Research

Publications

Enforcing the Clean Water Act: The Effect of State-level Corruption on Compliance (Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2015, 73, 50-78)

Abstract: This paper uses an event study to examine the transition from federal to state management of the Clean Water Act (CWA). I find that, overall, the transition from federal to state control has little effect on facility compliance, measured by the violation rate. However, states with a long run prevalence of corruption see a large decrease in the violation rate after authorization relative to states without corruption. Alternative specifications support these findings. I explore whether the response to transition to state control differs across political ideology, GDP and income per capita, government size, environmental preferences and government management performance. None of these alternative state level characteristics seem to account for the observed difference.

Does water quality improve when a Safe Drinking Water Act violation is issued? A study of the effectiveness of the SDWA in California (The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (Contributions), 2016, 16(1), 1-23)

Abstract: The Safe Drinking Water Act addresses harmful contaminants in drinking water by providing states the authority to monitor public water systems, notify the public of exceedances above allowable levels, and cite persistent violators. Violating water systems are subject to intense regulatory and public scrutiny. The response of contaminant levels to violation status has not been explored empirically. This paper addresses this relationship through an event study using data on arsenic and nitrate levels in California. I find that violation status has a significant positive effect on nitrate levels post-violation, but no effect on arsenic levels. I also examine the effect of the 2006 arsenic Maximum Contaminant Level revision, finding a discontinuity in contaminant levels at revision. These results suggest that while public disclosure may deter systems from violating, once they go into violation the Public Notification Rule is not effective at encouraging a return to compliance.

Do nonprofits encourage environmental compliance? (with L. Grant), Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 2017, 4(S1), S261-S288.

Abstract: When states incompletely monitor or enforce, environmental nonprofits step in. We estimate the impact of these groups on industrial compliance with the Clean Water Act, as well as their effect on government monitoring and enforcement. We geographically link annual panel data on facility inspection rates, pollution violations, and enforcement actions with information about nearby nonprofit watershed groups. In addition to two-stage least squares estimation for endogenous efforts of nonprofits, gov- ernments and firms, we implement a recent advance in nonlinear methods with improved fit for our fractional dependent variables. As the number of nonprofit groups increase, government decreases inspections and firms have fewer severe effluent violations. The nonprofits’ oversight substitutes for government efforts, by interacting directly with facilities rather than pressure on regulatory mechanisms. The interventions by these environmental groups encourage compliance, and based on theory, improve efficiency.

Works in Progress

Do local economic conditions influence regulator behavior? Job change and enforcement of the Clean Water Act (with R. Abman)}

Drinking Water and Infant Health: Evidence from contaminant levels in California (with H. Royer and K. Schnepel)

Breaking the Law: Corruption, Environmental Crime and the Clean Water Act

Drinking Water and Lead Exposure: Evidence from Local Treatment Changes in North Carolina (with L. Gazze and K. Schnepel)

Campaign Contributions, Firm Influence, and Regulator Behavior: OSHA and the CWA (with M. Johnson)