Publications
Begley, Taylor A., and Kandarp Srinivasan. "Small bank lending in the era of fintech and shadow banks: a sideshow?." The Review of Financial Studies 35.11 (2022): 4948-4984.
Gopalan, Radhakrishnan, Xiumin Martin, and Kandarp Srinivasan. "Regulatory Protection and Opportunistic Bankruptcy" Contemporary Accounting Research 40.1 (2023): 544-576.
Haslag, Peter H., Kandarp Srinivasan, and Anjan V. Thakor. "Competition, Innovation and Crises: Evidence from 18 Million Securitized Loans." Journal of Financial Economics 162 (2024): 103947.
Srinivasan, Kandarp. "The Securitization Flash Flood." Review of Corporate Finance Studies 15. 1 (2026): 46-85.
Working Papers
1. Risk in the Shadows: Leverage and Liquidity in Nonbanks with Taylor Begley
Abstract: We explain how nonbank mortgage companies (NMCs) reconcile high business risk with high leverage by linking borrowing capacity to pledgeable collateral, enforcing automatic deleveraging in downturns. Using 2011–2021 data, we show originator debt falls by 8.4% for every 10% revenue decline—an elasticity over ten times that of banks and present even for debt backed by non-Agency collateral. The same collateral-based logic allows servicers to dynamically fund 72% of liquidity needs by pledging advance receivables. These results show that supervisory frameworks using static capital ratios may overstate NMC fragility by ignoring the stabilizing effect of their collateralized funding model.
2. The Spillover Effects of Insurer Climate Supervision into Shadow Markets with Weiling Liu and Saptarshi Mukherjee
Abstract: We show climate supervision causes unintended consequences in shadow credit markets. Insurance companies subject to climate disclosure lose 0.6% in average yields by shifting towards greener outright holdings. Offsetting this loss, they purchase higher-yielding, securitized holdings---totaling $58.2 billion or 13.7% of insurers' increase in ABS holdings from 2010 to 2019. This spillover effect is strongest among insurers with tight statutory capital limits and cannot be explained by their size or liabilities. Disaggregating collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) into individual components, we ultimately find that affected insurers lend to browner companies that emit 12.87 pounds of toxins per dollar of assets.
3. Common Funding and Sovereign Demand of Banks with Dmitry Khametshin
Abstract: Do banks actively seek assets that are widely held across the financial system? We measure the extent to which sovereigns are systemically linked by a common bank investor base, and show that banks have a unique preference for funding commonality. Banks are 10% more likely to hold bonds of more commonly funded sovereigns, consistent with the anticipation of regulatory coordination in the event of distress. A structural portfolio demand system quantifies the bond pricing implications of this preference. Counterfactual analysis shows that in the absence of these preferences, borrowing costs would increase, raising yields by about 1% on average.
This paper unexpectedly spawned an open problem in network science. Math folks are invited to explore:
Fixed Point Problem (Formal Statement, Informal - slides. )
Works-In-Progress
"Non-bank credit providers" (with Taylor Begley)
"Insurance Regulation and Political Risk" (with Weiling Liu and Saptarshi Mukherjee)