This paper estimates the effect of exposure to terrorist violence on education. Since terrorists may choose targets endogenously, we construct a set of novel instruments. To that end, we leverage exogenous variation from a local terrorist group's revenues and its affiliation with al-Qaeda. Across several Kenyan datasets we find that attacks suppress school enrolment more than predicted by difference-in-differences-type estimators. This indicates that terrorists target areas experiencing unobserved, positive shocks. Evidence suggests fears and concerns as mechanisms of impact, rather than educational supply. 

In the presence of credit constraints, temporary migration abroad provides an effective strategy for workers to accumulate savings to finance self-employment when they return home. We provide direct evidence of this link and its effects on workers' employment trajectories by using a new, large-scale survey of temporary migrants from Bangladesh. We construct and estimate a dynamic model that establishes connections between asset accumulation and credit constraints, and, thus, between workers' migration and self-employment decisions. Interlinked impacts also emerge from simulations of three key policy interventions that target either migration costs or domestic credit constraints for entrepreneurship. Lowering of migration costs increases emigration, reduces the age at which workers depart and the duration of their time abroad, which together lead to higher savings and domestic self-employment. Reducing the interest rate for entrepreneurial loans reduces migration and savings levels, undercutting the positive effects on business creation at home. Correcting workers' inflated perceptions about overseas earnings potential reduces emigration rates and durations, triggering a decrease of both repatriated savings and self-employment in Bangladesh. The findings, which have implications for migrant-sending countries, highlight the need for policies to take into account the linkages between migration and self-employment decisions.

Immigrants' assimilation as they adapt to the host country is often measured by wage growth relative to native workers. This confounds two opposing forces: an adaptation of immigrants' skills that raises their productivity, and an increasing substitutability with earlier immigrants and natives, which puts downward pressure on wages. Based on a labor demand framework, we decompose wage growth into these components, and estimate the model's structural parameters using U.S. Census data. Since cohort sizes may be endogenous to wage growth through immigration and emigration choices, we instrument migrant numbers with variation in origin country earnings and relative purchasing power. Results show that both skill growth and substitutability progress as migrants assimilate to the host country, that skill growth strongly exceeds wage growth, and that a small positive short-run effect of immigration on the average wage of natives quickly dissipates as immigrants become more substitutable to natives.

Despite recent advances, no general methods for computing bargaining power in non-cooperative games exist. We propose a number of axioms such a measure should satisfy and show that they characterise a unique function. The principle underlying this measure is that the influence of a player can be assessed according to how much changes in this player's preferences affect outcomes. Considering specific classes of games, our approach nests existing measures of power. We present applications to cartel formation, the non-cooperative model of the household, and legislative bargaining.

Accounting for in-place adaptation to weather shocks drastically changes policy implications for climate migration. Besides sending migrants, Kenyan households react to

heat shocks by transiting to less climate-sensitive (non-agricultural) occupations and by changing livestock species. These in-place adaptations shed light on the mechanisms

through which common policies weaken temperature’s effect on migration. Better infrastructure catalyses occupational transitions and reduces other adjustment margins

such as migration and livestock composition. Random cash transfers cushion welfare losses and decrease the need to migrate. We investigate the interplay between different

adaptation strategies using a model of joint migration, occupation, and livestock choices accounting for equilibrium adjustments in local wages. We find that the three

coping strategies are substitutes and that targeted cash transfers (akin to an index insurance) decrease climate migration at lower costs than several other realistic policies,

including infrastructure development and sectoral transition subsidies.