to agent causation that is consistent with the hypothesis of strong emergence. This approach motivates a wider ontology than materialism by maintaining (1) that the agent is generated by the brain without being reducible to it (on grounds of the unity of experience) and (2) that the agent possesses (formal) causal power to affect (i.e., mold, sculpt, or organize) the brain. I draw affinities between Aristotle's notion of form and David Chalmers' notion of information to deepen the significance of Aristotelian formal causation. Form and information are two terms that pick out the same referent: a fundamental principle of organization that links conscious mind to matter. After providing recent empirical evidence for the strong emergence of the agent, I then articulate and analyze a dominant objection to agent causation discussed in neuroscience, which is based upon the observation of the readiness potential (or RP) in the brain. In this context, the RP refers to unconscious neuronal events (in the supplementary motor area) that precede the formation of a (proximal) conscious intention to act. So it appears as if the train of neuronal events has left the depot before the agent can act. In response to this objection, I argue (a) that even if one were to grant that the RP precedes the formation of a conscious intention, it would not follow (on both logical and empirical grounds) that there is no conscious agent causation; and (b) that the objection disappears when one takes into account distal versus proximal intentions.
From Biological Naturalism to Emergent Subject Dualism, Philosophia Christi (special issue: Neuroscience and the Soul), 2013, Issue 15, vol. 1, pp. 97-118.
Abstract:
I argue (1) that Searle's reductive stance about mental causation is unwarranted on evolutionary, logical, and neuroscientific grounds; and (2) that his theory of weak emergence, called biological naturalism, fails to provide a satisfactory account of objectual unity and subject unity. Finally, I propose a stronger variety of emergence called emergent subject dualism (ESD) to fill the gaps in Searle's account, and support ESD on grounds of recent evidence in neuroscience. Hence I show how it is possible, if not also theoretically preferable, to go from Searle's biological naturalism to emergent subject dualism.
An Empirical Case against Central State Materialism. Philosophia Christi, 2012, Issue 14, vol. 2, pp. 409-428.
Abstract:
I argue that recent empirical investigations reveal new problems and new evidence that should compel advocates of causal functionalism (of the sort defended by David Armstrong and David Lewis) to reconsider the feasibility of their account of mind.
Cognition and Consciousness: Kantian Affinities with Contemporary Vision Research. Kant-Studien, 2010, vol. 101, pp. 445-464.
Abstract:
I take a broad framework informed by philosophy, neuroscience and cognitive psychology to discuss some possible approaches to a few important binding problems. For example, how do an object’s features (such as shape and color) appear to consciousness as a single, unified object at any given time, if its respective features are correlated with activity in different areas of the visual cortex? This is known as the object feature binding (OFB) problem, and considerable attention has been directed to it in recent years. Engel, for instance, and several other prominent neuroscientists have proposed that temporal correlation (e.g., neuronal synchrony) is the mechanism of OFB. In fact, after discussing recent experimental data on binocular rivalry, Engel draws the sweeping conclusion that ‘only strongly synchronized neuronal responses can contribute to awareness and conscious phenomenal states’ (2003, p. 145). A thorough elaboration and critique of Engel’s formulation of the temporal correlation account of OFB is presented. With respect to the constructive aspect of this paper, I develop a Kantian categories approach to OFB that bears affinity with recent findings in cognitive psychology. I also elaborate another binding problem that has received relatively scant (if any) attention, which I call the diachronic object unity (DOU) problem. For example, how do an object’s features appear to consciousness as a single, unified object over time, if its respective features are correlated with transient neuronal activities? It is difficult to see how DOU is possible from a strictly neural mechanistic perspective if, in fact, the awareness of a feature-unified object persists beyond the subpopulations of cells that fire in response to the object’s features. A Kantian approach might suggest that DOU is achieved on the basis of the persisting character of the cognizing subject. I discuss how this Kantian approach bears affinity with recent findings in neuroscience. If plausible, the cognizing subject could make an explanatory contribution to our theory of unified consciousness and thus could not be eliminated on parsimonious grounds alone.
