Welcome to my webpage!

I am an Assistant Professor of Finance at University of Missouri, Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business.

I graduated from Purdue University, Krannert School of Management with a PhD in Finance.

I conduct empirical research on corporate finance and financial intermediation.

Here is my CV.

Working papers:

• The Rise of Nonbanks and the Quality of Post-Origination Mortgage Servicing (with Ahmet Degerli)

We show that as nonbanks' market share increases in a local residential mortgage market, the quality of mortgage services in the market improves. 

Selected presentations: AFA (2024), FDIC Annual Bank Research Conference (2023)

• The Role of Growth Strategies in Acquisitions (with Yang Bai, Fred Bereskin, and Micah Officer)

We find that firms with similar growth strategies, proxied by skill demand disclosed in job postings, are more likely to merge.

• The Implications of Concurrent Underwriting and Lending for Bond Underpricing (with Stanislava Nikolova)

We show that concurrently lending to a firm while also underwriting its corporate bond offerings increases the firm's bond underpricing.

Selected presentations: MFA (2025), MARC (2025)

• Monetary Policy Exposure of Banks and Loan Contracting (with Ahmet Degerli)

We show that banks with greater monetary policy exposure—banks whose lending capacity shrinks more as the federal funds rate increases—include stricter covenants in loan contracts.

Publication:

1. Debt Covenant Renegotiations and Creditor Control Rights (with David J. Denis), 2014, Journal of Financial Economics, 113(3), pp.348-367

Abstract: Using a large sample of private debt renegotiations from 1996 to 2011, we report that, even in the absence of any covenant violation, debt covenants are frequently renegotiated. These renegotiations primarily relax existing restrictions and result in economically large changes in existing limits. Renegotiations of specific covenants are a response to both the distance the covenant variable is from its contractual limit and the firm׳s specific operating conditions and prospects. Moreover, the borrower׳s post-renegotiation investment and financial policies are strongly associated with the covenant changes resulting from the renegotiation. Overall, the findings imply that, even outside of default states, creditors have strong control rights over the borrower׳s operating and financial policies, and they exercise these rights in a state contingent manner through covenant renegotiations.

2. Debt Covenant Design and Creditor Control Rights: Evidence from the Tightest Covenant, 2017, Journal of Corporate Finance, 44, pp.331-352. 

Abstract: Within the same debt contract, some financial covenants are considerably more restrictive than others. I exploit this heterogeneity in covenant design and show that the design of the most restrictive covenant is systematically associated with covenant outcomes - compliance, violations, or renegotiations. Consistent with an alleviation of moral hazard problems, tighter capital expenditure restrictions (performance covenants) are more likely to facilitate ex post creditor control through covenant renegotiations (violations). By contrast, borrowers are more likely to comply with contracts with tighter capital covenants, suggesting that these covenants more effectively align shareholder-creditor interests ex ante to avoid adverse selection problems.

3. Bank Integration and the Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from Cross-State Acquisitions (with Kose John and Qianru Qi), 2020, Management Science, 66(7), pp.2801-3294.

Abstract: Using the staggered and reciprocal passage of interstate bank deregulation as an exogenous variation in the degree of bank integration, we investigate how and why bank integration influences the market for corporate control for nonfinancial firms. We posit that bank integration affects acquisitions either through reducing the information asymmetry between acquirers and targets or through increasing credit supply. Our evidence is more consistent with the former channel. Specifically, we document that (1) cross-state acquisitions are more likely to occur between reciprocally deregulated states, and (2) firms are more likely taken over by out-of-state acquirers after deregulation; this effect is stronger for a target who borrows from an out-of-state bank, whose local bank is acquired by an out-of-state bank, and who is informationally more opaque. Announcement returns for acquirers of out-of-state (particularly private) targets increase after deregulation, consistent with better identification of higher-valued targets by acquirers after deregulation.

4. Debt Structure Instability Using Machine Learning (with Qianru Qi), Journal of Financial Stability, 57(2021).

Abstract: Applying a machine-learning algorithm to a large sample of U.S. public firms, we document that more than 30% of the firms substantially alter debt structures in a year, even when leverage ratio is stable, when short-term debt is trivial, and when little cash outlay is required for operations. The instability of debt structure reveals new costs of financial constraints: compared to high-credit-quality firms, low-credit-quality firms have to change debt structure more frequently to accommodate their financing needs, even with increased borrowing costs; low-credit-quality firms lack the opportunity available to high-credit-quality firms to reduce borrowing costs through switching debt instruments.

5. When Shareholders Cross-Hold Lenders’ Equity: The Effects on the Costs of Bank Loans  (with Liying Wang), Journal of Banking and Finance, 163(2024).

Abstract: We show that syndicated loan spreads are lower as borrowers’ shareholders cross-hold more lenders’ equity. Apart from controlling for borrower and lender fixed effects and various other ownership measures, we address endogeneity concerns by conducting a difference-in-differences analysis exploiting the mergers of institutional investors. Additional tests on cross-holding shareholders’ holding period, the impact of active cross-holders, subsamples of borrowers subject to different degrees of shareholder–creditor conflicts, changes in borrower risk around loan initiation, and the number of financial covenants provide support for the hypothesis that borrower shareholders’ equity holdings of lenders reduce agency costs of debt. 

6. Social Connections and Bank Deposit Funding (with Sean J. Flynn Jr.), Journal of Banking and Finance, (2025).

Abstract: We show that household social connections transmit shocks that influence bank deposits. We find that counties experience an increase in bank deposits when they are more socially connected to counties affected by natural disasters. This effect is not driven by physical proximity, large disasters that attract significant media coverage, or other cross-county channels, including multimarket bank branch networks, population migration, or economic connections. Banks that collect deposits in highly socially-connected counties experience high deposit volatility, but geographic diversification reduces the volatility associated with depositor social connectedness.