Private Providers in Labor Market Policy: How Reimbursement Schemes Shape Performance (with Lisa Laun, Johan Egebark, Magnus Rödin)
How to Design Private Provider Schemes in Labor Market Policy (with Simon Ek, Lisa Laun, Johan Egebark, Magnus Rödin)
Principles for Designing an Efficient Unemployment Insurance System (with Gabriel Nielsen, Jonas Cederlöf)
Gender Without Kids (with Camille Landais, Petter Lundborg, Tatiana Pazem, Erik Plug)
Can Monitoring Improve the Performance of Private Providers? (with Simon Ek, Johan Egebark, Magnus Rödin, Josefin Andersson)
Cockx B, Egebark J, Van Hoye G, Videnord E and Vikström J (2026), "Motivating Job Seekers. A Field Experiment", IFAU Working Paper 2026:7
Abstract: Reduced motivation among jobseekers over the unemployment spell may lead to declining job-finding rates. We report findings from a low-cost digital intervention with motivational emails aimed at enhancing and sustaining motivation and search effort among job seekers in Sweden. Using a randomized controlled trial that included 200,720 job seekers, we evaluate both carrot messages aimed at encouraging the pursuit of personal goals and intrinsic motivation and stick messages focusing on external pressure and constraints. A large share of job seekers opened the emails, and they triggered behavioral responses. Both types of messages backfired, reducing search effort and job-finding rates. The carrot messages reduced both the number of job applications and job finding, particularly among men. One likely explanation is that these messages signal to job seekers that the Public Employment Service was less controlling than initially perceived, prompting a reduction in effort. The stick messages backfired for job seekers who, at the onset of unemployment, reported that they were motivated by an inner drive rather than by constraints. These findings underscore the challenges of motivating job seekers to actively search for jobs and suggest that low-cost digital interventions, in isolation, are inadequate and may even be counterproductive.
Rambjer, L, A Uhlendorff and and J Vikström (2026), "Strictness in the Evaluation of Job Search Effort and Employment Outcomes", IFAU Mimeo
Abstract: Unemployed job seekers must comply with job-search requirements to be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. We exploit variation in strictness across caseworkers who conduct monthly reviews of these requirements to examine the effects of stricter enforcement on job finding, search intensity, and job quality. This variation arises from central office caseworkers who are randomly assigned to review job seekers’ activity reports and whose only interaction with job seekers occurs through this process. We find that stricter enforcement increases the likelihood of reported violations and benefit sanctions, leading to persistently higher job-search intensity, shorter unemployment durations, and higher employment rates. We find no evidence of negative effects on job quality. These positive employment effects are more persistent among job seekers from low-growth industries and those with weak labor market attachment.
Athey S, Simon L,, Nordström Skans O, Vikström J and Yakymovych Y (2024), "The Heterogeneous Earnings Impact of Job Loss Across Workers, Establishments, and Markets", IFAU Working paper 2024:10.
Abstract: Using generalized random forests and rich Swedish administrative data, we show that the earnings effects of job displacement due to establishment closures are highly heterogeneous. We find as much heterogeneity within as across closing establishments, and within as across worker types defined by age and schooling. We display the potential of market-based policy interventions by showing that much of the heterogeneity across establishments is shared within markets. Several results suggest that the effect heterogeneity disfavors already vulnerable workers. Thus, targeted policy interventions may be justified to a larger extent than suggested by estimated average earnings effects.
Cederlöf J, M Söderström and J Vikström (2024), "What makes a good caseworker?", Journal of European Economic Association, accepted.
Abstract: How do caseworkers affect job finding and what characterizes a productive caseworker? To answer these questions we exploit variation coming from the fact that many local employment offices in Sweden assign job seekers to caseworkers based on their date of birth. We couple this identification strategy with fine-grained administrative data on caseworkers and job seekers. Estimation of caseworker fixed effects reveals sizable variation in overall caseworker value-added. Female and more experienced caseworkers perform better than male and less experienced caseworkers, respectively. Cognitive ability is not related to caseworker performance. We find that caseworker strategies are important. Matching caseworkers to job seekers based on previous labor market experiences or gender leads to better outcomes.
Cheung M, J Egebark, A Forslund, L Laun, M Rödin and J Vikström (2024), "Does job search assistance reduce unemployment? Experimental evidence on displacement effects and mechanisms", Journal of Labor Economics, 43(1), 47--81.
Abstract: Using a two-level randomized experiment, we find that job search assistance ( JSA) reduces unemployment among the treated but also creates displacement effects. Analyses of mechanisms show that vacancy referrals from caseworkers to job seekers explain the positive effects for the treated by helping the job seekers apply to the most relevant jobs earlier. We also find that the overall assessment of JSA hinges on how the displacement effects hit the labor market and to what extent firms react by opening new vacancies. The displacement is larger in weak labor markets, and we find no displacement of resources.