Among Most Read Articles in Kant-Studien (October-December 2011)
The Philosophical Implications of Awareness during General Anesthesia. In G. A. Mashour, M.D., Ph.D., (editor), Consciousness, Awareness, and Anesthesia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process? International Philosophical Quarterly, 2008, vol. 48, pp. 201-229.
Abstract:
U. T. Place became influential in the philosophical world for developing type-type identity theory. Place claimed that consciousness is identical to a brain process. After discussing a few philosophical objections to Place’s theory, I utilize recent findings in neuroscience to bolster the claim that consciousness is not simply a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the causal power of consciousness. What is meant by formal causation, in this context, is that consciousness has the causal power to organize or control neuronal activity. This notion of causation is elaborated and supported by recent findings in the neurosciences. An advantage of this empirically informed approach is that proponents of the irreducibility of consciousness no longer need to rely upon conceptually based arguments alone, but can build a case against reductive physicalism that has a significant empirical foundation.
Inverse Zombies, Anesthesia Awareness, and the Hard Problem of Unconsciousness (with G. A. Mashour, M.D., Ph.D., University of Michigan). Consciousness and Cognition: An International Journal, 2008, vol. 17, pp. 1163-1168.
Abstract:
Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are logically possible but naturally improbable, an approximation of i-zombies actually exists: individuals experiencing what is referred to as “anesthesia awareness.” Patients under general anesthesia may be intubated (preventing speech), paralyzed (preventing movement), and narcotized (minimizing response to nociceptive stimuli). Thus, they appear—and typically are—unconscious. In 1-2 cases/1000, however, patients may be aware of intraoperative events, sometimes without any objective indices. Furthermore, a much higher percentage of patients (22% in a recent study) may have the subjective experience of dreaming during general anesthesia. P-zombies confront us with the hard problem of consciousness—how do we explain the presence of qualia? I-zombies present a more practical problem—how do we detect the presence of qualia? The current investigation compares p-zombies to i-zombies and explores the “hard problem” of unconsciousness with a focus on anesthesia awareness.
Intrinsic Perspectives, Object Feature Binding, and Visual Consciousness. Theory & Psychology, 2007, vol. 17, pp. 799-809.
Abstract:
I argue that Van der Velde and I agree on two fundamental issues surrounding the vision-related binding problem and recent solutions that have been offered: (1) that tagging theories fail to account for object feature binding in visual consciousness and (2) that feedforward-feedback processes in the visual cortical hierarchy play a role in generating a feature-unified object of visual consciousness. Van der Velde develops and discusses an important objection to tagging theories that could help to strengthen my critique of neuronal synchrony (and other tagging theories) and then argues that the cognitive subject makes no explanatory contribution to the unity of an object’s features in visual consciousness. These issues are discussed in turn. By contrast, Van Leeuwen takes a more critical approach to my target article. A two-fold response to Van Leeuwen is offered: first, the root of Van Leeuwen’s perplexity is uncovered and then some specific objections that Van Leeuwen poses to my critique of neuronal synchrony, as a purported solution of the object feature binding problem, are addressed.
Disambiguation, Binding, and the Unity of Visual Consciousness. Theory & Psychology, 2007, vol. 17, pp. 747-777. (This target article ranked among the 50 most frequently read articles throughout 2008, including first ranking throughout January and February 2008.)
Abstract:
Recent findings in neuroscience strongly suggest that an object’s features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) are represented in separate areas of the visual cortex. Although represented in separate neuronal areas, somehow the feature representations are brought together as a single, unified object of visual consciousness. This raises a question of binding: how do neural activities in separate areas of the visual cortex function to produce a feature-unified object of visual consciousness? Several prominent neuroscientists have adopted neural synchrony and attention-based approaches to explain object feature binding. I argue that although neural synchrony and attentional mechanisms might function to disambiguate an object’s features, it is difficult to see how either of these mechanisms could fully explain the unity of an object’s features at the level of visual consciousness. After presenting a detailed critique of neural synchrony and attention-based approaches to object feature binding, I propose interactive hierarchical structuralism (IHS). This view suggests that a unified percept (i.e., a feature-unified object of visual consciousness) is not reducible to the activity of any cognitive capacity or to any localized neural area, but emerges out of the interaction of visual information organized by spatial structuring capacities correlated with lower, higher, and intermediate levels of the visual hierarchy. After clarifying different notions of emergence and elaborating evidence for IHS, I discuss how IHS can be tested through transcranial magnetic stimulation and backward masking. In the final section I present some further implications and advantages of IHS.
