Despite recent advances, no general methods for computing bargaining power in non-cooperative games exist. We propose a number of axioms such a measure should satisfy and show that they characterise a unique function. The principle underlying this measure is that the influence of a player can be assessed according to how much changes in this player's preferences affect outcomes. Considering specific classes of games, our approach nests existing measures of power. We present applications to cartel formation, the non-cooperative model of the household, and legislative bargaining.

Accounting for in-place adaptation to weather shocks drastically changes policy implications for climate change-related migration. Besides sending migrants, Kenyan households react to shocks by transiting to less climate-sensitive occupations and by changing livestock species. These in-place adaptations shed light on the mechanisms through which common policies weaken migration in response to weather shocks. Better infrastructure eases occupational transitions, thereby reducing alternative adjustments such as migration and livestock composition. Transfers received under a randomised income support programme instead cushion consumption losses and decrease adaptation pressure, including migration. A model of joint migration, occupation, and livestock choices reveals important dynamics. Whilst transition to non-agricultural occupations initially serves as a substitute for migration, it also acts as a steppingstone for later migration increases. At the same cost, infrastructure reduces migration in the short run by more than cash transfers, whereas the reverse is true in the longer run. 

If workers are complementary in production, heterogeneity in their mobility reduces the shock absorption capacity of migration. We document that more educated workers are more mobile between European countries, and calibrate a dynamic equilibrium model in which workers differ in skill and migration preference. Migration on average offsets one fifth of the welfare loss following a negative shock in one country, with gains accruing largely to high-skilled workers. Low-skilled workers benefit marginally, and sometimes earn lower real wages than without migration. We examine other integration margins and find that the implemented ones (migration and monetary integration) primarily favor high-skilled workers.

Immigrants' assimilation as they adapt to the host country is often measured by wage growth relative to native workers. This confounds two opposing forces: an adaptation of immigrants' skills that raises their productivity, and an increasing substitutability with earlier immigrants and natives, which puts downward pressure on wages. Based on a labor demand framework, we decompose wage growth into these components, and estimate the model's structural parameters using U.S. Census data. Since cohort sizes may be endogenous to wage growth through immigration and emigration choices, we instrument migrant numbers with variation in origin country earnings and relative purchasing power. Results show that both skill growth and substitutability progress as migrants assimilate to the host country, that skill growth strongly exceeds wage growth, and that a small positive short-run effect of immigration on the average wage of natives quickly dissipates as immigrants become more substitutable to natives.