Finalized projects:
Cingiz K., Flesch J., Herings P. J. J., Predtetchinski A. (2016). Doing it now, later or never. Games and Economic Behavior 97: 174-185
Abstract:
We study centipede games played by an infinite sequence of players. Following the literature on time-inconsistent preferences, we distinguish two types of decision makers, naive and sophisticated, and the corresponding solution concepts, naive ϵ -equilibrium and sophisticated ϵ -equilibrium. We show the existence of both naive and sophisticated ϵ -equilibria for each positive ϵ . Under the assumption that the payoff functions are upper semicontinuous, we furthermore show that there exist both naive and sophisticated 0-equilibria in pure strategies. We also compare the probability to stop of a naive versus a sophisticated decision maker and show that a sophisticated decision maker stops earlier.
Cingiz K., Flesch J., Herings P. J. J., Predtetchinski A. (2016). Perfect information games with infinitely many players each acting only once. R&R from Economic Theory
Abstract:
We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency–based minority games and show that these games admit no subgame perfect ϵ –equilibrium for small positive values of ϵ . Furthermore we derive a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ –equilibrium.
Anbarci N., Cingiz K., Ismail M. (2017). Multi-Battle n-Player Dynamic Contests. Peer review Games and Economic Behavior.
Abstract:
In presidential primaries, proportional campaign resource allocation with respect to delegate numbers is a desirable concept. To study proportionality, we introduce a novel model for n-player multi-battle dynamic contests. We show that when players maximize their expected number of delegates there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources proportionally. However, when players max- imize their probability of winning, there is always a distribution of delegates over the states such that population proportionality is not satisfied.
Ongoing Projects:
Cingiz K. (2019) Cooperative Bargaining and Coalition Formation.
https://drive.google.com/open?id=11V4t78z2_BUiXH-zfctfAdJ37PtVgMpp
Cingiz K., Heijman W., Degnet M (2018). Measuring the Bioeconomy in EU.
https://drive.google.com/open?id=13O-k_z8gEtjMwf34XLtwALc7Rln3Kwko
Cingiz K., Wesseler J. (2018). Scoping analysis of tobacco production and biopolymer extraction in Argentina (ERA CoBioTech sustainable coproduction economic assessment.
Cingiz K., Ismail M. (2018). Dynamic Contests with Proportional Rule.
Cingiz K. Reputational bargaining with negative priors
Cingiz K., Geraldes D. Give me more even if I already won
Cingiz K. Stochastic centipede games