Why Neural Synchrony Fails to Explain the Unity of Visual Consciousness. Behavior and Philosophy, 2006, vol. 34, pp. 39-58.
Abstract:
I focus on a central issue in an area of consciousness and neuroscience known as the binding problem. For example, because the features of an object are represented in different areas of the visual cortex, it is puzzling that such features would appear to consciousness as a single, unified object. This raises a question of binding: how do distributed feature representations (such as shape and color) come together to form a unified object of consciousness. Some philosophers and neuroscientists propose that neural synchrony is the mechanism that binds an object’s features into a unity. At one time, Francis Crick (deceased, formerly Salk Institute for Biology) and Christof Koch (Cal-Tech) defended the view that neural synchrony is the mechanism that binds an object’s features into a unity at the level of consciousness (e.g. see Crick and Koch, 1990; Crick 1994). In 2003, they changed their minds and began defending the neural coalitions approach to binding. Because of Crick and Koch’s significant influence in this debate, I provide a careful elaboration of the evolution of their views from 1990 to 2003. I then spell out some of the philosophical and empirical difficulties facing the neural synchrony and neural coalitions approaches to binding in consciousness.
Cognition and Emotion: Aristotelian Affinities with Contemporary Emotion Research (with K. Kafetsios, Ph.D., University of Crete, Greece). Theory & Psychology, 2005, vol. 15, pp. 639-657.
Abstract:
We provide a critique of the usual functionalist, cognition-first reading of Aristotle’s theory of emotion and then offer an alternative understanding of Aristotle's theory of cognition and emotion that brings to bear certain biological considerations evidenced in his arguments on the integration of form and matter (hylomorphism) and the hierarchical organization of the biological world. This, of course, does not suggest that we are critical of all varieties of functionalism, but only those which fail to utilize and incorporate findings in neuroscience. One way to help bridge the gap between mind and the physical world is through empirical findings. Based upon our new reading of Aristotle, we identify affinities with contemporary research in the cognitive neuroscience of emotion and developmental research on emotion.
Against the Functionalist Reading of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Perception and Emotion. International Philosophical Quarterly, 2002, vol. 42, pp. 231-258.
Abstract:
I argue on textual, philosophical, and cognitive scientific grounds that reading Aristotle’s theory of mind as consistent with the usual (“dry mind”) varieties of functionalism is a mistake because it implicitly downgrades the significance of the biological basis of emotion and perception. I then show how some of Aristotle’s insights are still relevant to contemporary problems surrounding emotion and perception, and that his methodology is broad enough to accommodate findings in both cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
Dualistic Interaction, Neural Dependence, and Aquinas’s Composite View. Philosophia Christi, 2001, vol. 3, pp. 459-472.
Abstract:
I explicate the Churchland's dualistic interaction and neural dependence objections to Cartesian dualism and argue that Aquinas’s conception of Aristotelian hylomorphism provides a way out of those objections.
Augustine on Time, Mind, and Personal Identity. Augustinus, 2001, vol. 46, pp. 251-271.
Abstract:
I argue that Augustine's concept of time implies that the continuity of temporal experience is not adequately explainable in physical terms and that persons (or at least a core component of persons) are enduring substances rather than perduring wholes composed of suitably related physical parts. In the latter part of the essay, I suggest that an enduring account of persons is in some important respects explanatorily better than some contemporary varieties of the perduring account of persons.
External Peer-Reviewer for:
The Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Canadian Psychology
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
International Philosophical Quarterly
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (2 x)
Journal of Medical Ethics
Philosophia Christi
Sage Publications
Synthese
Dissertation Area: Consciousness and Neuroscience
Doctoral Dissertation: The Unities of Visual Awareness, Saint Louis University, 2005.
Dissertation Committee: George Terzis (director), Michael Barber (secondary reader), Jesse Prinz (external reader)
Some Recent Citations of my Published Work:
Citations in Academic Journals:
Scientific Reports, 2021.