Caliendo M, R Mahlstedt, G van den Berg and J Vikström (2023), "Side effects of labor market policies", Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 124(2), 339-375.
Abstract: Labor market policies, such as training and sanctions, are commonly used to bring workers back to work. By analogy to medical treatments, exposure to these tools can have side effects. We study the effects on health using individual-level population registers on labor market outcomes, drug prescriptions, and sickness absence, comparing outcomes before and after exposure to training and sanctions. Training improves cardiovascular and mental health, and lowers sickness absence. This is likely to be the result of the instantaneous features of participation, such as the adoption of a more rigorous daily routine, rather than improved employment prospects. Benefits sanctions cause a short-run deterioration of mental health.
Lombardi S., O.N. Skans and J. Vikström (2018), "Targeted wage subsidies and firm performance", Labour Economics, 53, 33-45.
Abstract: This paper studies how targeted wage subsidies affect the performance of the recruiting firms. Using Swedish administrative data from the period 1998–2008, we show that treated firms substantially outperform other re- cruiting firms after hiring through subsidies, despite identical pre-treatment performance levels and trends in a wide set of key dimensions. The pattern is less clear from 2007 onwards, after a reform removed the involvement of caseworkers from the subsidy approval process. Overall, our results suggest that targeted employment subsi- dies can have large positive effects on post-match outcomes of the hiring firms, at least if the policy environment allows for pre-screening by caseworkers.
Sjögren A. and J. Vikström (2015), "How long and how much? Learning about the design of wage subsidies from policy discontinuities", Labour Economics, 34, 127-137.
Abstract: Employment and wage subsidies are used to combat long-term unemployment, yet there is little research to guide the design of such programs. Discontinuities and changes in the design and implementation of wage subsidies under the Swedish NewStart Jobs-policy allowus to study effects of both subsidy rate and subsidy duration. We find that wage subsidies have substantial effect on job-finding rates for those eligible. The effect is stronger for larger subsidies and more than doubles as the length of the subsidy doubles. Although employment drops as subsidies expire, the probability of being employed remains higher for workers finding subsidized employment also after the expiry of the employment subsidies.
Van den Berg G.J. and J. Vikström (2014), "Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality", Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 116(2), 284-334 (SJE Best paper of 2014).
Abstract: Unemployment insurance systems include the monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the causal effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wages and occupational level. We use Swedish data and estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We also develop a theoretical job search model that monitors job offer rejection versus job search effort. The empirical results show that, after a sanction, the wage rate is lower and individuals move more often to a part-time job and a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.
Hesselius P., P Johansson and J. Vikström (2013), "Social Behaviour in Work Absence", Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115(4), 995-1019.
Abstract: By making use of a large-scale randomized experiment, we test whether social behaviour is important for work absence due to illness. The individuals treated in the experiment were exposed to less monitoring of their eligibility to collect sickness insurance benefits, which sharply increased their non-monitored work absence. This exogenous variation is exploited in two complementary analyses. In both analyses, we find significant social-behaviour effects. Using detailed data, we conclude that the social-behaviour effects most likely stem from fairness concerns.
Vikström J., M. Rosholm and M. Svarer (2013), "The effectiveness of active labor market policies: Evidence from a social experiment using non-parametric bounds", Labour Economics, 24, 58-67
Abstract: We re-analyze the effects of a Danish active labor market programme social experiment, which included a range of sub-treatments, including meetings with caseworkers, job search assistance courses, and activation programmes.Weuse newly developed non-parametric methods to examine howthe effects of the experimental treatment vary during the unemployment spell. Non-parametric techniques are important from a methodological point of view, since parametric/distributional assumptions are in conflict with the concept of experimental evidence. We find that the effects of the experiment vary substantially during the unemployment spell.
Forslund A, P Fredriksson and J Vikström (2011), "What active labor market policy works best in a recession?", Nordic Economic Policy Review, 2011(1), 171-202.
Abstract: This paper discusses the case for expanding active labor market policy in recession. We find that there is reasonable case for relying more heavily on certain kinds of programs. The argument is tied to the varying size of the lock-in effect in boom and recession. If programs with relatively large lock-in effects should ever be used, they should be used in a downturn. The reason is simply that the cost of forgoing search time is lower in recession. We also provide new evidence on the relative effectiveness of different kinds of programs over the business cycle. In particular we compare an on-the-job training scheme with (traditional) labor market training. We find that labor market training is relatively more effective in recession. This result is consistent with our priors since labor market training features relative large lock-in effects.