My current project is a monograph titled The Physical Mind: Toward a Scientific Theory of Consciousness. This monograph blends together several of my published ideas and several of my article-lengthed works-in-progress (see "Research"); I add new and key ideas tying everything together. The overarching aim of the monograph is to respond to the problem of consciousness from a physicalist viewpoint and to build from this the philosophical foundations for the science of consciousness.
Further Detail
The Physical Mind has several themes. To get the general flavor, here are two.
One theme is that a philosophical problem can be substantially if not wholly artifactual. After all, philosophical problems, including the problem of consciousness, do not fall to us like manna from the sky; much like arguments they have premises, whether explicit or implicit premises, and these premises are often questionable. Moreover, these premises--and even the implied conclusion--can vary in the precise details; this can happen across viewpoints and across authors who supposedly share the same one. Such can really muddy the philosophical waters by presenting a family of problems as though there were just one problem.
Such considerations have many potential upshots. One relevant upshot advanced in the monograph is that careful examination shows that the problem of consciousness is itself problematic and avoidable even. Rather than trying to solve the problem "as is" you can politely decline the invitation to do so. Crucially, and meanwhile, you can make significant progress explaining consciousness on other, more acceptable terms--even scientifically acceptable terms once a select group of foundational philosophical assumptions are in place.
A second theme is that we not only can but also ought to separate the problem of consciousness from the mind-body problem. Perhaps the full-blown mind-body problem requires the problem of consciousness. But not vice versa: you can fruitfully work on the problem of consciousness in isolation from the mind-body problem.
These latter considerations also have many potential upshots. One is that separating the problems this way makes the problem of consciousness more tractable. A second is that doing so can also help to find the commonalities between physicalism and its competitors. Camaraderie, I find, is a rather refreshing alternative to the status quo. Partisan use of the problem is distracting and, frankly, a bit tiresome, at least if your main goal is to better understand consciousness itself.
These are merely themes. The devil is in the detail of course. I aim to explain the above views (whether my own or others'), the problems, and much more in a way that is accessible and interesting for both philosophers and a general audience. The target audience is anyone seriously interested in consciousness.
The monograph also--even in its currently incomplete state--is chock-full of substantial philosophical work: it offers a new, critically developed definiton of 'the physical' and of 'physicalism'; analysis of the problem of consciousness (that is, the problem itself) as hinted at above; a presentation of a new problem of consciousness; a critical presentation of foundational principles for the science of consciousness; plus more.