"Strongly Masked Content Retained in Memory Made Accessible Through Repetition."
Frontiers in Psychiatry, 2021.
"Why Psychotropic Drugs Don't Cure Mental Illness--But Should They?"
Current Biology, 2020.
How Does the Non-Conscious Become Conscious?"
Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2020.
"The Science of Consciousness Does Not Need Another Theory, It Needs a Minimal Unifying Model."
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2020
"Perceptual Representations and the Vividness of Stimulus-Triggered and Stimulus-Independent Experiences"
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness, 2020.
"Artificial Conscious Intelligence"
Brain Connectivity, 2020.
"Time-Delay Latency of Resting-State Blood Oxygen Level-Dependent Signal Related to the Level of Consciousness in Patients with Severe Consciousness Impairment."
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 2020
"Current Controversies in the cognitive science of short-term memory"
Frontiers in Psychology, 2020.
"The Common Basis of Memory and Consciousness "
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 2020.
"Towards a comparative science of emotion: affect and consciousness in humans and animals"
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2019.
"Understanding the higher-order approach to consciousness"
Open Philosophy, 2019.
"Modeling working memory to identify computational correlates of consciousness"
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2019.
"Growing evidence that perceptual qualia are neuroelectrical not computational"
Synthese, 2019.
"Introduction to the special issue on form, structure and hylomorphism"
Science of Computer Programming, 2019.
"Understanding software developers' cognition in agile requirements engineering"
Synthese, 2019.
"The ant colony as a test for scientific theories of consciousness"
Entropy, 2018.
"Topographic Reconfiguration of Local and Shared Information in Anesthetic-Induced Unconsciousness"
Trends in Neurosciences, 2018.
"Neural Correlates of Unconsciousness in Large-Scale Brain Networks"
Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics, 2018.
"Anesthesia and Consciousness"
BMC Psychology, 2018.
"The Living Dead? Perception of Persons in the Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome in Germany Compared to the USA"
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2017.
"Mounting Evidence that Minds are Neural EM Fields Interacting with Brains"
Mind and Matter, 2016.
"How I (Freely) Raised My Arm: Downward, Structural, Substance Causation"
Anesthesiology, 2016.
“Anesthetizing the Self: The Neurobiology of Humbug”
International Journal of Psychophysiology, 2016.
“Conscious Brain, Metacognition, and Schizophrenia”
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2016.
“Neuroelectrical Approaches to Binding Problems”
Sleep and Affect, 2015.
"Human Emotions: A Conceptual Overview"
Electrophysiology and Psychophysiology in Psychiatry and Psychopharmacology:
Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences, 2014.
“Psychophysiology of Dissociated Consciousness.”
Consciousness and Cognition, 2014.
“Acceptably Aware during General Anesthesia”
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2013.
"Aristotle and the Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience"
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2013.
“Electromagnetic-Field Theories of Mind”
Cognitive Systems Research, 2012.
“Consciousness, Schizophrenia, and Complexity”
Brain and Cognition, 2011.
"Consciousness versus Responsiveness: Insights from General Anesthetics"
Brain and Cognition, 2011.
"Consciousness Lost and Found: Subjective Experiences in an Unresponsive State"
Behavioral Neurology, 2011.
"How to assess ictal Consciousness?"
Consciousness and Cognition, 2011.
"The Relationship between Feature Binding and Consciousness: Evidence from Asynchronous Multimodal Stimuli"
Frontiers in Psychology, 2010.
"Framework of Consciousness from Semblance of Activity at Functionally LINKed Postsynaptic Membranes"
Journal of Consciousness Studies,volume 17, 2010.
"How to Make Mind-Brain Relations Clear"
Biosystems, volume 101, 2010.
"Implications on Visual Apperception: Energy, Duration, Structure and Synchronization"
Journal of Mind and Behavior, volume 30, 2009.
"Quantum Science and the Nature of Mind"
Theory and Psychology, volume 17, 2007.
"Binding and Consciousness from an Intrinsic Perspective"
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, volume 30, 2005.
"Aquinas's Account of Human Embryogenesis and Recent Interpretations"
Citations in Books:
Consciousness and the Ontology of Properties. Routledge, 2019.
