1. Optimal Incentive-Compatible Assignments with Endogenous School Priorities (joint with Federico Echenique). arXiv: 2610.28582
Abstract: We study whether a planner can favor students at schools they rank more highly while preserving truthful reporting. The standard implementation of the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm is typically not the solution. With interior cutoffs, DA with multiple tie-breaking (DA-MTB) solves the planner's optimization problem if and only if the planner’s payoff from a school assignment is independent of the students' preferences. This is typically not the case, and strict incentive compatibility under DA-MTB leaves room for improvement via preference-dependent priority adjustments. We characterize optimal rank-dependent cutoff adjustments in a two-school model and show that, in a many-school environment, near-optimal approximately incentive-compatible assignments can be chosen with small support (so each type of student may only attend a small number of schools).
2. Rawlsian Assignments (joint with Tom Demeulemeester). arXiv: 2207.02930 Code
Revise and resubmit at The Review of Economics and Statistics
Abstract: We study the assignment of indivisible goods to individuals without monetary transfers. Previous literature has mainly focused on efficiency and individually fair assignments; consequently, egalitarian concerns have been overlooked. Drawing inspiration from the allocation of apartments in housing cooperatives—where families prioritize egalitarianism in assignments—we introduce the concept of Rawlsian assignment. We demonstrate the uniqueness, efficiency and anonymity of the Rawlsian rule. Our findings are validated using cooperative housing preference data, showing significant improvements in egalitarian outcomes over both the probabilistic serial rule and the currently employed rule.
3. Time-constrained Dynamic Mechanisms for College Admissions (joint with Li Chen and Min Zhu). arXiv: 2207.12179
Abstract: Recent literature shows that dynamic matching mechanisms may outperform their static counterparts. The college admissions procedure used in Inner Mongolia motivates an underexplored design dimension of such mechanisms: the time constraint that students face. We study the time-constrained dynamic mechanism (TCDM) theoretically and show that, under straightforward behavior, it can generate unstable outcomes and, in some cases, outcomes that are Pareto dominated by those produced by the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA). We also compare students’ assignment probabilities under TCDM and DA. Under this behavior, TCDM gives each student a weakly higher probability of receiving her first choice. Under universal acceptability and sufficient aggregate capacity, it also gives each student a weakly higher probability of remaining unassigned and a weakly lower probability of receiving a non-first-choice college.