Publications

Bó, I., Shimoji, M., Kratz, J., (2024). Generalized Cumulative Offer Processes, Review of Economic Design.

Kratz, J., (2024). Conflicting Objectives in Kidney Exchange, Journal of Economic Theory 217.

Andersson, T., Kratz, J., (2020). Pairwise Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier, The Review of Economic Studies 87, 1091-1133.

Kratz, J., (2017). Overlapping multiple object assignments, Economic Theory 63, 723-753.

Andersson, T., Erlanson, A., Gudmundsson, J., Habis, H., Ingebretsen Carlson, J., Kratz, J., (2014). A method for finding the maximal set in excess demand, Economics Letters 125, 18-20. 

Work in Progress

Weak misrepresentations

        With Makoto Shimoji. 

• Abstract: This paper investigates the role of weak misrepresentations in strategy-proof college admissions mechanisms. We show that a mechanism is strategy-proof if and only if it is weak misrepresentation-invariant, i.e., a student's assignment is unaffected by adopting a weak misrepresentation strategy using the college they would have been assigned under truth-telling. To showcase the usefulness of this result, we provide an alternative proof of the strategy-proofness of Deferred Acceptance using weak misrepresentation-invariance. Experimental data suggest that weak misrepresentations are commonly observed in strategy-proof mechanisms. However, weak misrepresentations weakly improve each student's assignment under Deferred Acceptance and can thus result in Pareto-improvements. We identify Irrelevance of Less-Preferred Alternatives and Maskin monotonicity as necessary and sufficient conditions for strategy-proofness, respectively. Finally, we show that (under weak conditions) it is impossible to improve a student's assignment by reallocating seats among matched students in a strategy-proof manner.