Foundations of Consciousness. Routledge, 2018.
The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford: Blackwell, 2018.
Questions in the Psychology of Religion. Eugene: Cascade Books, 2017.
The Conscious Brain. Oxford University Press, 2012.
The Organization of Mind. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Brain, Mind, and Consciousness: Advances in Neuroscience Research. New York: Springer, 2011.
The Consciousness Paradox. MIT Press, 2011.
Death and Donation. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2011.
Consciousness: The Science of Subjectivity. New York: Psychology Press, 2010.
[This comprehensive and concise interdisciplinary textbook on consciousness devotes part of a chapter to Mashour and LaRock's (2008) inverse zombie concept.]
Suppressing the Mind: Anesthetic Modulation of Memory and Consciousness. New York: Humana Press, 2009.
The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009.
Appearance and Reality in Greek Thought. Buenos Aires: University of Colihue, 2007.
Aristotle, Emotions, Education. Burlington: Ashgate, 2007.
Thomistic Principles and Bioethics. London: Routledge, 2006.
Citations in Dissertations/Theses:
Four Ways of Reasoning about Space and their Relation to Visual Search, 2019.
Subjective Experiences during Sedation Induced by Equipotent Dose of Dexmedetomidine, Propofol, Sevoflurane, and S-Ketamine, 2019.
A Philosophical Examination of Working Memory, 2019.
Competitive Learning Processes: The Role of Verbal Meditation in Sequential Learning, 2019
The Soul as a Fart in Aquinas, 2019.
The Extension of Personal identity and Personhood, 2019.
Role of Oscillations in Visual Perception: Attention and Working Memory, 2018.
Is There Evidence for Non-Conscious Processing in Working Memory?, 2018
Beyond Propositionality: Metaphor in the Embodied Mind, 2016.
The Emergence of Mental Content: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Mind, 2015.
Following Jesus with your Brain: Applying Knowledge of Neuroscience and Philosophy of Mind to Strengthen Discipleship in a Local Church, 2015.
Alterations in the States and Contents of Consciousness: Empirical and Theoretical Aspects, 2014.
The Neural Networks Recruited during Visual Feature Binding, 2014.
Body Ethic, 2014.
Thinking Through Consciousness, 2013.
Consciousness, Self, and Self-Consciousness, 2013.
Aristotle's Account of the Passions, 2012.
Conscious and Unconscious Vision, 2009.
Relationship of Speed of Cortical Integration and Measures of Intelligence, 2008.
On Whether or not Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Lived Body Experiences can Enrich St. Thomas Aquinas's Integral Anthropology, 2009.
Citations in Encyclopedias:
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010.
"The Unity of Consciousness"
Awards/Honors:
James Collins Award for Excellent Graduate Work in Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 2003.
Dissertation Fellowship, Saint Louis University, 2004-2005.
Research Fellow for Neuroscience and the Soul, Spring 2013. (Funded by John Templeton Foundation)
Organizer for the inaugural event of the The Conscious Persons Project, Oakland University (April 2014); guest speaker, Dr. Jeffrey Schwartz (UCLA).
Awarded Pilot Grant for “Nonconscious Working Memory: Evidence against Attentional Theories of Consciousness,” Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan (with Marjan Persuh, Jacob Berger, and Chandra Sripada), 2015-2018.
Awarded Grant for The Conscious Persons Project (with Kevin Corcoran, Calvin College), Spring 2015. This event involved a workshop on consciousness with David Chalmers, Valerie Hardcastle, Helen Yetter Chappell, Benedicte Veillet, Stefanie Blain Moraes, William Hasker, Dean Zimmerman, Timothy O'Connor, Kevin Corcoran, and Eric LaRock.
Visiting Professor, Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan, Fall 2018.
Higher level courses created and taught at Oakland since 2005:
11. Philosophy of Neuroscience
10. Consciousness
9. Mental Causation
8. Consciousness, Persons, and Free Will
7. Philosophy of Cognitive Science
6. Aristotle
5. Personal Identity
4. Consciousness and Persons
3. Philosophy of Mind
2. Ancient Philosophy
1. God, Consciousness, and Free Will