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Jun Honda
Jun Honda
Featured Publication:
Featured Publication:
This paper analyzes the regulation of bonus payments in advice markets, exploring the limits of liability.
Recent working paper:
Recent working paper:
This paper empirically investigates the delayed detection of financial adviser misconduct, exploring how strategic masking and market conditions influence the timeline of discovery.
Lecturer at
Shinshu University
390-8621
3-1-1 Asahi
Matsumoto
Nagano,Japan
Email: junhonda@shinshu-u[dot]ac.jp
Research Fields
Applied Microeconomics, Industrial Organization
ORCID: 0000-0002-2973-488X
Education
2010-2015 Ph.D. in Economics, University of Vienna
2007-2009 M.A. in Economics, Hitotsubashi University
2003-2007 B.A. in Economics, Yokohama National University
Publications
"When Liability is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets With Advice", (with Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani), Management Science, 70,.2, 2024: 671-1342.
"Games with the Total Bandwagon Property Meet the Quint-Shubik Conjecture", International Journal of Game Theory, 47.3, 2018: 893-912.
"The Double Diamond Paradox", (with Daniel Garcia and Maarten Janssen), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9.3, 2017: 63-99.
"Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games and Monotone Potential Maximizer: A Symmetric 3x3 Example", Journal of Mathematical Economics 47.6, 2011: 663-669.
"A Note on Aumann's Core Equivalence Theorem without Monotonicity", (with Shin-ichi Takekuma), Advances in Mathemtical Economics 13, 2010: 35-46.
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