Academic Articles
Journal Articles:
24. Cabrales, A., Z. Gürgüç, M. Drouvelis and I. Ray (2025), “Communicating in a coordination game with private information,”
Economic Theory, Forthcoming.
23. Forges, F., and I. Ray (2024), “"Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies": Back to the roots,”
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 114, 103044.
22. Gonçalves, R. and I. Ray (2024), “Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction,”
Review of Economic Design, 28(1), 125-150.
21. Ganguly, C. and I. Ray (2023), “Information-revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information,”
International Journal of Game Theory, 52(4), 957-992.
20. Ganguly, C. and I. Ray (2023), “Simple mediation in a cheap-talk game,”
Games, 14, 47.
19. Dokka, T., H. Moulin, I. Ray and S. Sen Gupta (2023), “Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game,”
Review of Economic Design, 27(2), 419-438.
18. Georgalos, K., I. Ray and S. Sen Gupta (2020), “Nash versus coarse correlation,”
Experimental Economics, 23(4), 1178-1204.
17. Gonçalves, R. and I. Ray (2017), “A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels,”
Economics Letters, 159, 177-179.
16. Moulin, H., I. Ray and S. Sen Gupta (2014), “Improving Nash by coarse correlation,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 150, 852-865.
15. Ray, I. and S. Snyder (2013), “Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games,”
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 49(6), 471-477.
14. Ray, I. and S. Sen Gupta (2013), “Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games,”
International Journal of Game Theory, 42(2), 541-562.
13. Kar, A., I. Ray and R. Serrano (2010), “A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 69(1), 189-193.
12. Ray, I. (2008) “Multiplicity of equilibrium in canonical and non-canonical correlation devices: an example,”
Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, 7(1-2), 74-84.
11. Polemarchakis, H. and I. Ray (2006), “Sunspots, correlation and competition,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 56(1), 174-184.
10. Carvajal, A., I. Ray and S. Snyder (2004), “Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification,”
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 40(1-2), 1-40.
9. Ray, I. and S. Snyder (2003), “On rationalization of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior from observed outcomes,”
Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, 2(1-2), 62-78.
8. Ray, I. (2001), “On games with identical equilibrium payoffs,”
Economic Theory, 17(1), 223-231.
7. Ray, I. (2001), “Buying and selling in strategic market games,”
Economics Letters, 71(1), 49-53.
6. Ray, I. and L. Zhou (2001), “Game theory via revealed preferences,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 37(2), 415-424.
5. Ray, I. (2000), “Consistency, dummy and independence of irrelevant strategies for strategic games,”
Social Choice and Welfare, 17(2), 217‑222.
4. De Fraja, G. and I. Ray (1999), “Slot allocation: competition between firms when consumers are procedurally rational,”
Mathematical Social Sciences, 38(1), 71-81.
3. Ray, I. (1998), “Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior,”
Review of Economic Design, 3(3), 257-269.
2. Ray, I. (1996), “Efficiency in correlated equilibrium,”
Mathematical Social Sciences, 32(3), 157-178.
1. Ray, I. (1996), “Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: a definition.”
Games and Economic Behavior, 17(1), 56-79.
Book Chapters:
1. Ganguly, C. and I. Ray (2010), “Cheap talk: basic models and new developments,”
In Dhar, A. (ed.),
Some Contemporary Issues on Development and Growth Economics, 383-416, Allied Publishers (India).
2. Ray, I. (2010), “Game theory,”
In Free, R. C. (ed.),
21st Century Economics: A Reference Handbook, 173-184, Sage Publications.
3. Ganguly, C. and I. Ray (2009), “Unmediated and mediated communication equilibria of battle of the sexes with incomplete information.”
In Basu, B, B. K. Chakrabarti, S. R. Chakravarty and K. Gangopadhyay (eds.),
Econophysics & Economics of Games, Social Choices and Quantitative Techniques, 347-361, Springer.
4. Ray, I. (2007), “Subgame perfection.”
In Darity, W. A. Jr. (ed.),
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd Edition, 193-194, Macmillan Reference USA.
5. Ray, I. (2005), “Game theory and the environment: old models and new solution concepts.”
In Sahu, N. C., and A. K. Choudhury (eds.),
Dimensions of Environmental and Ecological Economics, 156-167, Universities Press (India), Hyderabad.
Book Reviews:
1. Ganguly, C. and I. Ray (2005), “Regulation and Development by Jean-Jacques Laffont and Scarcity, Conflicts, and Cooperation: Essays in the Political and Institutional Economics of Development by Pranab Bardhan,”
Economic Journal, 115(507), F415-F418.
2. Ray, I. (2004), “Strategic Multilateral Exchange: General Equilibrium with Imperfect Competition by J. J. Gabszewicz,”
Economic Journal, 114(496), F336-F338.
3. Ray, I. (2002), “Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory by M. Slikker and A. van den Nouweland,”
Economic Journal, 112(480), F388-F390.