I am lecturer at the Department of Economics at Ohio State University and research fellow at Research Center SHARQ, Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
My interests are industrial organization, development economics, and agricultural economics.
At OSU, I teach Intermediate Microeconomics.
"Screening through Red tape and Determinants of Bribes," working paper; Stata code (Data available upon request)
Abstract: I use the standard screening model to study the relationship between bribes and red tape. I argue that bribe-taking bureaucrats extract bribes by exploiting differences in firms' marginal costs of red tape and offer a menu of bribes and paperwork processing times, where a larger bribe is associated with a shorter paperwork processing time and a smaller bribe is associated with a longer paperwork processing time.
The estimation of the screening model suggests that the marginal cost of red tape for negative-profit firms is US$ 14 per day and the marginal cost of red tape for positive-profit firms varies between US$ 52 and US$ 324. The predictions of the screening model hold only for firms whose managers or owners have no friends or relatives among the bureaucracy.
Technical Report on Shadow Economy in Tajikistan in 2015; [PDF]
"Hold-up and Negotiation Timing," working paper; [PDF]
“Multidimensional Quality Sorting Between Online and Offline Auctions: The Role of Attribute Transparency” (with Brian Roe), International Journal of Industrial Organization (2017), 53: 145–169; [PDF]
“Pigs in Cyberspace: A Natural Experiment Testing Differences between Online and Offline Club-Pig Auctions” (with Brian Roe and Tim Wyszynski), American Journal of Agricultural Economics (2011), 93 (5): 1278-1291;